Immigration to Germany: Past and Present Experiences

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Immigration to Germany: Past and Present Experiences
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Abstract

Germany long stood as the epitome of the ethno-nationalist approach to immigration. However, passage of the new Citizenship Law in 2000, which introduced *jus soli*, seemed to signal a sea change in the direction of a postnational outlook. This paper warns against seeing in the new legislation an emerging normative consensus around the kind of liberal cosmopolitanism advocated by the likes of Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck or Will Kymlicka. I document the persistent allure and influence of nationalism and point to the growing appeal and sway of proposals and policies informed by a postmodern normative outlook. Germany’s normative landscape, like that of most European lands, is highly complex and contentious, manifesting *Kulturkampf* rather than consensus as far as immigration is concerned. The result is a complicated, indeed messy, immigration policy that defies easy categorization into neat typologies putative in comparative immigration studies.

INTRODUCTION

Germany has long stood as the prototype of the ethno-cultural approach in the field of comparative immigration studies. The New Citizenship Law of 2000, which essentially replaced *jus sanguinis* with *jus soli*, cast doubt on the validity of the dominant neo-institutionalist methodology of this field with its emphasis on the nation-state and path dependency. In fact, as I argued in my 1996 book *Beyond the Swastika*, the roots, both institutional and ideological, of this liberal, cosmopolitan turn can be traced not only to the new Aliens Law of 1990, not only to the Kuhn Memorandum of 1978, but to the Allied Occupation and the immediate postwar efforts to establish in West Germany a reliably liberal polity and culture in which the Holocaust could not recur. Put differently, there is not now and there has not been for decades a clear national consensus regarding immigration policy in Germany that would justify comfortably fitting the land into a putative comparative typology of nation-states either neatly juxtaposed against, say, “republican France” or “multicultural Britain,” or since 2000 transferred into the republican or multicultural category. Immigration policy in Germany, like every other land in Europe, is controversial, contended and therefore highly fluid, or to borrow from Gary Freeman (2004, p. 946), downright “messy.”

I want to build off this insight in two ways that I am developing in a new book project entitled *Clashes within Western Civilization: The Politics of Immigration in Europe*. First, Germany must be understood in the context of a much broader and longer normative debate that is Europe-wide, even world-wide. Here I can only refer the audience to the deservedly esteemed work of Isaiah Berlin (1979 & 1980), who illuminatingly chronicled and analyzed the protracted and unresolved philosophical
debate between two ontologically, epistemologically and morally incompatible and incommensurable worldviews that he termed “Enlightenment Liberalism” and “Counter-Enlightenment Nationalism.” In his 2000 book *Integral Europe*, Douglas Holmes brilliantly applied Berlin’s insights to the politics of immigration, though Holmes chose to call nationalism “integralism.” Second, I seek to augment Berlin’s and Holmes’ contributions by adding *postmodernism* as a vying and equally influential normative worldview in the politics of immigration. Expressed with extreme pith, liberalism prescribes universal rights protecting the autonomy of the individual to all persons regardless of nationality as long as they respect the same rights for others as well as rational and democratic values or procedures (rules of the game) to govern the pluralism that inevitably results in free societies (Habermas, 1983, Rawls, 1987, Bauböck, 1994, Kymlicka, 1995, Benhabib, 2004). Against liberalism, nationalism, or what I prefer to call “particularism,” stresses community and cultural homogeneity in addition to a political structure designed to protect both (Berghe, 1979, MacIntyre, 1981, Walzer, 1983, Smith, 1991, Waever, *et al.*, 1993, Taylor, 1994, Miller, 2000, Thaa, 2001). Rejecting both liberalism and nationalism, postmodernism posits invincible relativism and irreducible cultural heterogeneity accompanied by ultimately irrepressible political antagonism (Hall, 1992, Gray, 1995, Fish, 1999, Nancy, 2000, Mouffe, 2000). I introduce the notion of *Kuturkampf* to characterize the relationship between the three worldviews. *Kuturkampf* means that none finds itself in a position to defeat or dismiss once and for all its two rivals as appealing sources of normative legitimacy in the politics of immigration.

Ideally one would integrate normative and non-normative factors into a balanced analysis that favours no single factor unduly (Tichenor, 2002, Schain, 2008). Given limited scope, however, I analyse in these pages only normative factors.

**THE METHODOLOGY OF PUBLIC PHILOSOPHIES**

notion of public philosophy represents an analytical construct and tool to help empirically identify and conceptually organize the myriad normative ideas and presuppositions that actors willy nilly bring to politics.

I underscore three specific attributes of public philosophies. First, a (significantly influential) public philosophy rests on foundational ideas articulated by ‘great thinkers’ (by which I mean the kind of savants covered in any standard *History of Western Philosophy* text). For liberalism, I have in mind such seminal thinkers as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant; for nationalism, Vico, Herder, Burke, Renan; for postmodernism, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger. Second, a public philosophy is further shaped by the articulations of prominent contemporary (postwar) intellectuals who compellingly augment and develop the ideas of seminal thinkers in varied and nuanced ways that resonate today. Though I have not the space here to explain just how, these two categories of thinkers are primarily responsible for why the three public philosophies find themselves in a *Kulturkampf* unable definitively to defeat their rivals. Third, a public philosophy turns up in the pronouncements of political actors seeking to legitimate their policy agendas. In politics, however, normative ideas are most often deployed as mere fragments of the parent theory. Call them normative sound bites – “equality for all,” “Germany for the Germans,” “The Turks are the new Jews.” Fragmentation eases inconsistent deployment, because the fragments become disassociated from the logic and coherency of the larger theory. Add to this what Charles Taylor (2007, p. 11) calls “mutual fragilization.” This is an inescapable if at times diffuse awareness of the persuasiveness of rival viewpoints.

We live in a condition where we cannot help but be aware that there are a number of different construals, views which intelligent, reasonably
undeluded people, of good will, can and do disagree on. We cannot help looking over our shoulder from time to time, looking sideways, living our faith also in condition and uncertainty.

The resulting diffidence leads political actors to be more willing to compromise their moral convictions, which in turns enables normative inconsistencies to permeate policies.

The ideas of both “great thinkers” and contemporary intellectuals I access through their own published writings as well as some secondary interpretations. The ideas of opinion leaders I tap through their own (or their organization’s) pronouncements (platforms, position papers, press releases, etc.), media coverage of such individuals and organizations, and social scientific studies. Due to limited space, presentation of the evidence of each of the three dimensions will have to remain suggestive as opposed to exhaustive. As a result, the normative stances I limn below do not pretend to represent comprehensive descriptions of the ideas of either the theorists or political actors whom I cite. The nuance thus sacrificed is compensated, I hope, by the breadth of the perspective gained through an analysis that ranges across the whole of the political landscape. Specialists hungry for details can pursue them in the provided references – one reason they are deliberately plentiful.

LIBERALISM

Citizenship and integration courses and tests represent the latest fad in the politics of immigration. In 2006 Baden-Württemberg and Hesse developed and mandated them for (would-be) immigrants hailing from predominantly Muslim countries. Most other Länder subsequently followed suit. The Netherlands first introduced such civics classes in 1998. The EU has endorsed them while numerous other national and subnational governments have devised and implemented them as required hurdles for naturalization as well as for
acquisition or extension of visas. While the courses mandate proficiency in the dominant language of the receiving country, they also invariably teach and test commitment to the essential liberal democratic principles and values anchored in the constitution of the immigrant’s supposedly new homeland (de Groot, Kuipers & Weber, 2009, Joopke, 2007). In fact, the classes comprise merely a part of a more general ‘return of assimilation’ (Brubaker, 2001) and ‘the retreat of multiculturalism’ (Joppke, 2004) discernible in the West for the last two decades.

Some analysts (Parekh, 2008, O’Brien, 1993) have sought to diagnose this unmistakable political trend as a symptom of profound liberal diffidence in the face of cultural diversity of an unforeseen magnitude. In fact, ‘liberal assimilationism’ (Bauböck, 2002, p. 176) rests on sound, inveterate liberal principles, sustained by an abiding belief in the demonstrated superiority of the universal values enunciated during the European Enlightenment by luminaries such as Voltaire, Kant, Locke, and Jefferson (Barry, 2000, pp. 132-40). These liberal tenets (in updated formulation) include first and foremost the fundamental equality of all human beings regardless of race, creed, nationality, gender, and sexual orientation as well as the primacy of the moral autonomy of the individual against the claims of any wider community. Furthermore, all humans must be presumed to possess the capacity to reason and thus to govern their own lives in self-interested and self-improving ways. These values are neither culturally, historically nor geographically contingent and therefore apply to all persons in all contexts (Kant, 1959, Rawls, 1971).

So important are these ideals to individual and collective well-being that the state ought to protect and promote them against real and potential foes. And this it does best by actively molding its citizens into informed, open-minded political participants in the
democratic process. Across Europe in dialogue about immigration policy can be heard echoes of this basic message that in academic circles receives articulation under such rubrics as ‘Atlantic republicanism’ (Pocock, 1975), ‘strong democracy’ (Barber, 1984), ‘deliberative democracy’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004), ‘liberalism with a spine’ (Macedo, 2000), ‘civic patriotism’ (Laborde, 2002), ‘citizenship education’ (Crick, 1999), “patriotism” (Viroli, 1997), ‘preference competence’ (Buchstein, 1995), to name but a few scholarly iterations. An international chorus of prominent opinion leaders including, in Germany Henryk Broder, Hans-Peter Raddatz, Seyran Ates, Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Shabana Rehman, Helmut Schmidt, and elsewhere André Gerin, André Glucksmann, Emmanuel Todd, Chadortt Djavn, Bat Ye’or, Caroline Fourest, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Paul Scheffer, Herman Philipse, Ralph Giordano, Melanie Phillips, Hugo Young, Farrukh Dhondy, Roy Jenkins, and Niall Ferguson has sounded the warning. Though the verses of the individual authors may vary, their common refrain is unmistakable: Islam is inherently illiberal and anti-democratic, and, therefore, pious Muslims and the organizations that represent them threaten democracy, indeed Western Civilization itself. Accompanying these Cassandra-like voices are the clarion sounds of mostly sensationalized, bestselling books and articles as well as widely consumed documentaries and reportage revealing alarming practices of forced marriage, honor killings, genital mutilation, anti-Western indoctrination, and terrorist plotting on European soil (Dirie, 1999, Kelek, 2004, Çileli, 2006). Politicians respond to the indignation with assurances that their governments will not waver in the defense of democracy. This was what was meant, well before any talk of integration classes, when Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared in his first inaugural address that foreigners “must
decide to integrate” or “return home” (quoted in O’Brien, 1996, p. 98). It is also what Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble had in mind when in opening the German Islam Conference in 2006 he stipulated that only Muslims who demonstrate an inner “bedingungslose Anerkennung der demokratisch-rechtsstaatlichen Ordnung” would be welcome and tolerated (quoted in Amir-Maozami, 2011). A similar liberal assimilationist tone was to be heard by the German’s counterpart in Austria, Liese Prokop, when she asserted in 2005: “we have to teach the Muslim women, who allow their husband to beat them, that this is different in Austria” (quoted in Gresch, et al., 2008, p. 425). Similarly, Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy asserted in the same year:

We are proud of the values of the Republic, of equality between men and women, of laïcité, and of the French ideal of integration. So let us dare to speak of these to those we welcome here. And let us bring pressure to bear so that the rights of French women apply also to immigrant women (quoted in Scott, 2007, p. 162).

The normative logic of assimilationism implies a guarantee of equal treatment to the assimilated. Indeed, most European governments, in keeping with the EU’s Racial Equality Directive of 200, have enacted anti-discrimination legislation aimed at shielding immigrants from prejudice (Koopmans, et al., p. 249). Germany passed its Antidiskriminierungsgesetz in 2006, which included establishing the Die Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes. Angela Merkel condemned Thilo Sarrazin’s (2010) xenophobic Deutschland schafft sich ab as “ausserst verletzend und diffamierend” and warned against scapegoating Muslims, who deserve equal respect (Migration und Bevölkerung, September 2010). Immigrant advocate groups such as the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, the German Institute for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, the Open Society Institute, SOS-Racisme, and Amnesty International work tirelessly to keep the public
aware of on-going discrimination. Tony Blair captured the essence of the Europe-wide movement to eliminate discrimination with his much repeated phrase: ‘racists are the only minority’ (quoted in Koopmans, et al., 2005, p. 243).

As the erstwhile British Prime Minister’s remark suggests, anti-discrimination legislation typically applies to all persons, assimilated or not. Here emerges an important variant of liberalism that I term ‘cosmopolitanism.’ In contrast to liberal assimilationism, which insists that newcomers earn, so to speak, the rights of citizenship through demonstrated commitment to liberal values, cosmopolitanism asserts that immigrants, by lone virtue of being human beings, deserve (virtually) immediate access to the full rights and privileges of citizenship from the countries in which they reside (Carens, 1987, Tassin, 1994, Rubio-Marin, 2000, Kostakopoulou, 2001, Habermas, 2003, Benhabib, 2004, Beck & Grande, 2007). Citizenship, in other words, should attach to personhood rather than peoplehood and follow individuals across nation-state borders (Delanty, 2009, p.131).

Germany’s Citizenship Law of 2000 stands out as an example of realized cosmopolitanism. Because it established *jus soli*, it was trumpeted by its Social Democratic and Green legislators as political sea change in a Germany that had for decades insisted that *Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland* and had defended *jus sanguinis* as necessary for a nation divided by the Iron Curtain and berlin Wall. In truth, as I have shown elsewhere (O’Brien 1996), the adoption of liberal cosmopolitan values has deep roots in both the CDU and the SPD that can be traced to the 1970s and were quite firmly entrenched by 1990 when a Christian Democratic government took the first major legal step toward *jus soli* with the Aliens Law of that year. Other states have *jus*
soli as well. France has long practiced it, while Greece introduced it in 2009. As early as 1948, in the British Nationality Act, the United Kingdom guaranteed citizenship to all members of the Commonwealth. The Netherlands followed suit in 1954 for the inhabitants of Surinam and the Dutch Antilles.

The pressure toward cosmopolitanism is not likely to abate. The European Council Tampere Conclusions of 1999 directed member states to confer on third-country nationals citizenship rights ‘comparable’ to EU citizens. These and other EU policies have created a “thin Europeanisation” (Geddes, 2000) of rights and privileges for third-country nationals that they do not enjoy at the national level but do enjoy at the supranational level. Sweden, Ireland, and the Netherlands permit legal aliens to vote in municipal elections. Pro-migrant advocacy groups maintain a steady chant of cosmopolitanism with slogans such as ‘open borders,’ ‘des papiers pour tous’ (papers for all), or ‘Ausländer, lasst uns nicht mit den Deutschen allein’ (Koopmanns, et al., 2005, p. 207).

Needless to say, by detaching the rights of citizenship from a specific territory or people, cosmopolitanism promotes cultural diversity. While liberal assimilationism treats robust cultural diversity as a vice to be overcome, what I dub ‘liberal multiculturalism’ re-conceptualizes it as a virtue to be fostered. By this light, diversity can enhance a more authentic form of personal autonomy. Vigorous affiliation with a chosen tradition can enrich and strengthen one’s personal beliefs. Moreover, just such a sense of secure belonging and connectedness can fortify an individual to resist the fearsome pressures of conformity in mass consumer society (Raz, 1994, Kymlicka, 1995, Bielefeldt, 2007). If cultural identity and pride are integral to personal autonomy, as is for example private
property, then the liberal state should protect them as well. In a plural society, the state ‘should aim at insuring that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as a distinct culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 113). The state adopts a neutral position, facilitating fair and equal relations among varying, even vying, communities as opposed to siding with one particular worldview (Raz, 1994, p. 174). As early as 1978, the very first Bundesbeauftragter für Integration, the erstwhile Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn, stressed that integration could not have anything to do with “Zwangsgermanisierung” because aliens deserve a “guaranteed opportunity to preserve their identity” (quoted in O’Brien, 1996, p. 56). Pronouncing that ‘diversity brings employers tangible advantages’, Kühn’s contemporary counterpart, Maria Böhmer, threw her support in 2010 behind ‘The Charter of Diversity’ signed by 800 German firms representing 4.5 million employees. Germany is not alone. The Zapatero government’s Strategic Plan of Citizenship and Integration 2007-2010 has as one of its principles ‘inter-culturalism, according to which persons of different origins and/or cultures can interact with esteem and in full respect of diversity’ (Quoted in Ferrero-Turrión & Pinyol-Jiménez, 2009, 344). The EU’s Race Directive of 2000 states its goal as ‘promoting diversity’. Indeed, for the last three decades policies of multiculturalism that aid immigrants in maintaining integral elements of their distinct identities while simultaneously firmly establishing them in the receiving country have steadily mushroomed across Europe at various levels of government (Koopmans, et al., 2005, p. 72, Joppke & Morawska, 2003, p. 19). Especially since 9/11, state-sponsored efforts have intensified to help Muslims maintain their faith (Fetzer & Soper, 2005, Cesari, 2004). The recently established Deutsche Islam Konferenz and the Conseil Française de Culte
Musulman are two examples. The thrust of such strivings, various though they are, typically centers on the formation of some type of ‘Euro-Islam’ that is at once authentically Islamic but conceived and practiced in a way consistent with the liberal democratic values cherished in Europe (Tibi, 2002, Ramadan, 2004, Nielsen, 2007).

In its support for cultural diversity liberal multiculturalism can sometimes appear one with communitarianism. However, the two should not be confounded, for they rest on divergent philosophical principles. In the former, cultural diversity has no value in and of itself; it should be permitted and encouraged only in so far as it enhances individual autonomy (Delanty, 2009, p. 131, Benhabib, 2005, p. 676, Raz, 1994, pp. 186-89, Bader, 1995). For this reason, liberal multiculturalists invariably insist on voluntarism in and the right of exit from cultural associations and practices (Spinner-Halev, 1999, 73, Koopmans, et al., 2005, pp. 178-79). As Habermas (1998, p. 222) puts the case:

The constitutional state can make this hermeneutic achievement of the cultural reproduction of worlds possible, but it cannot guarantee it. For to guarantee survival would necessarily rob the members of the freedom to say yes or no…When a culture has become reflexive, the only traditions and forms of life that can sustain themselves are those that bind their members, while at the same time allowing members to subject the traditions to critical examination and leaving later generations the option of learning from other traditions or converting and setting out for other shores.

Schäuble (2009), in his popular little book *Braucht unsere Gesellschaft Religion? – Vom Wert des Glaubens*, echoes the esteemed liberal philosopher:

Anyone who does not want that, for example does not want their children – and particularly their daughters – to grow up in an open western society because they disapprove of various aspects, is making the wrong decision to settle permanently in Central Europe. One has to accept the conditions of one's new home (…) as we are not prepared to put the rules of tolerance, diversity and pluralism up for discussion."
In 1995, the Austrian government rejected a proposal by the Islamic Congregation – the officially recognized representative of Muslims in Austria – to make veiling mandatory in Islamic education classes in public schools (Bauböck, 2002, p. 174). Similarly, Berlin introduced Islamic education in its public schools in 2005. However, upon determining that the provider of the instruction, The Islamic Federation of Berlin, was imparting illiberal, anti-democratic values to pupils, the Senate abolished denominational religious instruction in its public schools in 2008, opting for a Religionskunde approach. The British government has for similar reasons dragged its feet in establishing publicly funded Islamic schools of which there are only seven compared to 7000 Christian schools (Monsma and Soper 2009, p. 151).

PARTICULARISM

Though much research indicates that European Muslims overwhelmingly support individual rights (Phalet, van Lotringen, & Entzinger, 2000, Goldberg & Sauer, 2003, Parekh, 2006, pp. 181-85, Hargreaves, 2007, p. 116, Klausen, 2009, 3), there doubtless exist Muslim groups and individuals (especially among Fundamentalists and Islamists) who willfully violate liberal values (Klausen, 2009, 3). Illiberal positions can be cogently defended under the principles of communitarianism. Though often denounced as dangerously relativistic (Bader, 1995, p. 216), communitarianism rests on the firm philosophical footing of the venerable strain of nationalist thought in the Western tradition. Nationalism’s pantheon of sages includes the likes of Vico, Montesquieu, Burke, Herder, Hegel, Fichte, Renan, and Mazzini. In divergent ways, these thinkers rejected the Enlightenment notion of a universal human nature and with it the idea of universally valid and applicable principles and laws. Humans are products of their
particular contexts, be they historical (Vico, 1948), environmental (Montesquieu, 1989), or cultural (Herder, 1877-1913). It follows that because the contexts are neither identical nor chosen, humans cannot share a universal essence or nature. They are insurmountably particular. Each nation, Herder averred, has a unique ‘Seele’. Montesquieu called it a ‘spirit’. Whatever the label, this essence defines not only the nation but its individual members as well. They experience life collectively as a ‘we’ as opposed to an isolated ‘I’ (Hegel, 1953). Most profoundly, as Burke (1969, p. 194-95) pointed out, nationalism is experienced as an on-going and quasi-sacred pact or ‘partnership between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’ to honour the nation’s achievements of the past, enrich those of the present, and make possible those of the future (also Renan, 1996).

Communitarians of our times invoke similar ideas but apply them to all meaningful communities, not solely to the nation. Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004, p. 435) speaks of a common ‘horizon of experience’, Alain de Benoist (1994, 263) a ‘sense of belonging’, Michael Sandel (2005, p. 258) a ‘common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings’. Taylor (1994) calls for a ‘politics of difference’ that enables all significant communities to maintain their idiosyncrasies under ‘the presumption of equal worth’ and the ‘ideal of authenticity’ (Taylor, 1995, p. 233 & 234). Walzer (1983: 314) denounces the imposition of extraneous values on communities: ‘Since there is no way to rank and order these worlds with respect to their understanding of social goods, we do justice to men and women by respecting their particular creations…To override those understandings is (always) to act unjustly’.
Diasporas of various sorts typically invoke communitarianism when pressing to preserve their distinct ways, especially when they appear to transgress or affront the dominant norms and values of the majority culture. In Europe, Muslims, more than any other minority community, seek exemptions from statute and convention by insisting on the right to be different (Koopmans, *et al.*, 2005, p. 155, Rohe, 2005, Gresch, *et al.*, 2009). Take *halal* butchering, for example. The Islamic rite prohibits stunning the animal before slaughtering it. In 2002, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that to guarantee freedom of religious expression, *halal* preparation of meats had to be permitted (though the *Bundestag* immediately responded with a kind of liberalism for animals by anchoring their protection from harm in the *Grundgesetz*, thereby tying the court’s hands). In France and Britain the practice is permitted (Koopmans, *et al.*, 2005, p. 55). When called on to justify such exemptions from statute, Muslims commonly enunciate two of the tenets of communitarianism: 1) the practice in question should be permitted because it is integral to the minority community (regardless of its reception in the wider society); and 2) only the diaspora should determine what is integral. Qatar-based cleric Youssef Al-Qaradaoui, who reaches millions of European Muslims via his programs carried by *al-Jazeera*, argues that only the organization which he heads, the Conseil Européen de la Recherche et de la Fatwa (www.islamophile.org/spip/-Conseil-Europeen-de-la-Recherche-.html), should determine what is and is not properly Islamic for Muslims living in the European diaspora. The *Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland* would appear to be heeding his advice. In its negations with the Ministry of Education to establish centers of Islamic Studies at the Universities of Tübingen, Münster and Osnabrück, which will train imams and religious education teachers, the council has insisted that Muslims and Muslims
alone should determine the professors and the content of what they teach (Migration und Bevölkerung February-March 2010). The Turkish government’s Ministry of Religious Affairs (DITIB) has steadfastly demanded that it should have the sole prerogative to provide the curricula, materials, and teachers for Islamic instruction of Turkish pupils in European schools (Klausen, 2005, Fetzer & Soper, 2005).

Indeed, in efforts to shape the actions of their emigrants abroad, governments of sending countries have used diplomacy to become influential voices in Europe defending numerous aspects of transnationalism beyond retention of religious identity (Freeman and Ögelman, 1998). Turkish premiere Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for instance, stirred up much discussion in visits to Germany in 2008 and again in 2011 by urging Turks to found Turkish Gymnasien in Germany like the German ones in Turkey. Receiving countries too have often embraced communitarian principles. This is true, moreover, not only of countries, like Sweden (Soininen, 1999) and the Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007, Entzinger, 2003), which in the Seventies adopted official programs of multiculturalism. Often keen to assuage the mounting xenophobia of native populations, other governments instituted or tolerated forms of ‘de facto multiculturalism’ (Joppke & Morawsak, 2003, p. 8) with the argument that they were preparing immigrants to return to their homelands (Palidda, 2009, Gresch, et al., 2009, Koopmans, et al., 2005, pp. 11-12 & 31-73, Entzinger, 2000). As was the case with the Kohl government’s Rückkehrpolitik anchored in the Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern of 1983, guestworkers had to be given the opportunity to maintain their native culture, language and ways (among their children as well, for instance, through specific classes in their own language at school) if they were to be induced to repatriate.
Despite having motivated relatively few immigrants to depart permanently, many elements of these programs of ‘reintegration’ in Germany and elsewhere have persisted to the present and play a significant role in sustaining transnational communities (Faist, 2000, Kastoryano, 2002, Caglar, 2001). Acceptance or toleration of dual nationality, which facilitates transnationalism, is on the rise across Europe (Hansen and Weil, 2002; Faist, 2007). In Germany it is officially verboten but the ban is rarely enforced (Hansen, 2003, p. 95).

The durable, conspicuous cultural diversity spawned from transnationalism has helped to generate a xenophobic backlash bent on protecting the majority culture. Over the past three decades, radical rightwing parties and personalities have regularly garnered between 10 and 25 percent of the popular vote across Europe. Their electoral success, moreover, has moved moderate parties of both the center right and left to propose or legislate measures aimed at reducing the number of immigrants and/or the rights and privileges which they enjoy (Givens, 2005, Gingrich and Banks, 2006, Messina, 2007). This was manifestly part of the political calculations that led in 1992 to the agreement between CDU and SPD to amend Article 16 of the constitution to make it more difficult for refugees to reach or reside in Germany (O’Brien, 1996, p. 107). The same holds for anti-immigrant legislation such as the British Nationality Act of 1981, Italy’s Bossi-Fini Law of 2002, or the so-called Sarkozy Law of 2003, all of which sought to make it harder for would-be immigrants to enter the land and easier for resident aliens to be deported.

Well before but more intensely since 9/11, Muslims have become the favorite target of xenophobic antipathy. As early as 1968, Enoch Powell delivered his ‘river of blood’ speech presaging civil unrest if the tide of Muslims entering the United Kingdom

Leftists have denounced these xenophobic tendencies as ‘the new racism’, which substitutes cultural for biological differences and hierarchies (Baker, 1981, Stolke, 1995, Taguieff, 2001). I prefer the epithet ‘nativist nationalism’, for these movements and sentiments, though various in shape and content (Messina, 2007, p. 64), repose on the same founding notions of European nationalism that inform communitarianism. However, nativist nationalism places highest (even lone) moral priority on the nation and nation-state. On this view, history has demonstrated that, despite the efforts of democratic and totalitarian ideologies and regimes committed to cosmopolitanism, people insist (often with their lives) upon living in self-governing nation-states (Schnapper, 1998, 98-110; Huntington, 2004). Following Hegel (1953, pp. 50-52), a people organically bound together as a self-governing nation represents the highest political achievement of humankind, ‘the divine Idea as it exists on earth’. Hermann Lübbe (1994, p. 38) concurs:

The ‘people’…which is the subject of constitutional authority in democracies, does not first acquire its identity from the constitution that it
gives itself. This identity is rather a preconstitutional, historical fact: thoroughly contingent, but not for that reason arbitrary…it is unavoidable for those who find that they belong to a particular people.

National solidarity and unity enable the smooth functioning of the political system. Börkenförde, for instance, has maintained that

a relative homogenization in a shared culture is needed...if the society which tends to become atomized is to be reunited into a unity capable of concerted action, in spite of being differentiated into a multiplicity of parts. This task is performed by the nation and its attendant national consciousness along with, and in succession to, religion...Thus the ultimate goal cannot be to overtake national identity and replace it with something else, not even with a universalism of human rights. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30 September 1995)

Similarly, British political philosopher David Miller avers that ‘without a common national identity, there is nothing to hold citizens together (Miller 1992, p. 94). ‘Nations are ethical communities...The duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to humans as such’ (Miller, 2000, p. 27). Jörg Haider iterated a (perhaps distorted) version of Miller’s argument when he exclaimed: ‘the right of natives to Heimat is more important than the right of immigrants to family life’ (quoted in Fillitz, 2006, p. 143). With similar concerns in mind, the Danish political scientist Ole Waever (1993, pp. 23-26) contends that ‘societal security’ should be granted equal priority alongside national and social security by nation-states. Societal security constitutes ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’. It entails ‘the sustainability...of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom’. It exists when a people does not have to fear that ‘we will no longer be able to live as “us”’. Essentially the same argument did the 15 German professors who published the Heidelberg Manifesto in 1982 advance:
Peoples are...living systems of a high order, each with its own systematic characteristics which are transmitted genetically and through tradition. For this reason the integration of large masses of non-German foreigners is impossible for the simultaneous preservation of our people, and leads to the well-known ethnic catastrophes of multicultural societies. (quoted in Chin, 2007, p 148)

The influential French professor, Dominique Schnapper (1998, 116) avers that homogeneity of population is not enough to create a nation, but it is true that it favors the interaction of social life and a political society. This is why the formation of the nation was always accompanied by policies aimed at reducing particularisms, not only political, but cultural.

Something of the same logic informs the comments by Angela Merkel and David Cameron to the effect that multiculturalism has failed (‘and failed utterly,’ according to the chancellor).

On this view, immigrants are to be tolerated only on condition that they assimilate to the majority culture. This outlook turns up in naturalization requirements that demand a manifestation of, say, ‘Britishness’ (quoted in Ryan, 2009, pp. 290-91), ‘feeling Dutch’ (quoted in Van Oers, 2009, p. 128) or a ‘voluntary and lasting orientation toward Germany’ (quoted in Hansen, 2003, 91). The French, of course, purport that their requirement of assimilation à la communauté française is based on the universal republican principles of the French Revolution. And yet, the web page of the Ministry of Justice instructs prospective applicants that they need to be ‘well assimilated to the French customs and manners’. In practice, for instance, French officials are known to automatically deny naturalization to Muslims who observe the pious duty to pray five times daily at prescribed moments (Klausen, 2005, p. 21; on Denmark, see Mouritsen, 2006 and, on Italy, Triandafyllidou, 2006). In Germany, particularly before 2000, officials considered membership in an ethnic or Islamic association as grounds for denial
of naturalization (Hansen, 2003, p. 91). Is this trend likely to change, when the current Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, asserts, as he did when assuming office in 2011, that ‘Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland’ (Deutsche Welle 30 March 2011)?

Nativist nationalism tends to exhibit an unmistakable propensity to view immigrants with suspicion as a potential threat to the well-being of the nation. The philosophy here retains some of the ‘friend-foe’ distinction in the thought of the German nationalist Carl Schmitt (1996). The Nazi enthusiast maintained that in order to overcome internal frictions – to treat one another as friends -- a folk needed to have a designated foe against whom to unite. Today around Europe that enemy designate is doubtless Muslims. Listen, for example, to Frits Bolkestein, erstwhile parliamentary leader of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy: ‘One must never underestimate the degree of hatred that Dutch people feel for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. My political success is based on the fact that I was prepared to listen to such people’ (quoted in Buruma, 2006, p. 64). Clifford Longley, in an editorial to the Times (8 July, 1989) entitled ‘A very British lesson Muslims must learn’, cautioned Islamic immigrants not to underestimate British resolve to protect their way of life: ‘the white tribes of Britain can be every bit as stubborn and intransigent, and no less forceful in defense of their beliefs, as the brown tribes’. In 2010, Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin (2010) made the bestseller list in Germany with his opprobrious claim that ‘Germany is destroying itself’ by allowing untold numbers of inassimilable Muslims to reside in the fatherland.

**POSTMODERNISM**

Postmodernism interprets xenophobia as confirmation of the inescapable and insurmountable cultural and political antagonisms endemic to the ‘postmodern
condition’ (Lyotard, 1984). Nationalism winsomely posits a hopelessly utopian and nostalgic dream world of cultural homogeneity. The only real community, claims Jean-Luc Nancy (1991), is ‘the inoperative community’. Similarly, liberalism quixotically chases after universal principles despite the demonstrated futility of the ill-conceived endeavor (Gray, 1995, pp. 85-95). Etienne Balibar (2004, p. 201) insists

there can be no new ‘Leviathan’ that would regulate belief and officialize knowledge (‘institute the truth,’ as the modern state has done through its schools and universities), and there is even less possibility for a new ‘civic religion’ that would relativize ‘traditional’ or ‘revealed’ religions and relegate them to private choice.

Nietzsche sired postmodernism. It was his seminal insight that all truth claims are historically and contextually contingent. They cannot be universal because they are always views from a particular perspective – why Nietzsche (1968) labeled the idea ‘perspectivism’. Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty in differing ways went on to explain tellingly how our particular perspective evolves from and is embedded in the day-to-day practice of our lives (Solomon, 1987, pp. 178-82). What the Frenchman termed ‘prereflexive consciousness’ colors our understanding of the world, closing our eyes to some dimensions while opening them to others. No person or idea is above bias (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Charlotte Nordmann and Jérôme Vidal (2004), for example, contend that the very republicanism that French liberals lionize for its universalism is itself as much a product of a particular outlook and experience as the Islamic fundamentalism that republicans vilify. Schirin Amir-Moazami (2005, p. 271) has taken like aim at the purported ‘neutrality’ of Germany’s brand of secularism. Across the channel, Bhikhu Parekh (2000, p. 13) underscores the contextual contingency that liberalism cannot overcome.
Liberalism is a substantive doctrine advocating a specific view of man, society and the world and embedded in and giving rise to a distinct way of life. As such it represents a particular cultural perspective and cannot provide a broad and impartial enough framework to conceptualise other cultures or their relations with it.

Though the two concepts share some similarities, postmodernism’s perspectivism differs from nationalism’s “rootedness.” To begin with, nationalist tenets posit a single, hermetically sealed cultural homogeneity that gives holistic meaning and identity to those who live under its influence. Postmodernism, by contrast, maintains that persons are increasingly confronted with and simultaneously influenced by multiple, intersecting perspectives that undermine coherent experience. Whether they characterize it as ‘schizophrenia’ (Deluze and Guatarri, 1987), *différance* (Derrida, 1991), ‘being singular plural’ (Nancy, 2000) ‘together-in-difference’ (Ang, 2001, p. 200) or ‘many in one’ (Balibar, 2004, p. 26), postmodern diagnosticians of unending and unexampled alterity and hybridity have something similar in mind to what Stuart Hall (1992, p. 277 & 287) describes:

The fully unified, completed, secure and coherent identity is a fantasy. Instead, as the systems of meaning and cultural representation multiply, we are confronted by a bewildering, fleeting multiplicity of possible identities, any one of which we could identify with - at least temporarily…Modern nations are all cultural hybrids.

Immigration, in particular, creates an atmosphere of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007) that intensifies the ‘instability and mutability of identities which are always unfinished, always being remade’ (Gilroy, 1993, p. xi).

Postmodern theory furthermore reads into all truth claims an ineluctable political dimension – what Nietzsche (1968) diagnosed as the ‘will to power’. Influenced by Edward Said’s seminal *Orientalism* (1978), postcolonial scholars and many Muslim
organizations contend that the great hullabaloo over the alleged threat posed by Islam to European societies is less about the defense of freedom and equality and more about the deliberate demonization and continued domination of Muslims by Europeans (El Guindi, 1999, p. 184, Lamont, 2000, pp. 212-13, Schiffauer, 2007, p. 86, Scott, 2007, pp. 42-89, Sayyid, 2009, pp. 198-99). The ‘Feindbild Islam’ (Naumann, 2010, p. 19) has deep roots in European history and feeds directly into the ‘Islam-bashing für jedermann’ (Gerhold, 2010, p. 345) common in contemporary Europe. Particularly but not exclusively in Germany, one hears the analogous argument that Islamophobia represents a kind of new anti-Semitism (Benz, 2009). Turkish rags with a wide distribution in Germany, such as Günaydın or Milliyet, frequently refer to Turks as ‘Germanys new Jews’.

Once all truth claims are exposed as ultimately contingent and self-serving, there can be no escape from the vicissitudes of politics into the reassuring certainty of metaphysics. ‘Truth’ or ‘right’ becomes nothing more than what has been made to pass for truth or right (Baudrillard, 1996, Fish, 1999). A case in point is Islamist organizations in Europe that persistently succeed in convincing their adherents of ‘truths’ deemed absurd by the European mainstream (Modood, 2002, pp. 121-22, Roy, 2004, p. 140). As far as citizenship is concerned, postmodernism conceptualizes it as neither an inalienable right anchored in universal ethics (or even in a legal constitution) nor a firm identity rooted in a nation. Citizenship is rather a political prize won through the ‘perennial’ give-and-take of politics (Cohen, 2009, p. 96-97). The politics of immigration, claims Werner Schiffauer (2007, p. 79), ‘must almost by necessity lead to an agonising conflict-oriented fight for recognition’.

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Because the outcomes of political contestations vary, citizenship is inherently protean, “plastic” (Konsta & Lazaridis, 2010) as well as ‘multi-layered’ (Yuval-Davis, 1999, 120). Thus, in addition to conventional (full) citizens, scholars have identified ‘dual citizens’ (Faist, 2007), ‘alien citizens’ (Bosniak, 2006), ‘hybrid citizens’ (Stasiulis, 2004), ‘fragmented’ citizens (Wiener, 1997), ‘semi-citizens’ (Cohen, 2009), ‘denizens’ (Hammar, 1990) and ‘margizens’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000). We are witnessing the ‘irregularization of immigration’ whereby increasing numbers of migrants do not have a formal or secure status (Engbergsen, 2001, 222). The ‘flexible’ nature of citizenship tends to foster instrumentalism. Increasingly individuals assume whatever available form of citizenship that produces the most advantage for them in a particular time and place (Ong, 1999; also Engbergsen, 2001). Virtually all sending countries honor dual citizenship, in part at least, as a way to keep much coveted remittances (estimated to be in the $100 billions annually) pouring back into their economies (Vertovec, 2004; Freeman & Ögelman, 1998). Receiving countries have a documented track record of adeptly controlling migration to serve their perceived economic interests (Messina, 2007), including turning a blind eye to illegal immigration that supplies cheap labor to industry (Verstraete, 2003, p. 228; Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006). In justifying his government’s introduction in 2005 of a “green card” program preferring select groups of migrants, Gerhard Schroeder crassly opined: ‘there are people we need and there are people who need us’. A year later Sarkozy contrasted desired immigration choisie and suffered immigration subie (a proposal actually first put forth by Socialists in 1998). Britain has had a Highly Skilled Migrant Program since January 2002.
The postmodern point, again, is that one’s citizenship status necessarily results from political decisions subject to ceaseless contestation. Furthermore, these inescapable struggles are not confined to formal politics. Some stigmatized immigrants, like Muslims in Europe, even after naturalizing, suffer informal discrimination to an extent that they experience citizenship differently from unstigmatized ‘fellow citizens’ (Essed, 1991, Ong, 1999, Rumbaut, 2002, Brysk, 2004, Tibi, 2006, Phillips, 2006, Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008, Cohen, 2009). By the same token, stigmatized groups are far from powerless. Of course, they can and do protest through official channels. But typically in ethnic enclaves they often manage to establish countervailing conditions of *de facto* citizenship more favorable to them. A striking example of such self-customized citizenship comes from numerous areas in Europe with dense concentrations of Islamists where significant elements of *sharia* (for example, mandatory veiling or polygamy) are regularly practiced and enforced (Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2003, Roy, 2004, pp. 281-82, Kastoryano, 2006, pp. 66-67, Saharso, 2007). This type of conflicting claims to sovereignty became particularly poignant and salient during the Salman Rushdie Affair when the Muslim Parliament UK – a legal immigrant organization – issued a *fatwa* calling for the author’s execution, and added that it intended to utilize every means at its disposal to carry out its law on British soil (Koopmans, *et al.*, 2005, p. 165). All of Europe witnessed again on September 11, 2001 just how radically different the mood, culture, and identity of such Islamist enclaves could be as some of their inhabitants cheered the destruction of the two towers while the rest of Europe commiserated with America. Indeed, some element of the plot appears to have been planned or prepared in Germany at the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg. Of course, these acts of defiance against
the West led to violent clashes between Muslims and non-Muslims. And there have, of course, been others, for instance, in Bradford, Burnley, Oldham in the summer of 2001 or following the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. These are the nastiest examples of what some deplore in the so-called ‘parallel society’ (Cantle, 2004). Hard-line postmodernists regret such degeneration of political difference into violence but warn that no one can devise a full-proof recipe to prevent it in a Hobbesian world lacking an overwhelming Leviathan to keep the peace (Gray, 1995, p. 90, Fish, 1999, p. 240). Just such Hobbesian postmodern candor did Tariq Modood (1990, p. 144) express when he called Muslims ‘the group that British society is currently being forced to adjust to or defeat’. Most of Europe’s cities, explain Diken and Lausten (2008, p. 245) contain an “Islamic ghetto” and are therefore “always already antagonistic. The city is an antagonism…that can only be united through fantasy.” Youth fora in Berlin’s Kreuzberg borough pose the open question ‘Zusammenwachsen oder Zusammenprallen der Kulturen?‘ (Spiegel 14 November 2005).

Not all (including Modood, 2006) believe postmodern politics has to be so starkly Hobbesian or necessarily result in the dreaded parallel society. Hospitable as opposed to Hobbesian postmodernism also offers no guarantee of harmony, neutrality, certainty or stability but refuses to jettison the possibility that rival parties adhering to fundamentally different worldviews can learn to interact with one another via mutually respectful and beneficial practices. Rushdie himself, for instance, encourages readers to celebrate ‘hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes from new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs’ (quoted in Joppke, 1996, p. 488). Julia Kristeva (1991) argues that deep down we are
each of us strangers to ourselves – an unavoidable state of the human condition which, however, can be tapped to ease and encourage openness vis-à-vis foreigners. In order to reap the benefits of insurmountable difference, opposing parties must resist the tempting urge to denounce and dismiss one another. Richard Rorty (1989), for example, proscribes cruelty toward others. Kristeva (1991, pp. 75-76) adds oppression to the list of discouraged practices, Stuart Hall (2000, p. 232) ‘inferiorisation’. Chantal Mouffe (2000, p. 9) dubs her preferred manner of co-existence ‘agonistic pluralism’ in which differing parties come to see themselves not as Schmitt’s foes, but as ‘adversaries, adversaries being defined in a paradoxical way as “friendly enemies”, that is, persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way’. Balibar (2004, p. 76) urges ‘citizenship without community’, while Romand Coles (2005, p. xiii) endorses ‘a democratic ethos that cultivates tension-dwelling’. ‘Such a starting point’, Ash Amin (2004, p. 4) envisages, ‘suggests that empathy/engagement with the stranger could become the essence of what it is to be “European”’. Hospitable postmodern encounters must be open-ended, totally void of unquestionable presumptions and foregone conclusions. No topic, no perspective may be considered taboo. Indeed, the legitimacy of the very ground rules of the meetings must remain open to debate (Lefort, 1988, p. 39). Hilmar Hoffmann, Cultural Minister for the city of Frankfurt, underscores that deep diversity ‘makes any all-inclusive ideology, religion, or worldview impossible… Whoever merely speaks of the preservation of a cultural identity, be it of Germans or foreigners, misunderstands the dynamic character of the cultural [exchange] process’ (quoted in Chin, 2007, p. 213). Parekh (2008, p. 52),
who headed the Runnymede Trust Commission, explains: ‘since every dominant group tends to impose the principles of justice that serve to legitimize its domination, we need to counter it by seeking out those it marginalizes or silences and ensuring their adequate representation in deliberative bodies’. Lacking consensus on principles, such bodies should seek a ‘pragmatic, case-by-case, negotiated approach to dealing with controversy and conflict: not an ideological, “drawing a line in the sand” mentality’ (Modood, 2009, p. 180). Indeed, studies reveal that across Europe Muslims and non-Muslims more often than not do manage to find pragmatic solutions to the conflicts that divide them (Liederman, 2000, Modood and Kastoryano, 2006, pp. 174-75, Mushaben, 2007, Faist, 2009, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2009, Wise and Velayutham, 2009). Sadly, such commonplace accommodations between parents and teachers, workers and bosses, imams and ministers do not receive the media coverage given to the less frequent conflicts that elude resolution.

**CONCLUSION**

Schain (2008), like Freeman (2004) and Schierup, Hansen and Castles (2006) cited in the introduction, underscores the messiness of immigration policies. In his transatlantic comparative study he finds a ‘contradiction of policies in different arenas’ (276) that governments regularly and quite knowingly, if tacitly, tolerate (283). Such glaring inconsistencies, he avers, ‘reflect the complexities of the democratic political process’ (Schain, 2008, p. 275). This paper has tried to show that normative discord represents a critical element of the political process. But more than mere philosophical discord between liberalism, particularism and postmodernism is at work. In politics, as opposed to philosophy seminars, what I call “normative fragmentation” is equally or even more
important. Most political actors, as we have seen, deploy but fragments of the grander theories. When detached from the parent theory, fragments are used by political agents with little or no regard for logical consistency. Indeed, the fragments do not in the detached form come across as contradictions but rather as moral legitimizations apropos for a particular political setting or argument. Normative fragmentation or muddle permeates political rhetoric and from there finds its way into policy itself. It is important to realize, however, that the intense normative fragmentation depicted above would not be possible in the absence of the deeper philosophical discord separating the three public philosophies, that is, the incompatibility and incommensurability underscored by Berlin (and augmented by me with regard to postmodernism). The clashing of the three public philosophies at the level of pure theory yields sharper shards that make the battles on the ground both fiercer and messier than they would be in the absence of the theoretical conflict. If virtually all significant political actors in the politics of immigration were committed liberals, as some analyses of the 1970s contend was largely the case (Schierup, Hansen and Castles 2006, p. 28, Messina, 2007, pp. 188-89), they would still debate how best to integrate Muslim newcomers, some, for instance, siding with a stronger others with a weaker role for the state to play in socializing migrants to liberal values. The nature of the conflict changes altogether when actors enter the field outfitted with nationalist normative artillery campaigning that the newcomers should be deported as opposed to integrated. The intensity of the fighting raises yet another level when newcomers wielding postmodern weapons claim that they plan to stay whether welcome or not and have no intention of adopting the predominant norms and values of what they see as a ravagingly cruel society. Moreover, as we have seen, the politicking takes place
within a fully internationalized normative political landscape in which actors are keenly aware of what is happening and being argued in countries beyond their own. For this reason, it is becoming increasingly problematic to talk of German immigration politics and policy in the sense of being distinct, say, from French or British despite the prominence of this nation-state, path-dependency approach in the field of immigration studies (Brubaker, 1992, Joppke, 1996, Koopmans, et al., 2005). Normatively speaking, the discourse is fully internationalized. It, furthermore, is the continuation of an inveterate *intra-civilizational Kulturkampf* (contra Huntington’s *inter-civilizational *‘clash’ thesis) the appreciation of which can help us better to comprehend “the bewildering diversity” (Bader 2007, p. 26) of immigration policies and politics.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


