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Imperial Incentives and Individual Allegiances in Juan Antonio Correa's *La pérdida y restauración de Bahía de Todos los Santos*

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Antonio Gramsci observed that the relative power of a nation can be determined by a combination of four factors: territorial expansion, economic power, military might, and 'the ability of a state to set its activities on an autonomous course so influential that other powers are bound to be affected by it'.¹ Among nations, an empire, practically by definition, stands at the pinnacle of power and greatness, and its ability to influence actions is at an ever greater distance from the centre of its authority. As it expands ever outward—through marriage, conquest, inheritance, negotiation, or economic/ideological dominance—it works ceaselessly to subordinate its disparate peoples and polymorphous components to conform to an ideal of a single, monolithic, homogeneous, and harmonious entity united in its goals, its loyalties, its strategies and tactics, and its treatment of individuals. In carrying out this project an empire requires to have at its disposal a variety of advantages and techniques, including centralized governance, well-articulated social and political hierarchies, cultural assimilation, indoctrination, and education, all of which are intended to realise and reinforce its goals as the dominant power and subdue or eradicate resistance through the imposition of a common language, religion, law, and culture. Over a period of several generations, this project of homogenization may produce genuine and lasting effects; one needs to think only of what happened in the case of the Celtiberians when they were Romanized, or to bear in mind the situation of the third or fourth-generation descendants of immigrants in the United States who never acquire the language of their grandparents and, except for racial and ethnic differences, may be culturally indistinguishable from their peers whose families arrived

1 Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. & trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg & Antonio Callari, 2 vols (New York: Columbia U. P., 1992-96), II, 240.

much earlier. In the short term, however, attempts to impose assimilation have an uncertain, incomplete, or superficial outcome: one may learn another language without forgetting the language of one's childhood, and one may be required to adopt a new religion without abandoning the beliefs and rites of one's previous faith.

Recent work in post-colonial cultural studies has gone a long way toward dismantling the popular, even mythic, self-image that empire characteristically seeks to reinforce both at home and abroad. But in seeking to understand the complex nature of empire, it is not necessary to limit oneself to focusing on the modern world. Indeed, it is clear from examining early modern Spanish history and literature that not all members of the Habsburg empire saw the world in the same way. A variety of different people linked by the religion they shared, their cultural affinity, social class, race, sex and sexual orientation meant that they often had very differing and conflictive relationships with the empire and hegemonic culture that ruled them. Even white, Catholic, Spanish males had different perceptions and were treated differently depending on where they were born, what other languages they spoke, what religion their great-grandparents observed, what social classes they belonged to, whom they knew, and how much money they had. These differences came into especially sharp relief during the sixty years between 1580 and 1640, when, through a quirk of dynastic inheritance, the territory under the control of the Spanish Hapsburgs virtually doubled with the addition of Portugal and its colonies.

To enable us to focus more clearly on the nature of empire, its character, and its effect on people, both as individuals and as cultures, let us look at an important seventeenth-century military victory as depicted in one of the artistic works created to celebrate it. Juan Antonio Correa's little-known work, *La pérdida y restauración de Bahía de Todos los Santos* is a play that demonstrates that the Spanish Empire's veneer of unity hides serious and important political and cultural fault lines, which have effects even where the quintessential activity of colonial warfare is concerned in which the participants are most starkly divided into *us* and *them*, good and evil, lucky and unlucky, winners and losers.

In May 1624, Dutch forces, aided by those of England and France, took possession of Bahia de Todos os Santos, Brazil, the place known today as Salvador. Since Bahia was the colonial capital and the centre of local government and activity, its loss could not be accepted without an attempt being made to regain it. As a result, just over one year later, an alliance made up of Spanish, Portuguese and Neapolitan soldiers and sailors, together with indigenous Brazilians and blacks living in Bahia, retook the city. The Spanish monarchy used this rare victory to proclaim that Spain and Portugal, which by then had been jointly ruled over by the Spanish Habsburg kings for nearly half a century, were stronger together than each was on its own. The triumph was commemorated by a number of poems,

paintings, and at least two dramas: Lope de Vega's *El Brasil restituido* and the much less famous play under consideration here.² Correa's play follows the historical trajectory first dramatizing Portugal's loss of its territory to the Dutch, then dealing with the arrival of the allied fleet from Europe, and the victory won under the leadership of the famous Spanish general, Don Fadrique de Toledo, but in the play two subplots are added involving love triangles that give rise to seditious activity by scorned lovers. Both the historical battle itself and Correa's play prompt a series of questions.³ Why would people sacrifice themselves in order to advance or protect the interests of peoples and nations that were not their own? Why would, for instance, Italian soldiers from Naples pledge their loyalty and their lives to the King of Spain and defend the far-flung outpost of Bahia against Dutch encroachments? And why would English Catholics side with Dutch Calvinists in Holland's struggle for independence from Spain? Why is there, too, so much more cohesiveness among those fighting on the side of Spain than is evident among those fighting on the side of Holland? Why would the marginalized, exploited, oppressed, vanquished, and dominated peoples of Brazil lift a finger to support any European power, rather than choosing instead to expend the same sort of effort to obtain their freedom and independence? Why would a playwright born in Lisbon write a work in Castilian celebrating a Spanish victory that came about because the Portuguese had lost an important part of their territory in Brazil? Indeed, one might also wonder why so many plays by Portuguese writers of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including some that celebrated Portugal's liberation from Spanish rule in 1640, were written in Castilian?⁴ What factors are at play in such circumstances, affecting the relationship between the individual and the society in question as demonstrated by personal motivation, political allegiance, and even the existence of the play itself?

All societies are to some degree or another diverse; at the very least they contain both men and women, the young and the old, the strong and the weak. For protection, companionship, and many other reasons, individuals naturally form affinity groups that, for a variety of reasons, are unequal in

2 For a more detailed account of the loss and retaking of Bahia, as well as insight into the importance of the victory to the prestige of Felipe IV and the union of Spain and Portugal, see Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, 'Observaciones preliminares: III *El Brasil restituido*', in *Obras de Lope de Vega*, ed. & estudio preliminar de Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, 33 vols (Madrid: [reprint] Atlas, 1963 1972), XXVIII (1970), BAE 233, 24 32.

3 It is the complexity of this multi layered plot structure, which provides greater insight into the interplay of various competing incentives and motivations, that inspired this study of Correa's play in preference to Lope's, which, while much better known, reads much more like a straightforward news report combined with a degree of pro monarchy pageantry.

4 António Henrique R. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal, Volume 1: From Lusitania to Empire* (New York: Columbia U. P., 1972), 323; Anna Klobucka, *The Portuguese Nun: Formation of a National Myth* (Lewisburg: Bucknell U. P., 2000), 70.

terms of size, power, and influence: the larger the society, and empires are the extreme case, the greater the number of possible affinity groups. Inherent inequalities among these groups allow one of them to become dominant, its values deemed to be not just normal but universal, and its actions perceived to benefit everyone even when they primarily benefit only the dominant group concerned.⁵ The relative cultural power of the dominant subgroup can be based on any number of factors, and sometimes these factors can overlap to create even more firmly established elites; among those accorded privileged status in different cultures are the nobles, the wealthy, warriors, philosophers, priests, and the like. Because Correa's work is a military play, it comes as no surprise that noble officers have greater authority, prestige, and importance than common soldiers. But the battle for Bahia, both the historical event and the event as dramatized in Correa's play, reveals a much more intensive stratification based upon national, cultural, military, linguistic and racial differences, all of which also existed within the unified Iberian empire. The Spanish are accorded greater status and power than the Portuguese; the Spanish king is the ruler over all, and the commander of all the Iberian forces sent to retake Bahia is a Spaniard. Portugal is clearly the lesser partner in the Iberian union. It was the Portuguese who lost Bahia and, without aid from Spain, they could not have reclaimed it. In the play, Portugal as a political entity is mentioned only three times in the entire play, and Brazil only once, while 'España' is referred to twenty-seven times.⁶ Catholicism is granted a status denied to Protestantism; all those fighting for the Iberian alliance are considered to be faithful to the Church of Rome and thus called 'Christianos' (I, 672; II, 170, 196, 605, 824; III, 166, 655, 821), and all the rest, regardless of their beliefs, are branded as 'hereges' (II, 415, 458, 461, 492; III, 325, 644).

Difference based upon race is perhaps the most natural and visible factor that serves starkly to divide people and assist their formation into social categories. In the play, all Europeans are, of course, called 'blancos' (I, 677). The most powerful members of both sides in the conflict are white Europeans who are not only granted more status than black or indigenous Brazilians, but who tend to share the same view of American lands as repositories of treasures there for the taking and of indigenous Americans as inferior to them in every way. Indeed, despite the fact that the 'negros' reportedly play a pivotal role in the retaking of Bahia by attacking the invaders spontaneously and with such great ferocity and bravery that no soldier fighting for the Dutch is able to escape (I, 658–59, 685–88), they are given no

5 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 179–80.

6 See, by way of example, I, 707 and II, 444, in Juan Antonio Correa, *La pérdida y restauración de la Bahía de Todos los Santos*, ed. & intro. de J. Carlos Lisboa, in *Uma peça desconhecida sobre os holandeses na Bahia* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1961), 6–70. All references are to this edition and are given in the text, in the form of Act number, followed by the line number.

lines to speak and do not even appear on stage; their silence and invisibility make it impossible to speculate about their motives or their allegiances, or even to determine whether the description 'negros' is being used to refer to the indigenous peoples of Brazil, or to the slaves of African origin or to their descendants, or, indeed, to anyone who is different from the peoples of Western Europe. The most one can say about the 'negros' in the play is that they are only referred to in the aggregate, that references to them note their otherness, that white Europeans rely upon them as one might rely on pawns in a chess game; and, even when some 'negros' flee Bahia to take refuge on Dutch ships (II, 21), in no case do they use their numbers and their abilities to resist all Europeans in order to gain real freedom for themselves.

There are several possible logical explanations for this portrayal of the 'negros'. First, the playwright might expect us to assume that the 'negros' were influenced as much by the cultural hegemony exercised by Europe as were the Europeans themselves: by the social and religious education they received, by the promises made that society would take care of them; perhaps they even identified psychologically with those who had been their masters for a century. Second, because the counterattack was led by the 'negros, y pocos blancos' (I, 677), the playwright might have wished to avoid wounding European pride by drawing attention to the fact that Europeans were being led by those over whom they believed they had the divine right of mastery. When Don Francisco recounts the attack at the beginning of Act 2, he mentions only 'los pocos Portugueses / que Vueselencia vé' (II, 9–10), not only failing to mention the leading role of the 'negros' in retaking the fort, but any participation by them whatsoever. Third, the fact that there were also 'negros' to be found on the opposing Dutch side might have caused the dramatist to underplay their historical role. He would not wish his audience to question the loyalty of this group so important to the economic success of the colonies. Any such doubts, were they to be raised, might have seriously undermined the celebratory nature of the play and perhaps even the larger imperial project which it dramatizes. After all, if the assumption is that the good triumph and the bad are defeated, on which side would the 'negros' fall? Imperial reliance on oppressed peoples was always a thorny issue: the 'passive or active adherence'⁷ to the aims and methods of the empire, the physical and emotional dependence of the underclass on those in power,⁸ and even the substitution of more distant, more abstract imperial interests for their own local, vital, and immediate interests⁹ were indispensable. The oppressed are induced to 'resemble the oppressor, to imitate him, to follow him' and to internalize 'the opinion the oppressors hold of them',¹⁰ with the

7 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 91.

8 Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, with a Foreword by Richard Shaull (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 51.

9 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 184.

10 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 49.

result that they accept their own ‘cultural inauthenticity’ and ‘begin to respond to the values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders’,¹¹ becoming ‘ambiguous beings “housing” another’¹² and exhibiting the ‘existential duality of the oppressed, who are at the same time themselves and the oppressor whose image they have internalized’.¹³

Gramsci speaks to both the efficacy of the mechanisms of cultural hegemony and its inability to effect its aims: ‘even when [the subaltern classes] rebel[,] they are in a state of anxious defense’.¹⁴ That there is any possibility that the oppressed would rebel under any circumstance is an acknowledgement that the assimilation of the ‘have-nots’ into the project of the ‘haves’ is not without risk. The same subaltern groups on which the empire depended were feared by those in power as marginal and undependable; the masters could not rely upon their loyalty and had to resort to harsh measures that did not conform to Renaissance values of human dignity in order to exploit this workforce. In short, the empire was usually loath to admit openly that its very success depended upon a population it considered so inferior, marginal, and untrustworthy.¹⁵ A final possible reason for underplaying their role and significance is the notion, so prevalent at the time, that the ‘negros’ were such inferior beings that their motivations were of no more concern to the Europeans than the motivations of mules or oxen or other animals whose only value lay in the labour they could provide. Correa’s play simply does not present people of colour as complex characters or as being worthy of consideration and of more humane treatment at the hands of Europeans.

Among the reasons why different, unequal, and even mutually suspicious subgroups should join together in a common goal are several that reflect the human subject’s engagement in both the imaginary and symbolic registers. No healthy human subject can exist beyond the scope of the symbolic Other that promises to establish its identity as an adult member of society, fulfil its

11 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 150.

12 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 134.

13 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 47.

14 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 21.

15 The silence and invisibility of the ‘negros’ in the play seem to be a clear example of Freire’s ‘“culture of silence” of the dispossessed’, as it is described by Richard Shaull (see his ‘Foreword’, in Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 10). In a very real way, this lack of noticeable presence appears to support, in racial terms, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s famous dictum, ‘The subaltern cannot speak’ (‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in *Colonial Discourse and Post Colonial Theory*, ed. Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman [New York: Columbia U. P., 1994], 104; see also Bruce R. Burningham, *Tilting Cervantes: Baroque Reflections on Postmodern Culture* [Nashville: Vanderbilt U. P., 2008], 15). Frustrating as it may appear to be, this presentation of the ‘other’ is, perhaps, a more enlightened one than what Lope offers us in *El Brasil restituído* (*Obras de Lope de Vega*, ed. Menéndez Pelayo, XXVIII, 257–96), a play that selects both traitorous *conversos* and capricious indigenous peoples for condemnation (see especially 260a–62b, 267a–68a, 291a, 295b).

desires, grant it the entitlements of office, provide answers to its existential questions, and give the appearance of closing up the gaps at its core via the acquisition of language, submission to the law, adherence to religious and cultural norms, and compliance with the obligations imposed upon it for the benefit of the larger group (society, country, church), all within a hierarchical superstructure in which the individual works and sacrifices in order to find validation through obedience. The symbolic demands, necessary to the development of the human subject, are not inborn; they are imposed upon the individual, in ways subtle and not so subtle, by the outside social, cultural, legal, scientific, political and religious environment that completely surrounds the individual. If one were to sum up this symbolic promise in a simple sentence, it might be, 'If you renounce your own desires and do as you are told, you will have a peaceful, fruitful, rewarding, and meaningful life'.¹⁶ The overt symbolic mechanisms for uniting disparate peoples vary from the direct—application of a uniform law, establishment of a universal faith, punishment for a lack of orthodoxy—to the subtle, such as the semiotic codification of different styles of clothing and the blurring of distinction through the use of a common language. Since all of these are imposed upon a subject, they must be taught; education, inculcation, and indoctrination are valuable tools not just of empire but of all society: 'the state has and demands consent, but it also "educates" this consent' at the behest of, and to consolidate the power of, 'the ruling class'.¹⁷ Just as the Conde-Duque de Olivares commissioned works to consolidate support among the people for the royal projects of Felipe IV, the Spanish clearly intuited the value of education as is evident

16 For specific references to those aspects of the symbolic noted here, see Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), 11, 24, 26 27, 42, 43, 60 61, 64 68, 80 82, 106, 124 27, 140 44, 148, 150, 155 58, 164 67, 172 73, 193 99, 232 34, 263 65, 281 82, 284 91, 296, 302 24; and Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953 54*, ed. Jacques Alain Miller, trans. John Forrester (New York: Norton, 1988), 69, 83 87, 102, 134, 140 42, 146, 155 57, 166, 171, 179, 185 86, 194, 217, 221, 222 23, 228, 242, 255, 262 65, 271 72, 276 77. For an overview of the symbolic register in the context of a study of the *comedia*, see Matthew D. Stroud, *The Play in the Mirror: Lacanian Perspectives on Spanish Baroque Theater* (Lewisburg: Bucknell U. P., 1996), 31 39, 49 50, 57 59, 63, 65 71, 107 09, 113 15, 126 29, 138, 181, 185 88, 215 29.

17 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, I, 153. Freire likewise discusses the political and economic 'myths' necessary to the successful subjugation of one people by another: that 'the oppressive order is a "free society"' marked by equality among people who are 'free to work where they wish' and that anyone willing to work hard can attain success as an entrepreneur; that this society of equals includes industrious 'dominant elites' who, by virtue of their 'charity and generosity' work to 'promote the advancement' of the lazy, dishonest, and naturally inferior people who, in gratitude, 'should accept the words of the elites and be conformed to them'; and that 'rebellion is a sin against God' (Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 135 36).

by their efforts to teach the Castilian language and Catholic doctrine to the indigenous peoples of the Americas.¹⁸

Even the use of particular words to describe individuals can be pressed into the service of the society concerned. It is no accident that in Correa's play the Iberian forces are referred to as 'españoles' and 'portugueses' interchangeably or that when a character of either nationality uses some form of 'nuestro' (I, 664; II, 68, 377, 512), it is often difficult to determine to whom the term refers. The symbolic process of cohesion works to hide or erase from consciousness the obvious differences among individuals, that is, to bring all members to submit to the Other; for some, submission involves little effort or struggle because the entrenched power structures reflect their own individual status based upon race, class, sex, and the like, while for others submission is tantamount to denial of one's core values and identity. Regardless of where one is in the hierarchy, people are trained to identify with the goals, the values, and the institutions of the elites, and symbolic acculturation is so effective that the need for more authoritarian measures wanes over time as people adopt the ideology of the power structure. At the moment when the Dutch attacked Bahia, no one could remember a time when the peoples of Brazil had not been part of either Portugal or Spain. Generation after generation had been assimilated by the teaching of Iberian languages, and the peoples of the Americas had been rigorously evangelized into Catholicism. After so many years under imperial rule, the notion of freedom and independence virtually disappears from the realm of possibility. Indeed, those with less power can actually be frightened of freedom, especially since it 'is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly',¹⁹ an especially overwhelming challenge for people in a relationship as asymmetrical as that between the indigenous peoples of Brazil and the Europeans, at least as that relationship was defined at the time. In essence, once a people have been successfully assimilated, they buy into the ideals and mechanisms of oppression; in fact, so much do they 'want at any cost to resemble the oppressor, to imitate him, to follow him'²⁰ that '[i]t is a rare peasant who, once "promoted" to overseer, does not become more of a tyrant towards his former comrades than the owner himself'.²¹

Another manifestation of the symbolic is the human tendency to bond with others like oneself, whether the defining characteristic is based on race,

18 Juan R. Lodaes, 'Languages, Catholicism, and Power in the Hispanic Empire (1500-1770)', trans. Gerardo Garza & Kenya C. Dworkin y Méndez, in *Spanish and Empire*, ed. Nelsy Echávez Solano & Kenya C. Dworkin y Méndez (Nashville: Vanderbilt U. P., 2007), 3, 9, 12, 19.

19 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 31.

20 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 49.

21 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 30. Further on in the work, Freire reports that during a takeover of an estate by armed peasants, no peasant was willing to stand guard over their former overlord. He ascribes this timidity to 'guilt feelings' or to an assimilative process by which the oppressed perceived that 'the boss was "inside" them' (50-51).

nationality, sex, language, or even personal preference. Recent research reveals that babies less than one year old respond more positively to people of the same or a familiar race and who speak their language, and even assume that those with similar tastes in food to their own are nicer.²² So strong is the need for fulfilment, for acceptance, for connection to others, and for membership in an enterprise larger than oneself, and so persuasive is the promised benefit, that one dismisses, sometimes repeatedly, evidence that the Other not only will not but cannot fulfil its promises; these are, after all, merely symbolic.

Evidence of the willingness of the individual to surrender his or her autonomy to the larger community is found throughout Correa's play, as well as in the circumstances of its writing. The main characters on both sides and of all nationalities, very few of whom reside permanently in Bahia and therefore have little personal stake in the outcome, frequently cite loyalty to others; their interest in the outcome is, to a considerable degree, indirect and derivative, and more a function of allegiance to society, church, and crown than of personal gain. The Portuguese, Spanish, and Neapolitan defenders are bound by their common political allegiance to a single individual, Felipe IV, to whom it is stated that Bahia rightfully belongs (II, 619–20). At the same time that the union of different nations under one king allows for more political and historical cohesion within the Iberian alliance, it also establishes a recognized hierarchy in which all participants know where they stand in relation to the centre of power; although the Portuguese and Spanish fleets joined forces before crossing the Atlantic together, all aid from Europe upon which the restoration of Iberian authority depends is considered to come from Spain, dispatched by the monarch himself (II, 57–60).²³

In addition to their loyalty to a single monarch, the Iberian forces are also united via another layer of symbolic investment in their submission to the Church of Rome, an overlapping imperative evident in the Bishop's call to the soldiers to fight in the name of God, His Spanish Majesty, and Saint Anthony, Portugal's patron saint, to reclaim the city from those who have defiled convents and altars, and to do whatever is necessary for Portugal to win: 'Portugal ha de ser siempre inuencible' (I, 624). This is an assertion that is perhaps technically accurate but that strikes one as odd considering that Portugal itself was at that very moment ruled by the King of Spain and

22 See Paul Bloom, 'The Moral Life of Babies,' *New York Times Magazine*, 9 May 2010, p. MM44, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/magazine/09babies.html>> (accessed 2 October 2012).

23 While specific members of the Iberian alliance are indeed described as Portuguese (Diego de Mendoza, Francisco de Mora, Manuel de Meneses and María and Daphne, the two women who play important roles in the amorous subplots) or Italian (the Marqués de Torrecuso, the sergeant major), those without a clearly identified national identity are assumed to be Spanish.

within fifteen years would rebel against the once-praised monarch in order to re-establish itself as an independent and sovereign kingdom. That the man exhorting the troops to victory is also the Bishop reveals the importance of religion as yet another marker for unity or division, especially when the political and religious institutions are so closely linked. This is not just a battle between Spain and Holland; it is a conflict between the faithful and the heretical (II, 492, 528). The Bishop even repeats the symbolic imperative expressed in the link, familiar in the *Comedia*, between honour and death: it is better to die for a cause greater than oneself than to strive to hold on to anything to which one has any kind of personal attachment such as an occupied land, a treasure in gold, or a loved one (see I, 601; II, 144–46, 595–96).

With few exceptions, empires encourage all of their members, regardless of their positions in the hierarchy, to believe that they are active participants in the advancement of the aims of society and, concomitantly, in the betterment of their individual lives; at the same time, those with less (power, money, status, etc.) are encouraged to look upon those with more as models for the ‘possibility of their own ascent’.²⁴ This strategic balance between incentives for loyalty to a superstructure that is greater but more remote and abstract on the one hand, and more local, parochial, or personal on the other, creates a system of mutually reinforcing behaviour: the powerless will continue to carry out the wishes of the powerful in order to be rewarded (and feel good about themselves), and the powerful will continue to dole out rewards (money, food, marginal status) in order to entice the powerless to continue doing their bidding. Indeed, the more successful the identification with the values of the elites, the more reinforced the elites are, and feel themselves to be, to continue or even intensify and expand their political and cultural dominance.²⁵

Both the Portuguese and the Spanish, despite their differences at home, find themselves motivated to defend the other. From the point of view of the Spanish, it was right and proper for the Portuguese, both those living in Brazil and those coming from Europe, to aid the efforts of the Spanish monarch who ruled them to re-establish dominion over his personal property and to ensure that the American colony remained resolutely Catholic. For the Portuguese, despite their understanding that Bahia was Portuguese, not Castilian, the Spanish had an obligation to protect Portuguese interests and send aid to retake the colony.

The acceptance of a hierarchical power structure coupled with the expectation that one will give one’s life to benefit the larger group is intensified in the play due to the military nature of the action. In addition to direct exhortations for personal sacrifice, tales of loyalty and heroism, such

24 Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 144.

25 B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 28.

as the brave death of Pedro Osorio (II, 483–84), the extraordinary valour of the Marqués de Coprani (II, 493–96), and the willingness of a Portuguese soldier, Carvalho, to give his life for his monarch (II, 539–43), are common examples designed to bind together a group of men for a higher purpose.²⁶ This kind of selflessness is expected of loyal soldiers; as Fadrique tells Carvalho, to be willing to give one's life for the King of Spain is to act as any Portuguese soldier would (II, 551–52). Victory, of course, also creates new demands and new incentives to work harder to reproduce the feelings of success and satisfaction. That each individual and group should both help and expect support from the other, and then celebrate the eventual victory together, goes a long way toward serving the purpose of convincing the soldiers themselves of the rightness of both the cause and the strategy to attain it, as well as demonstrating to the broader public that the union of both kingdoms is mutually beneficial even though in the short run it serves the interests of Spain and her king more than those of Portugal.

Success is not exclusively a function of symbolic incentives, however; as powerful as the symbolic imperatives are in inspiring both those with power and those without to work toward common goals, there are also significant imaginary incentives. One enters into alliances for reasons that are not just sociological but psychological in nature. In an act of denial of the essential lack at the core of the human subject, each individual creates imaginary ideals of happiness, wholeness, self-sufficiency, and superiority, and devises strategies to attempt to fulfil them.²⁷ Military culture is particularly adept at manipulating imaginary rewards that feed an individual's fantasy of power. The binary conception of battle (us/them, good/evil) as the struggle of two rivals (individuals, armies, nations, alliances) to possess the same object (territory, power, wealth, loved one) does not just intensify the desire for victory, it actually creates the desire; one does not happen to desire the same object as another person, one desires it *because* the other person does.²⁸ Thus, even if an Italian soldier or perhaps one of the voiceless 'negros' had

26 The military command structure makes even more evident and effective Freire's assertions that '[b]y means of manipulation, the dominant elites try to conform the masses to their objectives', and that '[m]anipulation, like the conquest whose objectives it serves, attempts to anesthetize the people so they will not think' (Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Bergman Ramos, 144, 146).

27 For specific references to those aspects of the imaginary noted here, see Lacan, *Écrits*, trans. Sheridan, 2, 4 7, 10, 15, 17 18, 20 21, 23, 45, 70, 80, 134, 137 39, 191 98, 233, 296, 302 24; Lacan, *The Seminar I*, ed. Miller, 52 53, 62 63, 68 69, 76 80, 86, 102, 109, 115 16, 122 26, 137, 139 42, 146 49, 153, 167, 169 72, 176 77, 194, 217, 222 23, 271, 276 77, 281 82. For an overview of the imaginary register in the context of a study of the *Comedia*, see Stroud, *The Play in the Mirror*, 28 31, 37 39, 49 50, 57 59, 65 71, 107 09, 113 15, 128 29, 185 88, 215 19.

28 See René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1977), 145; see also Lacan, *Seminar I*, ed. Miller, 147, 170, 176 77; Stroud, *The Play in the Mirror*, 29 30.

no personal stake in the battle for Bahia, the mere fact that others wanted to occupy the town, some of whom were his comrades and others his enemies, would be enough to inspire an affinity for the Spanish and Portuguese fighting alongside him, as well as his desire for victory over the enemy.

Related to desire for an object is the even stronger motivation to defend what one already has. Once one has an object in one's possession, a territorial sense of entitlement causes one to expend even more effort to hold onto it than might have been spent to attain something new. Although the Portuguese had only held Bahia for a bit over a century, and the Spanish even less, in their minds it is their property, not that of the indigenous Brazilians or the black population among them, and certainly not that of the Dutch, the English, or the French. As a ' "beleaguered" victim fighting a "defensive" struggle [...]',²⁹ those rushing to defend Bahia from the Dutch see themselves not as imperial villains who impose their values and rules on unwilling victims, but as protectors of civilization who justifiably struggle to defend their natural territory against the illegitimate desires of outsiders, a motivation that allows for greater fervour and a more deeply felt willingness to put differences aside and work together on the side of Spain and Portugal.

Another potent imaginary reinforcement is the tribal aspect inherent in praise for *us* and opprobrium for *them*. In battle settings in general and this play in particular, both sides in the conflict are called and consider themselves to be noble (I, 570), invincible (I, 37, 610; II, 443), fierce (II, 96, 244; see also I, 79), valiant (II, 84, 117, 136, 455), prudent (II, 84) and famous (I, 50; II, 125, 127) for their long traditions of winning in battle (II, 636–37); even when defeat appears inevitable, the Dutch general still praises his fearful men in an effort to encourage them to fight on (II, 367–71). The other side of the same coin, of course, is the demonization of the common enemy. Despite the fact that both they and their foes are of different nationalities and religions, those fighting to reclaim Bahia consider all their enemies to be Dutch (I, 42), heretics (II, 67, 492), arrogant (I, 104; II, 104, 144, 399, 405), and less than human ('perro', II, 398, 401), and, simultaneously, so formidable and determined ('brauo' [III, 106]; 'fuerça' [III, 139]) that the triumph over them will surely redound to the greater honour and glory for

29 Burningham, *Tilting Cervantes*, 10. Burningham primarily focuses here on historical plays that recount the precarious and often uncertain future of the Spanish state during the Reconquista. Such plays

remind their audiences[...] that there was a time when the nation was very much under siege, when there still existed the very real threat of complete cultural dissolution at the hands of an enemy who very much wanted to destroy everything the nation valued and stood for. (Burningham, *Tilting Cervantes*, 30)

More contemporaneous threats, such as those posed by competing nations (England, France, The Netherlands) and religions (Protestantism, Islam), served as potent motivations for the disparate components of the empire to rally to the cause of its defence.

the victor. Likewise, the Dutch captain Guillermo praises the Portuguese in general and Manuel de Meneses in particular, and reveres the great Don Fadrique de Toledo (II, 242–55). These imaginary motivations are closely linked to the notion of free will; when a soldier advances through the ranks, takes home plunder, is praised for his efforts, or is otherwise rewarded or enriched for his efforts, he takes this as a sign that he deserves credit for having done something deemed to be good.³⁰ The medals, praise and flattery that the officers shower on the troops, combined with the opportunities for power, wealth and personal distinction, appeal to their imaginary fantasies of power and dignity and reinforce actions that an individual might otherwise have had no incentive to undertake. Rather than question why the power structure should reward the particular actions in question, the soldiers are pleased to believe that they are being rewarded for who they are, what they have done, and why they have done it. In other words, part of the military strategy lies in creating an imaginary identity of oneself as strong, superior, competent, brave, masculine, and deserving, and providing an opportunity to prove oneself in battle against an enemy that is simultaneously worthy yet undeserving; taken together, these two conceptions of self and other inflate the ego of the individual soldier and create psychological attachments among the different subgroups (English and French, Spanish and Portuguese, blacks and whites) that did not exist among the same nations back home in Europe.

This nexus of pride, the fantasy of invincibility, the possibility of personal advancement or enrichment (via either authorized rewards or plunder), the approval of one's superiors and one's society, and, generally, the feeling that one is worthy of praise and status, will no doubt call to mind that overarching theme of early modern Spanish literature: honour. So skilful is military culture at manipulating both imaginary and symbolic motivators that the more one acts in the interests of others (one's comrades, one's unit, one's army, one's nation), the more personal glory one attains. Maintaining a subtle balance between obedience and encouragement, superior officers simultaneously command, coerce, and threaten their men and exhort them to work together for goals that do not immediately benefit them as individuals by appealing to their sense of imagined greatness. Thus, by inflating one's own sense of egoistic power and invincibility while also encouraging one to risk everything for the larger symbolic entities of king and crown, the imaginary and the symbolic registers work together to ensure the success of the interests of the hegemonic structure. The feelings of power, strength and wealth, as well as the emotional well-being that comes with success, are most seductive, and human beings naturally want to share in it. Indeed, there appears to be no limit to imaginary desire or symbolic demands, as both the Dutch after their initial victory (I, 369–74), and the

30 Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, 45–47.

Spanish after retaking Bahia (III, 744–47), hope to go on to conquer the entire world.

Opportunities for counter-hegemonic liberation exist even in absurdly asymmetric relationships because, despite their promises, neither the symbolic nor the imaginary can fulfil the promises of harmony and homogeneity, of superiority and totality; even royal grandeur, imperial might and religious orthodoxy cannot eliminate the frictions and fault lines beneath the surface of the most united alliance. A cursory description of the central conflict of the battle for Bahia reveals that the easy division between the Dutch and the Spanish cannot hold. The Spanish alliance was clearly more united than the opposition, but there is a reason that the Spanish monarch was referred to as the ‘rey de las Españas’.³¹ Although Brazil had only been a colony of Spain for less than fifty years,³² the forces that came to its rescue reflected the diverse nationalities, languages, cultures, and histories of Felipe IV’s subjects: Castilians, Aragonese, Navarrese, Neapolitans, Portuguese, Brazilians, and even the voiceless ‘negros’. The history of relations between Castilla and its subordinates in the Spanish empire, especially in Cataluña, the Basque Country, the Low Countries and Portugal, reveals considerable historical and contemporary tensions; not only did the Portuguese nobility resent the preferential treatment of their counterparts during the ‘Spanish captivity’,³³ but Spanish conflicts with both the Netherlands and England interfered with Portugal’s ties to its colonies and to trading partners, especially in Asia. Even in the context of this battle, there was considerable consternation among the Portuguese that Castilian forces had pillaged the city of goods that had rightfully belonged to the Portuguese before the Dutch incursion, prompting an ‘ink war’ in the Peninsula regarding exactly what kind of relationship existed between the Castilians and the Portuguese in this troubled, forced, political marriage.³⁴

31 Although this term *per se* is not mentioned in Correa’s play, its currency is made clear by the title of the book by Gonzalo de Céspedes y Meneses, *Primera parte de la historia de d. Felipe el III, Rey de las Españas* (Lisboa: Pedro Craesbeeck, 1631).

32 The Portuguese King Sebastião died in his attempt to conquer Morocco in 1578, was succeeded by his great uncle, Cardinal Henry, who died two years later having produced no heir and having failed to establish a Council of Regency to appoint a successor. The closest living relative with a claim to the throne was the Habsburg king of Spain, Felipe II.

33 Lisa Voigt, *Writing Captivity in the Early Modern Atlantic: Circulations of Knowledge and Authority in the Iberian and English Imperial Worlds* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2009), 209.

34 Carlos Ziller Camenietzki & Gianriccardo Grassia Pastore, ‘1625, Fire and Ink: The Battle of Salvador in Accounts of the War’, trans. Eoin O’Neill, *Topoi: Revista de História*, 2 (2006), n.p., <http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1518_33192006000200001> (accessed 2 October 2012). For the original version in Portuguese, titled ‘1625, o Fogo e a Tinta: a batalha de Salvador nos relatos de guerra’, see *Topoi: Revista de História*, 6:11 (2005), 261–88 (pp. 262, 281–82).

Just as victory brings unity, thus making it easier for the army to fulfil its role as ‘the permanent reserve of “order”’, to ‘appear neutral and rise above “factions”’,³⁵ defeat, on the other hand, brings recrimination, blame, hostility, and regret, and causes the fault lines to come much more visibly to the surface. The first defeat is that of the Portuguese, who lose their fortress to the Dutch in Act 1. The defeat is humbling (‘mas valiera quedar muerto’ [I, 424]), and Antonio, the son of the governor, accuses the Portuguese of valuing their own lives over honour and fame (I, 51–52, 94–96). Redemption will be theirs if they fight on to retake the city or die trying, but only dishonour will await them should they survive in defeat (I, 7–8, 38–39, 72–75). Struggling to recoup a bit of self-respect, the Portuguese governor makes it clear that the colony fell only because it was overpowered by the larger Dutch force (I, 65–66, 387–88), not because of lack of valour, honour, or a willingness to fight on the part of his men. Moreover, he vows that the ‘soberbia arrogancia’ of the Dutch will end up ‘rendida a mis pies’ (I, 104–05), and that the stronger and more numerous Dutch will be ‘abrasados en las llamas / de mi lealtad, ofrecida / al Quarto Leon de España’ (I, 140–42).³⁶

Whatever tensions are shown to exist here within the Iberian alliance, however, they are as nothing compared to those present among the forces fighting for Holland. In history, these forces may have had common goals—to harass the Spanish and Portuguese, diminish the Iberian influence in the Americas, and increase their own stake in the treasures of the New World—but they were anything but inseparable allies, equal partners, or even unified peoples within each nation. The two nascent empires of England and France had a long and bloody history of war and rivalry as well as internal instabilities, and they both looked down on the Netherlands, which at the time was not a nation but a union of semi-autonomous provinces.³⁷ Most importantly from a political perspective, the Dutch had only declared their independence from Spain in 1575, and the war to determine the outcome of the dispute would not end until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This meant that, at least from one point of view, the Netherlands, having been incorporated into the Spanish empire with the accession to the throne of Carlos V in 1517, still belonged to the King of Spain. In other words, the Dutch move to take Bahia was not only an attempt (along with its more significant efforts in Pernambuco) to enlarge its American colonial presence,

35 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Buttigieg & Callari, II, 237, 239.

36 This conflicted idea of the strength and failure of Portugal in its relationship with Spain and the Habsburg monarchy perhaps hints at tensions between the two Iberian powers and foreshadows the Portuguese rebellion against Felipe IV in 1640 in which Portugal re-established its independence, thus depriving Spain of the coveted colony of Brazil for good.

37 The House of Orange, created only in the sixteenth century, was considered to be of significantly less stature than the Bourbons or the Stuarts. As it turned out, the Dutch *Stadhouder*, Maurits van Oranje, died on 23 April 1625, just eight days before Bahia was reclaimed by the Iberian alliance.

but was also an attack on Spain during their long war for independence.³⁸ Thus, the presumptive lead nation in this alliance against Spain was essentially the junior partner, one that was not only militarily weaker but that commanded less respect and authority than its allies, creating instability in the chain of command and in the perceived natural order. Finally, the political tension within the Dutch-led alliance was coupled with enormous religious conflicts not only between Catholics and Protestants, but also among Anglicans, Lutherans, Calvinists and other Protestant sects, a situation which contributes to the lack of unity which is made evident from the beginning of the play. Still flush with victory, the invaders allow their personal desires to take precedence over the common military goal as they fight among themselves over the spoils of war (I, 260 *ff.*). Such rivalry may solidify the bonds among comrades when they find themselves on the same side of a conflict, but within an alliance of several different nations or nationalities, rivalry for the same object of desire causes significant rifts and interferes with unit cohesion, and so the internal divisions are shown to become greater as the tide turns against the Dutch. Early in Act 2, several Englishmen flee Bahia (II, 13–14) and the Dutch general laments having joined together Dutch and English forces because he does not trust the English Catholics (II, 194–97; III, 165–68). Thus it is no surprise that members of both camps characterize the Dutch alliance as having fallen into ‘civil guerra’ (II, 20, 600). After all, it is in Correa’s interest to differentiate the loose and fractious alliance of Spain’s enemies from the relatively more coordinated, cooperative, productive and peaceful allied forces fighting for and under the King of Spain.

One of Correa’s masterstrokes is the way in which he relates the main action to two subplots, which are used to reflect the discord within the Dutch alliance, have a bearing on the final outcome of the play, and highlight the different imaginary and symbolic imperatives affecting this outcome. Each subplot involves a love triangle in which two members of the Dutch-led coalition desire the same woman. In both cases, not only are the two competing suitors brought into conflict, but the conduct of each of them is in itself deeply conflicted. Each individual is part of a military hierarchy in which he is expected to perform in an obedient and unquestioning manner; yet at the same time he prizes his personal honour above all. As frequently happens in the *Comedia*, various definitions of *honour* are exemplified in the character’s behaviour, ranging from a sense of moral virtue to a belief that each one rightly deserves whatever may come his way as a result of his actions, to a deeply held conviction that it is his responsibility to help the weak, the vulnerable, and the needy. In the less prominent of the two

38 One irony is that if Spain had been able to defeat the Dutch in their struggle for independence and put down the Portuguese rebellion of 1640, Bahia would never have been lost to Spain and the battle would have been reduced to an internal fight over which Spanish dependency would administer it.

subplots, Guillermo, a captain, and his general both desire the same Portuguese woman, Daphne. For Guillermo, she is the only possession he has been able to obtain in this battle (I, 439–42), and it is significant that he treats her as spoils of war (it is only later that he conflates his desire for her with love, I, 488). She, of course, wants nothing to do with him because he is Dutch, and therefore is 'barbaro, atreuido, loco' (I, 470). Moreover, she values her honour too much to accept his attentions, and she finds it preposterous that a man should declare his love for her only two hours after first laying eyes on her (I, 489). When he threatens her if she does not welcome his advances, she appeals to the Dutch general to defend her from Guillermo's overtures (I, 504–06). The general intervenes, telling the captain that a man who forces himself upon a captive woman loses more (honour) than (the pleasure) he gains (I, 554–56). However, Daphne's beauty is so extraordinary that the general himself falls for her (I, 504–69 *passim*). The general orders Guillermo to leave her alone (thus removing an obstacle for the general's own desire), but, despite his promise to obey the general's order to leave Daphne in peace, Guillermo swears that he will not let their difference in rank prevent him from pursuing the object of his desire (I, 509–13), and later mutters that he is burning with rage and swears to take revenge on the general for his interest in the Portuguese woman (II, 157–58). In this instance, apparently, love, and the rivalry it provokes, trumps allegiance to a superior officer and even to the Dutch cause. Somewhat later, the general, as one might expect in a play intended to cast the Dutch in a negative light, also tries to force his attentions on Daphne: he will enjoy her or kill her (II, 841). A virtuous subject of the Spanish crown, Daphne will have none of it, declaring that it is not love that motivates him but 'apetito' (II, 844); that the mountains will be laid low, night will be turned into day, land into sea, the lion into the lamb, and fire into ice before she submits; and that love cannot be obtained by force: 'no ay voluntad forçada' (II, 868).³⁹

The other love triangle involves an English captain, Rugero, who, like Guillermo, deviates from the actions expected of him according to his rank in the military hierarchy and his national and religious allegiances. Unlike Guillermo, whose treacherous plan to attack his own general in order to possess Daphne is motivated by selfishness and a sense of entitlement, Rugero opposes those he fights alongside for noble and praiseworthy reasons. Early in Act 1, he comes to the defence of a young woman, María, who, like Daphne, finds herself the object of unwanted attention (I, 165–66). Since Rugero is also an invader, her initial reaction when he appears is one of fear and she rejects his help (I, 153–59), but he explains his two reasons for helping her. First, he makes clear that he wishes to

39 Interestingly, despite such words of rejection, Daphne goes on to say that she might give him what he wants if he were Catholic and he married her (II, 905–07), which indicates that for Daphne, at least at some level, love matters less than her honour and allegiance to her faith, which are paramount.

protect her from mistreatment, thus demonstrating that his allegiance to his own side is less strong than his desire to protect her from those who see her only as an object to be possessed and not as a human being worthy of dignity and respect. Second, although in a military sense she may be under his control, he declares he is her captive in love: ‘dueño, y esclavo soy yo’ (I, 187). He goes on to explain not only that his father was born in Spain, but that he is Catholic, and that he would gladly take her back to England with him if she would agree. His kind, generous demeanour and honourable offer, coupled with his mixed heritage that bridges the two sides of the conflict (‘Inglés, ô Español cortes’ [I, 223]), lead her to echo the amorous metaphor he has used and declare that she is his ‘esclava’ (I, 227)—which, in her case is true literally and not just figuratively. For María, Rugero’s Catholicism and his paternal Spanish nationality are more important than his current allegiance to the King of England and the havoc which the Dutch and their allies have caused in Bahia. Within a hundred lines of their first encounter, Rugero has promised to take her to back to Europe where she will be his lady (I, 247–50), and she has agreed to be his wife (I, 252–53).

Rugero’s rival is Rigepe, another captain serving on the side of the Dutch alliance. He has staked his honour as a Frenchman on his ability to win over María (‘no seré / el Frances, sino la gozo’ [I, 345–46]), and his attitude toward his rival is marked not by generosity and nobility but by intense emotions (‘furor’ [I, 304]; ‘abrasando’ [I, 324]) and threats of violence (‘veneno’ [I, 312]; ‘sacrifico’ [I, 323]). Like Guillermo in his attitude to the general (II, 186), Rugero views his rival as an obstacle to be overcome by lethal force if necessary (II, 178, 188–89). The two fight over María (who herself at one point enters dressed as a man in order to defend Rugero [II, 702–03]), but their attitudes are polar opposites. Rugero tries to reason with Rigepe, even allowing the latter to recover when he falls (II, 705) or drops his sword (II, 733). Such is Rigepe’s confused state of mind that even as he gives up, asking Rugero to kill him (II, 739), he continues to threaten to kill Rugero though by then he has no weapon (II, 787). On witnessing how Rugero calmly defeats the raging Rigepe, and evaluating them within the context of their different motivations (marriage *vs.* possession), María is moved to love Rugero even more (II, 803–04). The two lovers look forward to the end of the hostilities when they can marry (II, 826–38).

At the beginning of Act 3, Correa merges the two subplots when Rigepe and Guillermo, united in their respective desires for two local women as well as by a murderous jealousy of a comrade at arms, find in each other a companion in their misery. Rigepe confides his sorrow to Guillermo, bemoaning the fact that Rugero has deprived him of both his honour and María. They may be fellow captains on the same side of the conflict, but Rigepe’s wounded pride demands his rival’s death (III, 33–36). For his

part, Guillermo recounts the unhappiness he has suffered as a result of his feelings for Daphne and the fact that he is in a subordinate position to the general (III, 41–60); his emotional reaction to the loss of the woman he desires leads him not just to seek revenge but to commit treason by plotting to kill his commanding officer (III, 57–60). The imaginary impulse to destroy one's rival is so great in Rigepe and Guillermo that they consider joining forces against the Dutch-led alliance and so to enable the Spanish to retake Bahia; they are aware that if they were simply to refuse to fight they would in essence succeed in turning Bahia over to the Spanish (III, 64). To counter Guillermo's concern that they will be dishonoured if they fail to fight, Rigepe assures him that there is a way that they can both obey orders, yet still do their part in allowing the Spanish to retake Bahia, thus making both Rugero and the general pay for their 'soberuias' (III, 84). This word 'soberuias' is an interesting and ironically used term in this context since it is these two jealous men who are valuing their own desires in love over the greater need of their comrades in war and the crowns for which they fight. As the battle turns in favour of the Spanish, Rigepe urges the general to surrender, saying that their forces are few, the valour of the Spanish is great, and that it is better to live as a slave after a Spanish victory than for them to die in a siege (III, 105–14). Despite the general's insistence that they continue to fight to save their honour, the soldiers are influenced more by Rigepe and Guillermo, and shout as one that the city should be surrendered in order to save their lives (III, 150). Guillermo and Rigepe, two characters motivated so intensely by imaginary rivalry and ego-driven lust, thus convince their comrades on the Dutch side to raise the white flag of surrender (III, 190, 205). Ungracious in defeat, the general appears to take little personal responsibility for the loss, first noting that he could never rely on the 'Christianos Ingleses' and their 'pecho falso' (III, 165–68; see also II, 170–73, 823–24; III, 655), and later, in self-pity, laments his ill fortune (III, 750). Too late, Guillermo repents of his plans for revenge as he is left with nothing: no victory, no honour and no love (III, 604–05). The actions of Guillermo and Rigepe serve to demonstrate that symbolic superstructures have only limited success when they are in conflict with such basic instincts as love, passion, sexual rivalry, and jealousy.

The coming together of the main plot and the subplots enables for the Iberians a kind of apotheosis of ideals revered in the Spanish *Comedia*: valour, honour, masculinity, success, chivalry and devotion to the Roman Catholic Church. Bahia will once again be 'nuestra' (III, 176); all who fight in the name of Felipe IV share in the glory of victory, and even the dead can be considered to have triumphed because the souls of the fallen will find immortal life (III, 256–57). Fadrique demonstrates his magnanimity as he ignores assertions that the 'perros Luterios' (III, 514) will be consigned to eventual damnation (III, 548–49) and rejects calls that the Dutch captains be

put to death (III, 370–71, 514). Now that the hostilities have ended, it is imperative that the terms of surrender do not humiliate the vanquished enemy but rather that they restore the regular order with which all nobles, even enemies, treat each other. Indeed, to act so harshly against their enemies would dishonour the victors: ‘es afrenta dar la muerte / al que humillado se vé’ (III, 299–300; see also III, 598–601).⁴⁰ Honour and dignity are more important than baser emotions, and the Dutch will suffer enough because of their loss of power and possessions as well as through their internal conflicts (III, 266–72). By overruling the desire of his men for revenge, Fadrique ensures that all involved might re-establish their respective places as being in subordination to the even greater power of the empire.

To drive home the point of the play, the focus shifts to two allegorical figures, España and Fama, who recap the events of the battle, condemning the actions of the Dutch (III, 385–96) and glorifying the heroism of all who fought for the Iberian alliance. As this play sees it, and no doubt its spectators at the time heartily agreed, Felipe IV, favoured by God, has defeated the usurpers by a winning force of greater numbers and superior valour (III, 412–19). Clearly, the purpose of this scene is to serve as a lesson to the public, to praise what was regarded as the monolithic homogeneity, and the hegemony, of the Spanish-Portuguese union. Furthermore, the Portuguese, says Fama, should not be ashamed of having lost Bahia to the Dutch; Felipe IV considers Portugal’s concerns to be his own:

El Reyno de Portugal
no se descuyda, que causas
de su Rey, son propias suyas,
y assi junta fuerte Armada. (III, 428–311)

Fama concludes with the names of those who ‘a servir tu Rey / fueron’ (III, 484–85). After this bit of pageantry, the Dutch are ordered to render to Fadrique, in the name of the Spanish monarch (III, 494–96), not just the fortress and city but everything they have brought with them or have acquired in Brazil (III, 342–59, 524–30, 554–58). They will be afforded safe passage back to Europe with only their clothes, a few personal possessions, and enough light arms necessary to defend themselves at sea (III, 580–83,

40 A similar opinion was expressed earlier in the play when Coprani told Faro that one should not kill the vanquished; ‘antes es mayor grandeza / dexar que con vida salga’ (II, 424–25). These attitudes reveal that class, too, is definitely an influence here. Those who are elites have more in common with the elites in other societies than they do with the subordinate populations in their own society. In military terms, this can mean that in a conflict officers, especially, respect and feel a special kinship with the officers on the opposing side, offering them the honour and courtesy seen to be due to their rank and nobility, even when to accord such privileged treatment to their opponents seems to run counter to the overall military mission concerned and the wishes of those on their own side of lower rank.

618–20). Captives who are being held in Holland will be returned to Spain (III, 676–78). This section concludes with the hope that the King of Spain may someday rule over all lands upon which the sun and the moon shine (III, 744–47).

The play ends, not with the military triumph as such, but with the return of Rugero to the cultural and religious fold. The English captain reveals to Fadrique his Spanish heritage, his Catholicism, his dismay at the sight of the sacked churches (III, 792–97), his love for María, and his intention to return with her to Spain where they will live in Lisbon (Lisbon being thus understood to lie firmly within the borders of Spain [III, 241]). Rugero asks the general for his blessing, and Fadrique grants his request, adding that he will be the godfather at their wedding (III, 825). The manner of the conclusion is meant to offer us a number of lessons regarding how individual desires should relate to and be distinguished from social demands. Thus, in contrast to the actions of Guillermo and Rigepe, Rugero's conduct shows us that love is not necessarily incompatible with honour, courtesy, and gentlemanly behaviour. He is able to express his desires without resorting to violence and without compromising his principles, and he ends up with the woman he loves. The play's outcome shows, too, that if one gives oneself over to the baser emotions of anger, jealousy, and revenge, one harms not only oneself but the larger community. The conclusion also demonstrates that aligning oneself with power can prove to be personally advantageous. Not only are Guillermo and Rigepe on the wrong side of the conflict between Spain and Holland, their treachery means that they also find themselves in opposition to their own military hierarchy. Rugero, on the other hand, succeeds at the final curtain because he has proved his love for María in a way that is compatible with honour and gentlemanly courtesy, he has accepted the greater power of Spain and Portugal, and he has reaffirmed his faith in the Church triumphant. In short, he has pursued his love within the bounds of decorum as prescribed by Spain's army, its society, its Church and its king.

On a more general level, one notes the symmetry between the conquest of a woman by a man and that of a colony or nation by an empire. In both love and war, some people and countries resist the dominant force and others give in. Just as Daphne rejects Guillermo and María embraces Rugero, Brazil can be said to reject the attentions of its new suitor, Holland, and return to the arms of Spain. In both love and war, desire for possession itself is sufficient for one to feel entitled to or deserving of what is desired; and any rival who desires the same object will be seen as an enemy to be destroyed. Moreover, failure to pursue the object of desire at all costs may result in the loss of honour and valour, and perhaps even in death, either figuratively or in reality. Both types of endeavour, whether amatory or military, offer potential rewards, but also incur risks. While motivations derived from feelings of love and sexual desires may be much stronger than those that are determined by

political allegiance or military discipline, they do not necessarily lead to success; as Rigepe finds out, one cannot force love upon an unwilling subject. As the play also teaches, neither can an empire succeed if its members do not yield to the demands of the group, the society, and the ruler concerned. Success, on the other hand, can create its own dynamic: the greater the conquest, the greater the stature, the greater the desire for it, and the greater the entitlement to it. The benefits that are promised to those who align their imaginary, personal desires with the symbolic, imperial imperatives are, the play declares, virtually limitless: ‘poco es el mundo para su trofeo’ (II, 101).

As we pull back from its focus on the battle to the play as a whole, we discover that the very existence of Correa’s celebration of the retaking of Bahia reinforces the same cultural dynamics that we see reflected in the plot. Although we cannot be sure of the exact circumstances of the writing or performance of this play other than that Correa was apparently born in Lisbon and that his play was written before 1670,⁴¹ it is possible to make some reasonable assumptions. The play was probably written shortly after news of the victory reached Spain, and, if so, would have been composed in order to curry favour with the Spanish monarch as well as to please a paying audience in Spain, providing its spectators both with news and details of a great victory and with the occasion for national celebration. No doubt, Correa, like Lope de Vega, chose to highlight the failure of the Portuguese to hold Bahia in 1624 in order to underscore how essential it was for the Spanish to intervene in order to reclaim this important imperial asset. The fact that the Portuguese-born playwright should choose to write the work in Spanish should come as no surprise, especially considering the cultural importance of Spanish in the Iberian Peninsula for over a century (due in part to the presence of Spanish queens on the throne of Portugal), and the radical shift of power that inevitably took place during the period of Spanish rule over Portugal from 1580 to 1640. Other factors that would have influenced Correa’s choice of language include the existence in Spain, especially in Madrid, of much more highly developed public and court theatres, and the amount of support for the arts in Spain from Spanish patrons and, of course, from the king. This play, written in Castilian by a native of Lisbon to celebrate a Spanish victory, and for performance before the general public no doubt, not just a courtly audience, is additional evidence of the extent of Spain’s cultural hegemony beyond Spain itself and into Portugal and their overseas empires.

In conclusion, both the historical facts and details about the battle of Bahia (the various alliances and allegiances formed by both sides in this conflict), as well as the existence of this play written by a native of Portugal to celebrate the Spanish recovery of Brazil from its control by rival imperial

41 See Lisboa, *Uma peça desconhecida*, ‘Introdução’, xiv, xx.

powers, serve to show that such empires are not built or maintained by their armed forces alone. In their efforts to motivate subordinate populations into accepting and even actively supporting the imperial hegemony which dominates them, colonial powers employ a variety of mechanisms: military, religious, personal, social, cultural and artistic. By using every strategy available to pursue their goals, empires masterfully create incentives so that individuals, though they may speak of the ideals of liberty, individuality, and autonomy, given the chance, cast their lot with the elites in order to reap the benefits of associations with power, wealth, and status. The real genius of empire appears to lie in its ability to induce normal people to give their loyalty and support to those to whom they might otherwise be indifferent or even hostile, and to do so at great personal cost in the belief that the benefits outweigh the sacrifices; and all this is done in pursuit of imaginary fantasies and the fulfilment of what, at heart, amounts only to a symbolic promise.