1996

Sainthood and Psychoanalysis: Tirso's Santa Juana

Matthew D. Stroud
Trinity University, mstroud@trinity.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/mll_faculty

Part of the Modern Languages Commons

Repository Citation
In his seminar of February 20, 1973, entitled "God and the Jouissance of Woman," Lacan provocatively implies a connection between feminine sexuality and sainthood, using as examples two Spanish mystics, San Juan de la Cruz and Santa Teresa de Ávila. He does not here discuss sainthood per se, but rather mysticism, with its emphasis on unity of the soul with God, noting that mystics are most often women or "highly gifted people like Saint John of the Cross," that is, men who have enrolled themselves on the feminine side of sexuality, in the "not-all" (Lacan 1982, 146-47). In the next seminar, "A Love Letter," Lacan notes the specific connection between the love of the soul and hysteria. Considering the fact that Golden Age literature prefigures so remarkably many of the basic contentions of Lacanian thought, it is not surprising that Tirso de Molina's trilogy of the life of Sor Juana de la Cruz, Santa Juana, should provide a useful example for the study of these connections among hysteria, sexuality, and religious experience as literary manifestations.

At the outset, however, two preliminary principles need to be stated about the connections between psychoanalysis and either literature or religion. First, it is not the purpose here, nor should it be the purpose anywhere, to "psychoanalyze" a literary character. Such an endeavor is, quite simply, impossible; the basis of psychoanalysis is the talking subject, and while characters do "speak," they do not speak as real people do. They make no unforeseen slips of the tongue in the way living subjects do; their unintended utterances are consciously written into the text by the au-
They certainly will not answer our questions, nor can we delve into their family histories to discover the truths of their desires. That does not mean, however, that psychoanalytic literary criticism is fraudulent. Both disciplines ultimately study the human condition. Literary characters and the situations they get into are representations of psychoanalytic truths, that is, the workings of desire, its effects, and attempts to mediate it both within the subject and in its relations to others.

Second, and more harsh, is the requirement of a kind of scientific detachment or skepticism when dealing with matters of religion. If one really supposes that Juana spoke directly to Christ, appeared and disappeared at will, and was able to fly, then these comments here will be irrelevant at best and blasphemous at worst. These manifestations should be considered metaphorical representations of mental disturbances familiar in psychoanalytic case studies: hearing voices, having visions, believing one has supernatural powers, and the like, and in that sense they are a useful object of study. At the same time, in no way should one dismiss religion, especially in its usefulness to and effects on the subject. God can be defined in many ways which are most pertinent to Lacanian psychoanalysis: the unnamable, the Other, the real, the Name-of-the-Father, the all, the not-all. Lacan himself specifically included discussions of religious experience as pertinent to the psychoanalytic clinic, but, of course, only in their relationship to the speaking subject (Lacan 1976, 103).

Tirso’s Santa Juana is, in one sense, a typical hagiographical play that depicts the miraculous events associated with the life of a saint. At least one facet of Tirso’s genius is revealed by the way in which he placed the amazing actions of the life of the saint in the context of such familiar comedia plot elements as the efforts of a father to marry his daughter honorably, the rivalry among several suitors for various young women, and crises caused by honor and love. In Lacanian terms, these plot elements reflect the workings of the imaginary and symbolic registers. The imaginary register is the result of the “mirror stage” in which the subject learns that at its center is a lack, an in-
ability ever to absorb or unite with the others that are the objects of desire.\footnote{Lacan's discussion of the mirror stage is one of his earliest contributions, and it appears as the first selection in *Ecrits: A Selection* (1977, 1-7). It is taken up again and again throughout the seminars, especially in its relation to imaginary. Lacan’s writings about the imaginary, as with his writings about almost everything, were never published in one place or laid out in a systematic fashion. For general introductory discussions of the imaginary, see Lee 1990, 17-30 and Ragland-Sullivan 1986, 130-59.} As such, the imaginary is the locus of the ego in its relationship to the other and is marked by an image of the self as whole and unified, leading to manifestations of defensiveness, rivalry, and self-protection on the one hand, and, paradoxically, since the totalized subject is in fact only imaginary, love on the other. One of the central imaginary fantasies is that one can fill in the gap at the core of one’s being as subject by relating to another person. The mechanisms by which one person is attracted to another are called lures.

The symbolic is the result of the infant’s passage through the Oedipus phase and the concomitant acquisition of language. For Lacan, there are no more important events in the establishment of the human subject than the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father, a metaphor not only for the subject’s entry into language but also for the law, culture, and civilization.\footnote{For more on the Name-of-the-Father, see Lee 1990, 64-67. Regnault deals with the Name-of-the-Father in a religious context (1985, 61-62; 91; 95; 100).} Language resides in the Other, the symbolic Other, the capital Other that is at once both the cause of the subject’s desire and its unattainable object. This symbolic register serves primarily to mediate desire through the promise of law and order: if one follows the rules, one will be given a life in language that will compensate, or at least cover up, the essential and unfillable lack that structures all speaking subjects.\footnote{As with the imaginary, there is no one treatise on the symbolic. See Ragland-Sullivan 1986, 130-37, 145-83.} The symbolic in no way replaces the imaginary; both are
always in play as people respond to a lure and fall in love, or swear revenge against an adversary, only to have these desires mediated in the symbolic by marriage in the case of love, or justice in a court of law in the case of revenge. Two important considerations regarding the workings of the symbolic are, first, the fact that when one makes choices, as in the decision to submit to the law, one loses something, the subject fades.⁴ Second, the symbolic promise, just as the imaginary fantasy, is doomed to failure in its attempt to cover over the lack at the center of the subject.

At the beginning of the trilogy, Juana is closely bound to these imaginary and symbolic plot elements. Juana’s father, Juan, wants his daughter to marry a nobleman, Francisco Loarte, for whom she is the object of desire. Once he sees her, he falls hopelessly in love with her. For Loarte, love is an impossible imperative. Love is desire (PII: III, viii, 860a), which is at once pleasurable (PI: II, xi, 798b) and, because it recalls the absence that creates the desire, also untenable, or, in the terminology of the plays, poison (PI: I, iii, 778a), blindness (PI: II, vi, 793b), and death (PI: I, ix, 782a; PI: II, xv, 801b). When Toribio says that love can attain the impossible (PI: I, i, 774a), he is clearly speaking from the point of view of the imaginary, of which the two Don Juan figures, Jorge in Part II and Luis in Part III, are sterling examples. Jorge will never be satisfied with one woman (PII: I, iv, 829b); indeed, no single other person can ever completely satisfy a subject because there is no such thing as a complete subject. What makes these two particularly interesting as representatives of the

---

⁴ Aphanisis, or the fading of the subject, is always a characteristic of the speaking subject; as soon as the subject “appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading,’ as disappearance” (Lacan 1978, 218; 221; Durand 1983, 863-64). The fading of the subject is related both to castration and (again) the basis of the symbolic in language. “All that is language is lent from this otherness and this is why the subject is always a fading thing that runs under the chain of signifiers. For the definition of a signifier is that it represents a subject not for another subject but for another signifier” (Lacan 1972, 194; Lee 1990, 146-54).
imaginary is that neither Jorge nor Luis has any interest in mediating his desires. Jorge says that one tries in vain to rein in his will (PII: I, iv, 829a-b), and that the expectation and desire are better than the possession, referring to the imaginary lure and promise of fulfillment, which no possession ever really brings (PII: II, xii, 852b). Luis tells his father that he has no wish to mend his ways (PIII: I, ii, 868a). At the same time that they make no commitment to the women they seduce, they still are extremely jealous should the women see other men (PII: III, viii, 860b; PI: I, i, 867b). Even more, the scene in which Inés, thinking that Luis is César, allows him to enter her house and have sex with her (PIII: II, xiii, 893a), is a typical scene of méconnaissance, of misrecognition so common to the imaginary in its misunderstanding of where desire comes from (Lacan 1988, 116, 167-68). And he does it, in good Don Juan fashion, with the promise of marriage, the promise, doomed to failure, of some kind of restoration of wholeness through the symbolic.

Loarte does what honorable people usually do in the comedia, he asks her father for her hand in marriage. It is when the fathers of these characters try to impose their wills on the desires of their children that one begins to notice some important differences between the plots of these plays and those of comedias de enredo. Juana's father, Juan, is unable to get her to submit, despite his pleadings and arguments and those of his brother (PI: II, i, 788a-89b). Likewise, Diego, Luis's father, and Mateo, Melchor's father, also fail to impose the law on their rebellious sons. Submission to the Name-of-the-Father is absolutely essential for a functioning subject, and, toward the end of the trilogy, there is a strong, explicit moral to the effect that a father must punish a disobedient son (PIII: III, xiii, 903b), that it is dangerous for fathers to love their sons so much that they fail to impress the law upon them (PIII: III, xiv, 904a).

That the fathers of these characters are not successful in dealing with their children's desires does not mean, however, that they somehow inhabit a world without symbolic mediation. Juana is by no means immune from the effects of the law. She is known for her obedience; her greatest joy
appears to lie in obeying the law. Yet, she is unimpressed with Juan’s plans for her life. She is religious, and, as such, follows the law of God, not the law of her father, who admits, “Es su inclinación divina” (PI: I, xii, 784a). By focusing on the shift from one father to another, Tirso is able to contrast the workings of the secular comedias with those of the comedia de santos in the same play with a simple shift from the biological or other secular, symbolic father to God.

When Juana states that her father cannot marry her to a man when God wants her for His own spouse (PI: II, i, 789b), we have a substitution of fathers: God’s law is higher than Juan’s and she will follow that instead. This submission is not, actually, quite so different from obedience to one’s biological father; one must still suppress one’s own desires, give up something of one’s individuality, in exchange for the symbolic promise. The nuns in the convent are very much subject to the symbolic hierarchy of the Church, as we see in the first Abbess’s preoccupation with her relationship with the Provincial Father (PI: III, vii, 812b-13a). They are not, however, exempt from the imaginary register. Perhaps the most striking example of imaginary rivalry within the context of the religious plot is the envy of Juana’s success by the vicaria (later to become an abbess), who even enters into an agreement with Jorge to discredit Juana by accusing her of witchcraft.5

Who is the God to whom Juana is married? On the one

5 See PI: III, vii-viii, 813a-b; PI: III, xiii-xiv, 817a-b; PI: III, xviii, 821a; PI: II, ii, 844b, as well as the demonic possession of the little girl, PI: III, ix-x, 814a-16a. The question of the difference between divinely inspired miracles and witchcraft is both puzzling and interesting, especially in a literary context. How can one know the difference? One possible explanation in psychoanalytic terms is that witchcraft is the sign of the obsessive neurotic (the attempt to gain more power), while sainthood is hysteric (the attempt to lose power and rejoice in the symptom). Another possibility is that sainthood is hysteric and possession is psychotic: in possession there is an enigma in the symbolic that the possessed cannot process, as is evidenced in the symptom of speaking in languages the person does not know. This problem clearly deserves more study.
hand, there is God the creator, God the lawgiver, God the severe, but forgiving judge mentioned so often as an incentive to characters to change their ways (P. I, 827b; P. II, x, 851b; P. III, x, 861b; P. III, xv, 879a). Even Jorge and Luis submit to the law of this father (P. III, xxi, 907b-8a). This Christian God-as-Father should not, however, be mistaken for the philosopher’s God. François Regnault, in *Dieu est inconscient* (1985, 32-47), meditates on the difference between God as perfection and God as Lord, a difference noted by Newton in his *Principia*. God as all is perfect and infinite; He is the God of philosophy, of science; He governs the universe. The subject can have no relationship with such a God because there is no point of intersubjective contact; He is not a speaking subject. The other God, the God of the Israelites, the Catholic God, “my God,” can indeed maintain a more symmetrical relationship with the subject precisely because He too is constituted by a lack; He is a speaking subject (Regnault 1985, 36-43). This God, the God I worship, is the one who takes a personal interest in the day-to-day activities of his creatures. And He does this because he is not-all.

Lacan’s matheme for the not-all appears as the heading of “A Love Letter” (Lacan 1982, 149). Like almost all of his mathemes, it is rather opaque, and it underlines paradoxes with respect to both all and not-all:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\exists x. \Phi x & \exists x. \Phi x \\
\forall x. \Phi x & \forall x. \Phi x \\
\emptyset & \mathbb{S} (\emptyset) \\
\Phi & \text{The}
\end{array}
\]
The left side of the paradigm can be read: For all subjects or x, the function (Φ rules x. At the same time, there exists an x that is not subject to or that negates the function Φ. This is the formula for all, but it has the second part because there is no such thing as truly all. The subject is dependent upon the Other (O), the Other itself is not all (Ø), and there is no Other of the Other (Lacan 1982, 33). Perhaps a different way of saying the same thing is that all is all, including its failings. The right hand side can be read such that there is no x that is engaged in the function Φ; (yet, at the same time, there exists no x that totally escapes or negates the function Φ. Again, in other words, just as there is no all without its possibility for failure, there is nothing that does not allow for the possibility of the function Φ. These two sides are logically identical except for the inverted order of the assertions, or, to put it metaphorically, sexuality, divided symbolically between the masculine and feminine, functions the same way for all individuals. Neither all nor nothing is absolute.

With respect to God, the paradox can be stated as follows: even though God is the omnipotent Creator, God can also be the Other as not-all, the God who himself is lacking, a fact that allows God the possibility of jouissance. If God were all, a mystical relationship (or any other kind, for that matter), would be quite impossible. Instead, we have a God who, if He were a person, would enter into intersubjective relationships with other divided subjects in both the imaginary and the symbolic. That God is not-all in Santa Juana is clear by the discussion of Protestant rebellion and colonial proselytizing. Juana promises to help Emperor Charles V in his wars and conquests, obviously showing that this God is not the God of everybody but the God of only a few (PI: III, xx, 822b). Only Catholics practice the real faith (PII: I, i, 825a-28a). A second manifestation

---

6 It is quite interesting that, in discussing the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism, she exclaims, "Viva la ley de Cristo soberana!" (PII: I, i, 827a), when the main difference between Protestants and the Catholics was over Church hierarchy and secular functioning, which Juana herself avoids by her di-
of God's lack is the presence of the devil, evoked in the play as an alternative source of Juana's supernatural powers. If God really were infinite, there would be no place for the devil. Perhaps more important is the division of God into three personages in the play: God, who never appears on stage, but who is referred to both as the creator of the world but not part of the world, as we have seen (PI: III, xx, 822a-b; see Regnault 1985, 46); Jesus, who died on the cross for sins that were not His own; and the Christ child, who maintains a definite, explicit relationship with his mother, the Virgin Mary. Religion has taught us to invoke the name of God the judge, the very locus of the Name-of-the-Father, the origin of castration, the dead father, the absent father (Regnault 1985, 46-47, 61-62). But it is God as the suffering, pathetic Jesus Christ and God as child who are considered by Juana to be her husband. They are not-all, found at the place of the Other; they are the ones who establish a relationship with Juana (Regnault 1985, 46-47, 62). Indeed, the very fact of the division of God into parts is an indication of His incompletion. Regnault goes into great elaboration of the trinity from unity (the *Filioque* argument, 1985, 68-91). But, of course, the fact that God has three manifestations in the play shows that the God of all is in fact not-all, even if He pretends to be.

The paradigm of the not-all, clearly applicable to God, was introduced by Lacan in his treatment of feminine sexuality in which he elaborates his idea that women, as a category not necessarily defined by biological sex, are not entirely inscribed within the law (the function Φ in the paradigm, the phallic function). While man's *jouissance* is focused on the imaginary fantasy of possessing woman, woman "has many ways of taking on the phallus and keeping it for herself because of supplementary *jouissance* -it is in some ways liberating" (Lacan 1982, 145). That woman is not-all does not imply that she is inferior to man; "not-all" here does not mean "deficient." Rather, woman is not-all in the sense that she is not susceptible to the imaginary totalization under the phallic signifier (the law) as is man. Be-
cause she really partakes of both sides of the paradigm (since, as a speaking being who is not psychotic, she is also subject to the phallic signifier), her sexuality is much less rigid, more fluid. Characteristic of the not-all quality of feminine sexuality is its nature as masquerade. To give a common theatrical example, in the middle of Part I, Act II, Juana appears dressed as a man, which visually captions the fluidity of sexuality, especially feminine sexuality under the sign of masquerade, as well as foreshadowing the hysteric's question, "Am I a man or a woman?" Even more, when Loarte goes to embrace her, she disappears completely from his sight (PI: I, xiii, 800a). A further textual example of the not-all of feminine sexuality is Gil's assertion, made to explain the fact that demons have possessed his daughter: "¿No tien hartos agujeros / una mujer?" (PI: III, v, 811a).

Woman's jouissance is much more directly connected to the jouissance of the Other; in religious terms, it is an intersubjective relation between souls, which led Lacan to refer to women as âme amoureusesâelles âment l'âme, they "soul" for the soul (Lacan 1982, 156). Another word for this Other is, of course, God, an ex-static god who experiences pleasure and pain, a god who "comes" (Lacan 1982, 146). Most hysterics are women, and Lacan provides here the link between hysteria and feminine sexuality. Because of the more direct link between the subject and the Other (whose very existence is the marker of the lack in the subject), the hysterical subverts or bypasses the usual imaginary and symbolic constructs that one creates to hide the lack; rather, she rejoices in the suffering that experiencing the lack engenders. The not-all becomes the source of the pleasurable pain, the symptom that she loves more than her "self" (Ragland-Sullivan 1989, 213; Millot 1985, 227).

All of this brings us back to Lacan's assertion with

---

7 Of course, sexuality is a symbolic construct, not a biological destiny, and one may enroll oneself in either category as man or woman. As Crespo points out (PI: I, i, 775a), "Amor es hermafrodita," referring to the illusory nature of the sexual differences.
which we began, that there is a connection between reli-
gion, in particular mysticism, and feminine sexuality. Reg-
nault, again in Dieu est inconscient, states unequivocally
that religion is closely bound to hysteria.\(^8\) In the Christian
ceremony, the flock faithful are compelled to identify with
the suffering, imaginary father through a metaphorical
substitution of Jesus Christ for their own fathers. They al-
low themselves, at least for the duration of the ceremony,
to become hystericized, to enjoy the symptoms of pain and
self-denial.\(^9\) For Ragland-Sullivan, the symptom is not
only the bodily manifestation of desire as lack in the real,
something linked to real jouissance, to alienation and
death, but also something that the subject can believe in
(1989, 213, 216, 222-23). The suffering and symptoms, and
even death, for a Christian are not bad. They are not to be
considered burdens but a sign of glory, just as Christ says
that His crown of thorns is his crown of glory (PII: I, x,
834a). In the context of the play, not only is Juana hysteric,
but all those whom Juana helps, Mari Pascual (PII: II, iii,
845b-46b; PII: II, x, 851a; PII: II, xiii-xiv, 853a-54b), Ana
Manrique (PIII: II, iv, 887a-b), Jorge (PIII: II, v-vi, 887b-
88a), Luis (PIII: III, xvii-xviii, 905b-7a), and the rest, are in
effect hystericized in salvation. They all learn to love suf-
ferring and desire death. Indeed, by the very concept of orig-
inal sin, all are always already guilty and must suffer
unimaginably.

The love that one experiences in hysteria is not that
which is easily mediated by the symbolic. Indeed, it goes
far beyond the love object, as the other, to the great Other,

---

\(^8\) There is also an obsessional neurotic component; everything
that holds for obsessional neurosis also holds for religion. See
Regnault 1985, 49, 53.

\(^9\) Compare Ragland-Sullivan’s description of the hysteric as “one
who preserves the power of the dead father (the fantasy of an
ideal father) over and above the conscious admission that a den-
igrated imaginary father may have been impotent, minimal, mean,
or simply ineffectual” (1989, 226; 231). In the Christian
scenario, with its multiple manifestations of God, the hysteric
can at the same time identify with the suffering, denigrated father
(Christ) and preserve the power of the ideal father (God).
the source of desire. In hysteria one suffers precisely to assure the predominance of the Other, to become the Other's object of desire, to become effectively a slave for an insatiable, powerful Other (Ragland-Sullivan 1989, 214-15), descriptions that are clearly related to the Christian doctrines regarding humility (Di Ciaccia 1989). Hysteria implies a *plus-de-jouir*, which is at once an excess and a cessation of pleasure. The hysteric experiences *jouissance* through suffering. Of course, all *jouissance* is partly suffering, but the hysteric seeks out the painful aspects of it rather than hiding them under both imaginary and symbolic structures. Just like the mystic, she effaces herself and fades before the Other, which, not-all itself, provides the desired suffering (Ragland-Sullivan 1989, 234). But it is not only the Other as the locus of the symbolic to which the hysteric appeals; it is the Other as not-all, to the real lack that inhabits it. Just as we have conceptions of God as all and perfect, or as not-all and capable of an intersubjective relationship, so too do we have an ambivalence in God because He is at once the incarnation of the symbolic and not-all in its promise of totalizing harmony. Indeed, this God represents the failure of the symbolic, the fact that there is a real gap hollowed out at the core of the Other. Juana points to this failure when she equates marriage with the cross and death (PI: II, i, 789a-b). For her, the value of the symbolic (marriage) lies not in its capacity to solve all problems but precisely in the suffering caused by its inability to compensate completely. As a hysteric, she accepts the burden, but not to mediate desire. Instead, she rejoices in the suffering of Jesus Christ (PI: II, xvi, 801b), the incarnation of God who kept his symbolic promise, but only with His own death. The symbolic Other at once constitutes the law and the mediation of desire, but, because it is not-all, also gives rise to the possibility of suffering, of the hysteric’s

10 Regnault (1985, 97, 101) notes that, while one face of the Other, of God, is supported by feminine *jouissance*, the other face would be that of phallic *jouissance*. On the one side there is Mary-Diana: the sexual drive; on the other there is Yahweh-Adonai: the death drive.
symptom. Taken to its extreme, suffering leads to death. The Christian subject, and especially the saint, must die in order to experience total *jouissance* in the union with God.

There is no doubt that Juana identifies with Jesus and his suffering, and that she even takes on punishment for sins of which she is not guilty herself (as her Guardian angel tells her), just as Christ did. But the suffering is itself the source of her *jouissance*. For Juana, her development into a saint follows a trajectory from the secular to the religious to the mystic. In the very first scene of Part I, Juana appears as godmother at a wedding (PI: I, i, 771b). As such, she is the representative of the symbolic, of the Other, in this celebration of the mediation of desire. By act II, she is taking up the religious life of a nun, effectively replacing her father Juan by God, the symbolic father: “Padre: a Dios por padre tengo; / tío: Dios sólo es mi tío; / Dios es mi esposo y mi dueño” (PI: II, xviii, 803b; PI: II, vii, 794a). By the time she has fully developed as a saint, she has renounced her biological family, and given up on her own family novel through her identification with the pain of Jesus Christ. She is beyond them now and her *jouissance* is not susceptible to their pleas.

Starting with her initial supernatural experience, in which the habit of a Franciscan nun descends to her from heaven, Juana’s discourse is concerned almost exclusively with pain and pleasure. Juana accepts all of her tribulations with unsuppressed delight. Indeed, if such a thing is possible, Juana becomes famous for her humility (PI: III, i, 807a; PI: III, ii, 809a). When ordered to maintain silence for

---

11 Her Guardian Angel tells her that she has never committed a mortal sin, and that she is a “monja vieja en la inocencia” (PI: I, ix, 833b). There are numerous examples of her profession of worthlessness and willingness to assume guilt: PI: III, vi, 812a; PI: III, vi, 812b; PI: III, xvii, 820a; PI: I, i, 826a; PI: II, iii, 846b; PI: II, iv, 847a; PI: II, v, 848b-49b; PI: II, vii, 850a; PI: III, i, 855a; PI: III, ii, 857b; PI: III, i, 877b. There is, on some level, quite a bit of ego about being humiliated. She is well-known for, and proud of, the humiliation that she is willing to suffer. This, perhaps, is the religious imaginary, the ego of the humiliated, the pride of the masochist.
one year, she remains silent for two (PI: II, xxiv, 806b);\textsuperscript{12} she actively seeks out flagellation (PI: III, iii, 809b) and incarceration (PII: II, v, 849a), all in the name of cleansing her of her nonexistent sins. Ironically, the vicaria’s envy of her, based as it is in her own imaginary rivalries, feeds Juana’s hysterical desire for suffering. Juana lauds her prudent dispensation of punishment, underscoring again the difference between the character of the ordinary religious woman and that of the mystic saint. The vicaria, who becomes abbess, says about her “victories” over Juana, “Ya se cumplió mi deseo” (PII: II, vii, 850a), but, of course, it is only an imaginary triumph, in both the Lacanian and conventional senses of the word. At the same time, she is also fulfilling Juana’s hysterical demands for suffering. When Juana asks how she can resist such pleasure (PI: II, iii, 791b; PI: II, xvii, 802b; PII: III, i, 855a), she is expressing a masochism that wants to remain unsatisfied (Ragland-Sullivan 1989, 219; 225). Her pleasure here is jouissance, which, it should be remembered, is impossible pleasure. When it has crossed into the realm of the plus-de-jouir, the excess of jouissance, it is the pleasure one feels when one comes into direct contact with the real, the lack. Just as her actual conversations with Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the saints are impossible, so too is the joy associated with them. Then again, that is what makes the experience so intensely mystical. This is more than just sexual pleasure; this is beyond all that, surpassing symbolic and imaginary pleasure.

That these ordeals are done to imitate Christ could not be more manifest, as we see in the words of Christ Himself:

\begin{verbatim}
CRISTO:     Juana: Varón de dolores
            me llamo yo en la Escritura;
            quien imitarme procura
            busque espinas, deje flores.
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{12} There seems to be a clear relationship between silence and sainthood, as in the assertion within the play that sometimes the silent tongue deserves the name of saint, (PII: III, i, 856b). On loss of voice and excessive talking as hysteric symptoms, see Ragland-Sullivan (1989, 209; 236).
Somewhat later, Juana makes it clear that her desire is to suffer what Christ suffered: “Es justo / que a Dios pague en la moneda / que pagó por mis pecados” (PII: II, v, 849a). At the end of Part II, a nun comments on Juana’s virtual transformation into Christ: “En manos, pies y costado / impresas tiene las llagas / de su soberano Esposo, / en quien esté transformada” (PII: III, xxi, 865b). Perhaps the final attribute of Christ that Juana imitates is the ability to take away sins, as she does when Jorge asks her to save him from hell (PII: III, xii, 862b), or bring the dead back to life, as she does with the young girl (PIII: III, xiv, 903b-4a).

In Part III, Act I, Juana says that she wants to feel the pain of Christ’s passion (PIII: I, vii, 873b), a particularly apt word in this case because it means both pleasure and suffering, not a bad shorthand definition of the effects of jouissance. As the trilogy comes to an end and Juana approaches her death, she converses with the Christ child in the language of love: “Tu amor ha sido, / mi Dios, larga dilación / de este destierro pesado…” (PIII: II, xv, 894b). This is love, but not the same kind we saw between other pairs of characters, this is the love between souls, âmour, or perhaps in Spanish, almor. Early on, Toribio, noting the different kinds of love, pointed out that God is love and aspires to infinity (PI: I, i, 774b); that is, He is a manifest in the love of the soul for the Other. Just to underscore the nature of this type of love, Juana addresses her soul:

**Juana:**

Albricias, alma mía, 
que ya de vuestro bien se acerca el día, 
y el destierro cumplido 
que ausente de la patria os ha tenido, 
el soberano Esposo 
llamándoos a su tálamo amoroso…

(PIII: III, vi, 899b)
While one can compare the rhetoric here to that found in imaginary love, one cannot fail to connect the traditional use of "tálamo" with "túmulo," making even clearer the connection with the death drive. The goal of Juana's jouissance must be death, because only through death can she "unite" with her "husband," Christ. When, after a soliloquy full of talk of obedience, suffering, and death (PIII: II, xiv, 894a), the Christ child calls her to her apotheosis, he says that He raises up those who debase themselves (PIII: II, xv, 894b). As she approaches death, her identification with Christ becomes practically absolute, even down to her name, "Juana de la Cruz" (PIII: III, vii, 900a). Her Guardian Angel presents her with a chest in which he has kept the marks of her suffering, the nails, the hairshirt, and so on, which he also calls her "joyas divinas" (PIII: III, vi, 900a). For Juana, as she tells the nuns, these instruments of humiliation and suffering are "el tesoro / que apetece mi deseo" (PIII: III, ix, 901a). In the end, Juana's sainthood is indeed mystical, even if it does not have all the hallmarks of the experiences of San Juan de la Cruz and Santa Teresa. Juana's goal is the unification of her soul with Christ and she achieves that goal through ecstatic ex-sistence,¹³ a being absent in herself. Unlike the hysterical who seeks a psychoanalytic cure, Juana is consumed by her symptoms, she enters her fantasy and partakes of the highest form of religious experience.

In this discussion of psychoanalysis and seventeenth-century theater, it is not really so important that Juana's character can be demonstrated to have the structure of hysteria or even that these plays provide successful illustrations of psychoanalytic concepts. In that case we would be

---

¹³ The concept of ex-sistence is applicable not only to hysterical jouissance but also to God Himself. Regnault (1985, 58-60, 63-64), citing Lacan's Seminar XXII, R.S.I., notes that God is the unnamable; as such He does not exist. He is a hole, but we name Him. "I am that I am"; what comes out of the hole is the name. God is ex-sistence; He is repression incarnate. In that much, religion is true. The distribution of the function of ex-sistence (hole, Real, name) makes of this God not-all.
using the play to read Lacan rather than vice versa. What is of interest is the fact that, at some level, Tirso seemed to intuit the same truths about the human condition that Lacan was able to elucidate through his reading of Freud. Tirso’s plays are marvelous representations of phenomena that are of interest to psychoanalysis, and he was able to map them in such a way as to bring to bear the differences between secular and religious experience on the one hand, and different types of religious experiences on the other, to highlight the nature of Juana’s condition. He seems to know, more than three hundred years earlier, what Regnault sums up in Dieu est inconscient (1985, 51), that religious truth is the truth of the subject, the truth of desire, of drives, but hidden by mythologies and destiny.

Trinity University

WORKS CITED


