Title

Mortal Harm

Document Type

Post-Print

Publication Date

2007

Abstract

The harm thesis says that death may harm the individual who dies. The posthumous harm thesis says that posthumous events may harm those who die. Epicurus rejects both theses, claiming that there is no subject who is harmed, no clear harm which is received, and no clear time when any harm is received. Feldman rescues the harm thesis with solutions to Epicurus' three puzzles based on his own version of the deprivation account of harm. But many critics, among them Lamont, Grey, Feit and Bradley, have rejected Feldman's solution to the timing puzzle, offering their own solutions in its place. I discuss these solutions to the timing puzzle, and defend the view that while we are alive we may incur harm for which death and posthumous events are responsible.

Document Object Identifier (DOI)

10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.482.x

Publication Information

The Philosophical Quarterly

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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