Title
Overriding Reasons and Reasons to be Moral
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1986
Abstract
Do moral reasons override reasons of self-interest? Kurt Baier has, in a number of places,1 argued that reason alone requires us to acknowledge that they do, and thus that anyone who does not do what he has moral reason to do, even when this conflicts with what he has self-interested reason to do, is acting contrary to reason. I shall present an interpretation of Baier's argument and suggest that, so understood, the argument fails.
Identifier
10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01559.x
Publisher
University of Memphis
Repository Citation
Brown, C. (1986). Overriding reasons and reasons to be moral. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24(2), 173-187. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01559.x
Publication Information
The Southern Journal of Philosophy