Anglo-American Merchants and Stratagems for Success in Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-1807

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CHAPTER SIX

Anglo-American merchants and stratagems for success in Spanish imperial markets, 1783–1807*

But the Spanish Colonies, being wholly cloathed and in a great degree fed by our nation, should they like the tyger be suffered to cripple the hand whose bounty feed them? Has not the second nation on the Globe in commercial tonnage, and the first in exports for the necessaries of life, a right to demand with firmness, the respect due to her Flag and Citizens ...?

When Josiah Blakeley, consul of the United States at Santiago de Cuba, wrote these lines to Secretary of State James Madison on November 1, 1801 he had recently been jailed by administrators on that island.¹ This remarkable situation notwithstanding, his sentiments still neatly express the paradox of trade between the United States and Spanish Caribbean ports. The expanding hinterlands of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore furnished North American merchants with ever increasing, exportable food supplies and led to fierce competition for new markets at the end of the eighteenth century.² At the same time, Spain's American colonies remained chronically, often desperately, short of food-stuffs. Imperial bureaucrats at many levels consistently recognized this problem, yet they imposed numerous trade restrictions.³ Even more than the dizzying pace of war and peace itself after 1793, these restrictions made North American commerce with the Spanish Caribbean volatile, risky and undesirable for many.⁴ This essay focuses not upon those who were deterred from the trade, but rather upon a small network of North Americans who, despite the uncertainties, chose to operate within these markets. First, the salient characteristics of their businesses are outlined. Then, it is argued that their behavior departed from the models postulated for American merchants that have been developed by students of the period. As opposed to luck or 'imaginative innovation' or aggressive individualism, the key factor emphasized here is cultural flexibility.⁵ Moreover, the research is drawn from archives, both foreign and domestic, that are not often consulted by Anglo-Americanists. At the very least, this strategy allows a more correct identification of the individuals involved in trade with the Spanish Empire.

The example of John Leamy provides a case in point. Countless expedientes
Cuba: origins and modalities

in several Spanish archives attest to his commanding presence in U.S. trade with Spanish America after 1792. At times when no other North American received the necessary licenses, Spanish imperial officials made sure that Leamy was able to land his cargoes. Moreover, his ships were the first foreign ones admitted to the Rio de la Plata in 1798. Yet, the most commonly consulted North American sources yield only the barest indications of his existence. If Leamy’s personal or business papers have been preserved, they have yet to be found. But, since he was a founder and director of the Insurance Company of North America, it is possible to reconstruct some of his activities through less direct sources, such as minutes of directors’ meetings and maritime insurance policies. While certain types of questions regarding the rate of return on a particular venture, for example, still cannot be answered with precision, these alternate sources do add new insights into entrepreneurial behavior in this commercial sphere. In addition to John Leamy of Philadelphia, John and Thomas Stoughton, based in New York, are also treated here in some detail. Again, Spanish archival sources attest to their importance; in this instance, fortunately, two sets of their letterbooks have also been preserved in New York. Finally, Stuart Bruchey’s thorough treatment of the Olivers of Baltimore provides the opportunity to assess the business practices of a spectacularly successful firm from that port.7

In brief, the operations of these merchants shared the following characteristics: 1) they were built upon personal contacts cultivated over many years with high-ranking peninsular officials as opposed to Spanish merchants; 2) they preferred to rely upon relatives on the scene rather than native correspondents or United States’ consuls; 3) they often worked in concert with, instead of competing against, other North Americans from nearby ports; 4) they exhibited extreme flexibility in business dealings, including the willingness to ship provisions by indirect routes, to pay off corrupt bureaucrats, and even to transport slaves to gain admittance to ports that were officially closed. If such behavior failed to qualify as modern entrepreneurship in the fullest sense, it is clear nevertheless that, given the context of the Spanish commercial system, the Leamys, Stoughtons and Olivers acted quite rationally to maximize their trading opportunities. Those who acted differently simply did not succeed.

In the forefront of Spanish imperial trade in the 1790s, these men had steadily nurtured Spanish contacts throughout the preceding decade. With Spain’s overt participation in the Revolutionary War after 1779 came the legalization of direct trade to key Spanish Caribbean ports. This was due primarily to the influx of troops that needed to be fed. The Spanish initiated deals with prominent rebel merchants, offering Robert Morris one of the first trading licenses to Cuba. Morris jumped at this opportunity, but his principal contact, Juan de Miralles, soon died. Morris served as executor of the estate, but then turned his attention to governmental affairs and other, less fortunate business schemes.9 At the same time, John Leamy took his cue from the Spaniards, assiduously cultivating the deceased agent’s secretary, Francisco
de Rendón. Of Irish origin, Leamy had been educated in Spain, where he lived for several years prior to establishing himself in business in Philadelphia around 1781. Leamy had won the trust of some Spanish officials by that time, since he carried letters, luxury items and funds to Rendón, who was eventually named the new agent. Seven years later, the highest-ranking Spanish diplomat in the United States, Diego de Gardoqui, admitted that Leamy performed favors for him, such as recruiting Pennsylvania artisans to settle in Spanish Louisiana. Likewise, the up-and-coming merchant ingratiated himself with Gardoqui's two subordinates, Josef de Jáüdenes and José Ignacio Viar. Charged with obtaining food supplies for Santo Domingo late in 1791, these young Spaniards were duly impressed when Leamy diverted one of his ships, already loaded and destined for a French Caribbean port, to the Spanish colony instead. Jáüdenes and Viar noted Leamy's zeal and partiality for Spain, as well as the fact that he declined to take excessive profits from the switch. A few years later, Jáüdenes moved into a house in Philadelphia owned by Leamy. And, as late as 1820, Leamy served as a clandestine conduit for privileged information from peninsular authorities to Spanish representatives in North America. Unlike the Stoughtons, then, Leamy never held the title of Spanish consul, but it is clear none the less that he often functioned in a similar capacity over the course of four decades.

Like John Leamy, the Stoughtons also did favors over the years for Spaniards stationed in North America. For example, the son of Felipe Fatío, a long-time Spanish commercial agent, owed the North Americans money as early as 1792. But if Leamy provided a residence for Jáüdenes, John Stoughton went one step further by giving his daughter in marriage to the only man with authority to sell trading permits to Cuba in the early 1790s. The bride of Jáüdenes' successor, the Marqués de Casa Irujo, came from a distinguished Pennsylvania family, the McKeans. That tie kept him living in Philadelphia even after the capital had moved to Washington, D.C., no doubt a convenient arrangement for his business partner, James Barry. And surely it was no coincidence that, following the marriage of his sister to Francisco Sarmiento, John Craig of Philadelphia received promising trade concessions to Venezuela. Most of the persons discussed above were Roman Catholics, a fact that obviously facilitated these alliances. Undoubtedly, it would be difficult to overstate the influence of religion in cementing official trust. For example, it was none other than Bishop John Carroll himself who introduced James Barry to Jáüdenes and Viar. And the hapless Spaniard Rendón was recalled to Madrid when he sought to marry the daughter of a New York merchant who was Protestant. Still, it must be emphasized that these North Americans went out of their way to pattern their behavior along Spanish, as opposed to strictly Catholic, lines. When Jáüdenes went to drink at City Tavern, it was for the expressed purpose of ingratiating himself with Thomas Jefferson and other members of the government. Obviously, this lesson was not lost on another frequent patron of that establishment, John Leamy.
Cultivating the right Spanish officials was more efficient than seeking to establish close relations with Spanish mercantile firms. In the decade following the revolution, the Stoughtons sent out several feelers to houses in the peninsula and in the colonies. However, they do not appear to have maintained successful, long-term arrangements with specific individuals or businesses. The difficulties involved are illustrated by the case of Pedro Juan de Erice of Havana. Late in 1793, the Stoughtons consigned some goods to him. A series of increasingly stiff letters followed, demanding more prompt unloading of cargoes, quicker return shipments and payment of expired accounts. Finally, an exasperated John Stoughton went himself on a trading voyage to the Spanish Caribbean. He intended to settle with Erice in person: whether or not he succeeded is unknown.\textsuperscript{15} John Leamy solved the problems of unreliable correspondents by working through his brother James, a long-term resident of that Cuban port. And, on at least one occasion, local Spanish functionaries smoothed the arrival of consignments to him.\textsuperscript{16} This last point is a telling one. Historians often assume that the 'latin personality' helped to keep Hispanic businessmen from serving as competent correspondents. In truth, however, it was the Spanish commercial system, defined by policymakers in Madrid, that really circumscribed their role. Spanish imperial merchants simply did not have the freedom to make decisions, the ability to guarantee performance, or even the access to reliable shipping information that were enjoyed by their North American counterparts. Leamy and the Stoughtons recognized this fact and consequently directed their attention towards other, more productive channels.

While this circle of North American traders depended upon Bourbon functionaries in conducting their various commercial affairs, and even assumed Spanish offices themselves, they did not as a rule rely upon the services of American consuls stationed in Spanish colonial ports. This was an understandable and wise course of action. For many of the United States' consuls were themselves aspiring merchants who regarded official duties as secondary to their own business interests. Under such circumstances, it made little sense for them to aid competitors who already enjoyed strong influence in high places. More to the point, however, was the fact that the consuls were in the extremely unenviable position of not being legally recognized by the Spanish government. Thus, at the same time that the United States required them to protect the interests of its traders and seamen, Spain gave them little room to maneuver. Moreover, the consuls were often required to record formal protests against Spanish commercial policy, which subsequently limited their ability to work behind the scenes to alleviate specific problems. So, while stranded American sailors complained that their maintenance allowances, paid out of the consul's own pocket, were inadequate, local administrators harassed these representatives. On occasion, they had their papers confiscated, were asked to leave the colonies, and even were thrown into jail. Not surprisingly, the turn-over rate in this office was high. As a rule, then, its occupants never
established the powerful connections that Leamy, Craig and the Stoughtons had built up over the years.\textsuperscript{17}

Regarding their relationships with each other, the degree to which Leamy and the Stoughtons worked in concert to further their respective commercial ends is striking. They were never formal partners, but they did send business each others' way and each party performed vital services for the other. For example, Leamy functioned as an insurance broker, often purchasing maritime policies for his counterparts in New York and elsewhere. The Stoughtons, in turn, chartered and provisioned ships for Leamy around the time of the outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1793.\textsuperscript{18} They cooperated in much the same way as did John Craig and the Olivers, who at least were related by marriage.\textsuperscript{19} In short, when Spaniards like Jáudenes presented the opportunities, Leamy and the Stoughtons responded by trusting each other to advance their individual interests. This occurred, it should be pointed out, at a time when their respective home ports, Philadelphia and New York, rivalled each other for national supremacy in foreign trade.

From the examples presented above, it is obvious that success did not come easily to North Americans trading with the Spanish Empire. On occasion, even the operations of men as well-connected as Leamy and the Stoughtons did not proceed smoothly. When John Stoughton travelled as supercargo to Santo Domingo and Cuba during the summer of 1794, he carried numerous passports and letters of introduction to the proper authorities, each duly noting bis relationship to Jáudenes. Furthermore, the New Yorker's grasp of Spanish was strong enough to write appropriately flattering petitions to local dignitaries. Nevertheless, Stoughton was given the runaround, or at least caught in the middle of a dispute between the military commander, who wanted to buy flour to feed his troops, and the local economic authority, who opposed this. To complicate matters, the latter official had gone off on vacation on a remote part of Hispaniola. It took Stoughton over two weeks of difficult and dangerous travel through the backcountry to track him down. With a smile, the official finally suggested that the cargoes be sent to Cuba. Stoughton had sent one of his ship captains ahead already, with instructions to deliver gratis one dozen bottles of mustard to the highest-ranking functionary on the island. Then, perceiving the market at Havana to be temporarily weak due to speculation and multiple arrivals from the United States, Stoughton himself proceeded with another ship to the smaller port of Santiago. He intended to sell most of the cargo there, using the proceeds to purchase sugar, hides and brandy of higher quality and lower price than were available in Havana. However, he was not allowed to sell much flour there and ultimately sailed for the capital anyway. This particular letterbook ended with notices to his partners that Stoughton would winter in Havana, and that the venture would probably not live up to expectations after all.\textsuperscript{20}

If John Stoughton had to endure such costly delays, they were undoubtedly even more common for other North American traders. For example, some
twenty-two U.S. ships were suddenly embargoed in Havana harbor in June 1797, for reasons connected with military security. By the third week in port, the captains estimated that they had collectively lost over sixteen thousand dollars. Major expenses included: seamen's wages, provisions, and medical fees; damages to vessels caused by worms and unrepaired leaks; and spoiled cargoes. Moreover, they complained that ships already loaded with sugar for the return voyage would not arrive home in time to avoid an increased rate of duties on that item. This case is but one example of how costly disruptions of commerce could not always be blamed on cruisers and pirates. Again, it was Spanish imperial policy that caused uncertainty, risk and loss for North American merchants. And, for most of the years under consideration here, direct trade with the colonies had been strictly prohibited. Under those circumstances, Leamy, the Stoughtons and the Olivers had to endure the inconveniences of indirect shipping — via New Orleans or to a nearby French island where trade with both the United States and Spanish colonies was permitted. Alternately, traders could misrepresent their true destinations on official documents or entrust their cargoes to smugglers. Leamy and the Stoughtons accepted these conditions, but in an era when other markets existed, those who found the conditions distasteful simply turned elsewhere.

In fact, there was one aspect of trade with the Spanish Empire that for some North Americans was clearly unacceptable, even though it facilitated entrance to Spanish colonial ports. For years, foreign merchants transporting slaves were allowed to sell a proportionate number of barrels of flour at substantial rates of profit. This policy was extended to Cuba, desperately short of labor, in 1789. Throughout the next fifteen years, blacks were delivered to that island regularly; by far the majority of ships involved were identified as Anglo-American. While many of the slaves had probably been picked up on adjacent Caribbean islands, at least some were transported directly from the African coast. Furthermore, although such evidence is sketchy, there was at least one recorded instance of a black from Maryland being sold into slavery in Havana. More research needs to be done, but at this stage it is clear that most of the aforementioned merchants engaged in this activity. The Stoughtons, clearly, did. Moreover, they worried about obtaining insurance for ships carrying human cargoes. How the majority of their peers reacted to their involvement in the slave trade is unknown. However, it is interesting to compare the operations of men like Leamy with those of others less successful or less visible in the Spanish Caribbean trade. Thanks to Jules Boymel's unpublished analysis of the rich Boone Papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, it is possible to use the career of Jeremiah Boone as an example. Coincidentally, Boone arrived in Philadelphia the same year that John Leamy did; from 1781 on, both worked to build up their respective businesses. Yet, while Leamy cultivated contacts in the manner described above, Boone seems merely to have dispatched his ships to various Spanish and non-Spanish ports in the Caribbean. His son, William, occasionally
travelled as supercargo to Havana. While there, the younger Boone com­
plained strongly about official corruption. Contrast this attitude with John
Stoughton's, as he methodically sought to smooth his own way. And, given
the fact that Jeremiah Boone was a Quaker who once wrote an anti-slavery
tract, it is unlikely that he used slaves to gain entrance to colonial ports. In
short, Boone was unwilling to behave in the manner best calculated to insure
high returns from Spanish imperial trade. Not surprisingly, his businesses
failed three times. While these losses corresponded with the terminations of
three wars, the evidence indicates that, even in the good years, he never enjoyed
Leamy's and the Stoughtons' strong links to Spanish markets.

To conclude, we cannot fully understand trade between the United States
and the Spanish Empire in the 1790s simply by focusing upon traditional
market mechanisms. For, in general, demand in the Spanish Caribbean for
North American products was high, at the same time that east coast merchants
needed Mexican specie to trade with other parts of the world.\(^{27}\) Given the
geographical proximity, these areas should have been prime trading partners.
However, constraints imposed upon foreign merchants by Spanish imperial
policy obscured this relationship and molded entrepreneurial behavior along
distinctive, sometimes contradictory lines. Leamy and his counterparts were
often forced to act in ways reminiscent of seventeenth-century traders. Their
methods were highly personalized; they relied upon relatives and patrons at
the start of a century that saw the rise of the independent, less kin-oriented
entrepreneur.\(^{28}\) At the same time, they were modern men, whose behavior
was eminently rational and, in some instances, pioneering. Both Leamy and
John Craig were original subscribers to and directors of the Insurance
Company of North America, founded in 1792. Leamy also had the distinction
of being that agency's best customer during its first years; in so doing, he
showed himself to be a risk-taker who took some of the risk out of his own
operations.\(^{29}\) Perhaps his greatest talent was his ability and willingness to act
like a 'Spaniard' when circumstances so warranted, and like an 'Anglo-
American' when the opportunity was there. Of such was successful entre­
preneurship made in the Napoleonic era.
50. Appendix table 44 gives some idea of the American involvement in the Havana flour market after the war.

51. See 'Relación que manifiesta ...'.

52. This was Thomas Plunkett, an Irish-American merchant from Philadelphia. Plunkett's complaint in the 'residencia' of Unzaga provoked a later governor to protest bitterly that the only opposition to Unzaga's rule had been Plunkett, a prostitute, and a 'pardo libre'. Ezpeleta to Antonio Valdés, Havana, May 28, 1788, AHN, Consejos Suprimidos, leg. 20917, exp. 69, num. 187. Plunkett was able to return to Havana because he was a personal friend of Bernardo de Gálvez. He remained on the island at least until 1788, if not longer. See Beveridge to Jay, Philadelphia, April 12, 1786, State Dept., American Letters, 2: 270–5; Troncoso to J. de Gálvez, Havana, August 1, 1785, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1242, num. 70.


54. See note 19.

Chapter six

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Notes to chapter six


9. Light T. Cummins, 'Spanish agents in North America during the revolution, 1775–1779' (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1977), 290–92. When the merchant John Barry, not to be confused with the commodore, died in 1813, John Leamy and Patrick Hayes, a ship captain often employed by Leamy, served as executors of the Barry estate. Bond for 7200 dollars to Sarah Barry, Patrick Hayes and John Leamy, executors ..., Philadelphia, January 12, 1813, Arthur C. Bining Collection, HSP.

10. Francisco Rendón to Antonio Ramón del Valle, Philadelphia, June 11, 1781, AGI, Cuba, leg. 1283. Diego Gardoqui to Esteban Miró, New York, October 5 and December 3, 1788, AGI, Cuba, leg. 104A.

11. Jaudenes and Viar to Floridablanca, Philadelphia, October 18, 1791, AHN, Estado, leg. 3894 bis: Policy No. 2611, Fire Blotter, III, INA, for Jaudenes’ residence; Duque de Frias to Evaristo Pérez de Castro, London, September 26 and October 24, 1820, AGS, Estado (Inglaterra), leg. 8180 for Leamy’s secret efforts. John Stoughton, Spanish consul at Boston, Account Book of Fees Received, July 24, 1802–September 1, 1809 NYHS. Stoughton was still consul in 1820, when his son James, a lawyer who sometimes defended Spanish shipping interests in U.S. courts, was killed by an irate Baltimore merchant who had been accused of commercial fraud in New York: Mateo de la Serna to Duque de San Carlos, Washington, January 2, 1820, AGS, Estado (Inglaterra), leg. 8223.

12. To Charles Howard, New York, September 24, 1792, Lynch and Stoughton Letterbook, 1791–1794, NYHS.

who included Sarmientos, Olivers, and Biddies, see Bruchey, Robert Oliver, and Marten G. Buist, At Spes Non Fracta: Hope and co., 1770–1815, merchant bankers and diplomats at work (The Hague, 1974), 312–16. Virtually all of the ships that left Philadelphia for Venezuela in 1805 had been loaded by John Craig for his and the Olivers’ accounts: AGI, Ultramar, leg. 839.


15. To Pedro Juan de Erice, New York, October 3, October 7, and November 23, 1793; February 4, June 27, July 16, and August 28, 1794, Lynch and Stoughton Letterbook, 1791–1794, NYHS. Also see John Stoughton Letterbook, July 1794 – February 1795, NYHS, for a record of his travels throughout the Caribbean.

16. José Pablo Valiente to Gardoqui, Havana, December 3, 1793, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 1672. During his voyage to Cuba in 1794–95, John Stoughton was quite anxious to establish contact with James Leamy, whom he had not yet met personally.


20. John Stoughton Letterbook, July 1794 – February 1795, NYHS.

21. ‘The memorial and petition of the owners, supercargoes, and masters of American vessels now embargoed in the port of Havana to the Captain-General . . .’, Havana, June 19, 1797, AGI, Cuba, leg. 1518A.


23. Nichols, ‘Trade relations’, 292, lists of ships carrying slaves into Cuba are found in AGI, Santo Domingo, legs. 1673, 1675–77, and 1687. These lists cover parts of months from 1793, 1795–99, 1805, and 1806. For the following months, 100% of all foreign ships arriving in Havana were Anglo-American, and 100% of the slaves delivered to that port came in Anglo-American ships: January and May 1797; October and November 1798; June 1799; December 1805; and March, August, September, October, November, and December 1806.


25. To Cantera y Zavalata, New York, September 24, 1792, Lynch and Stoughton Letterbook, 1791–1794, NYHS, shows that the Stoughtons were involved in the sale of sixteen slaves. While John Leamy took out over 200 insurance policies for himself and his associates between 1792 and 1805, not one was written on slaves. Marine Blotters, INA. Along with Daniel Clark, who traded frequently to New Orleans,
the son-in-law of Charles Carroll, a Mr. Keating of Baltimore, was involved in supplying blacks to Spanish colonies: Clement Biddle to General Wilkinson, Philadelphia, April 10, 1789, Am 9180, HSP.

26. Jules Boymel, unpublished and untitled biography of Jeremiah Boone and his businesses, 1981. Mr. Boymel graciously made available the results of his detailed research, based on materials in the Boone Papers, HSP.


Chapter seven
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1. R.C., August 31, 1752, AGI, Mexico, leg. 1948.
2. For a late regulation explaining the scope of the operation, see *Reglamento e instrucción del real giro* ... (Madrid, 1802), in AGS, DGT, Inv^0^ 23, leg. 9.
3. See AGI, Contaduría, leg. 647A, for such examples.

5. AGI, Indif„, leg. 2333.
7. There is, indeed, some confusion as to the meaning of the word *libranza*. In Hapsburg and early Bourbon times, it seems to have meant no more than a payment order on a particular treasury, thus, the *Real Cédula de Libranza*. In this usage, the word was largely replaced by *libramiento*, and all late eighteenth century *libranzas* which I have examined were undoubtedly negotiable instruments. One cannot exclude the possibility, however, that the word was occasionally used in its older sense.
8. Troncoso to Lerena, March 2, 1791, AGI, Guatemala, leg. 669.
10. Zambrano and Montes to Gardoqui, September 19, 1792, AGS, Secretaría y Superintendencia de Hacienda, leg. 284.
11. Marquina to Valdés, December 18, 22, and 29, 1788, and July 31, 1799, AGI, Filipinas, legs. 787 and 794.
12. Gil to Lerena or Gardoqui, April 20, May 26, June 5, July 5, and July 20, 1792, and October 20, 1792, AGI, Lima, legs. 701 and 702.
15. The system was also applicable to Maracaibo. See acuerdo of the *junta de gobierno* of the Philippines Company, February 2, 1792, AGI, Filipinas, leg. 981.