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EUROPE: A CIVILIZATION ON THE EDGE

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Our European culture is one that has staked its all on the universal and the danger menacing it is that of perishing by the universal.

Jean Baudrillard'

INTRODUCTION

Rémi Brague rejects common charges of Eurocentrism leveled against Western civilization. He prefers to characterize the West as "eccentric," meaning off center. He equates Western civilization with Europe and understands it as that civilization which grew out of the western half of the Roman Empire and with time differentiated itself from Byzantine and Islamic civilizations (themselves successors to the Roman heritage). He labels Europe eccentric because it stands (physically and figuratively) on the edge of its professed universal core. Ancient Greece and Christianity comprise that core. Following Leo Strauss, Brague employs the symbols of Athens and Jerusalem. "Its culture comes down to two elements that cannot be reduced to one another. These two elements are the Jewish and the later Christian tradition, on the one hand, and the tradition of pagan antiquity on the other. 'Athens and Jerusalem' has been proposed as an expression to symbolize each of these currents with a proper name."²

Curiously, neither core city has historically been considered part of Europe.³ This marginality, Brague insists, runs much deeper than mere geography. Rome derived its culture and institutions from Greek Hellenism and Europe its civilization from Roman. Europeans have had then only indirect or secondary access via Rome and Latin to Ancient Greece and Greek. Similarly, the Christian God made His Covenant, not with Europeans, but with Jews in their language. "Christianity is to the old Covenant what the Romans were to the Greeks. The Christians know – even if they are constantly in danger of forgetting, as they have done on several occasions – that they are grafted onto the Jewish people and onto their experience of God."⁴ Greeks feel directly connected to

God because the good news of His Incarnated Son was spread and canonized in their language in (for the Greeks) the superior New Testament.⁵ But Europeans were left with only secondary linguistic access to both Holy Scriptures. "The Church is 'Roman' because it repeats the operation carried out by the Romans in regard to Hellenism, but in relation to Israel."⁶

Brague claims that this "Roman attitude" or state of "secondarity" has saddled Europe with a profound "feeling of inferiority" dating to its inception.⁷ As a result, Europeans have felt themselves uncomfortably situated (geographically but even more so culturally) somewhere between absolute knowledge, understood as Hellenic and Christian universalism, and barbarity, a state of ultimate ignorance and irrelevance. European attempts to escape this awkward liminality "between the uphill classical and the downhill barbarity" have found expression in repeated renaissances (e.g., twelfth century, *Quattrocento*, Reformation) designed to appropriate the core culture by perfecting it in the West as well as in conquests to recapture core territories (e.g., Crusades, modern imperialism).⁸

As I read it, Eurocentrism belongs with these efforts to re-center Europe, though less by recovering the core than shifting it. Eurocentrists depict a *modern* world with Europe at its center. The adjective "modern" is important. Serious Eurocentrists, at least since the Pirenne thesis,⁹ no longer assert an uninterrupted progression from ancient Athens through Rome onto Florence, Paris and finally to Brussels today. They acknowledge that during the Middle Ages Europe sat on the edge of more powerful empires, more vibrant economies, more sophisticated cultures to its east to which Europeans had only tangential and conditioned access. Modernity, beginning roughly in 1500, changed all that. Through cultural renaissance (e.g., science), political reform (e.g., democracy), economic dynamism (e.g., capitalism), and military domination (e.g., imperialism) Europeans crafted a modern iteration of their civilization that became the world's central axis.¹⁰

I contend below that judged by *their own subjective standards* modern Europeans failed to re-center the modern world around Europe. Thus, even if such a re-centering in fact transpired, Europeans were not fully convinced of it. They continued to fret over their marginality and secondarity. I provide two types of support for my thesis, indirect and direct. First, I mine recent anti-Eurocentric scholarship for actual developments known to educated Europeans which must have belied European centrality. Second, I highlight prominent Europeans who

expressed doubt over Europe's unrivaled greatness. Modern Europeans, it turns out, were never quite as smug vis-a-vis rival civilizations as Eurocentrism suggests

RIVALS TO THE EAST

Let us not lose sight of the deep sense of inferiority with which Europeans entered the modern age. Throughout the Middle Ages, they repeatedly either directly experienced or heard tales of larger empires (e.g., Abbasid, Mongol, Ottoman), fiercer warriors (e.g., Saladin, Jingiz Khan, Mehmed the Conqueror), speedier religions (e.g., Islamic conversions), wiser savants (e.g., Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides), lovelier cities (e.g., Córdoba and Constantinople), finer products (e.g., silk, glass, pottery), tastier foods (e.g., oranges, bananas, rice, sugar) all emanating from the east.¹¹ Put differently, if Europeans were to reach a sense of superiority, they had a long road to travel.

The year 1492 or thereabouts suggests itself as a good starting point for that journey to self-confidence. In that year the Spaniards expelled the Muslims once and for all from the Iberian Peninsula, and Columbus discovered the New World. Twelve years earlier Ivan III had thrown off the Tartar yoke. And in 1497 Vasco da Gama rounded the horn of Africa. Furthermore, the Renaissance was by that time in full flower and spreading its potent pollen well beyond Italy. As the epithet "rebirth" implies, Europe began emerging from its "Dark" or "Middle" Ages to take center stage in world history. Whatever its exact origins, modernity is invariably understood by Eurocentrists as an age dating to somewhere around 1500 and characterized by "The Rise of the West,"¹² "The Origins of the European World-Economy,"¹³ or simply "The European Miracle."¹⁴

The Russians may have slipped out from the Tartar Yoke in 1480, but the rest of Christendom remained imperiled by the menacing Turk until as late as 1683 – the last siege of Vienna. Near the close of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans, long feared only as a land power, fortified their navy and expanded their control of the Mediterranean so that Europeans traded only on Ottoman terms – not vice versa.¹⁵ Between 1499 and 1503 the Turks defeated the venerable Venetian fleet to enter the Gulf of Corinth, captured Lepanto, and forced Venice to pay annual tribute to the Sublime Porte.¹⁶ They captured Rhodes in 1522, Algiers in 1529, Tripoli in 1551, Cyprus in 1571 and Tunis in 1574.¹⁷ These victories secured a naval monopoly in the eastern Mediterranean (not to mention the Black Sea¹⁸) for the Ottomans and enabled the likes of the

legendary Barbarossa to menace the southern coast of Europe, thus practically nullifying the pacification of the Arabs in 1492.¹⁹ Tales spread through Europe of Christian women enslaved and fattened up on bread dipped into syrup to enhance their salability.²⁰

For nearly a century the Europeans could do little to halt Ottoman naval gains. In fact, the young zealot, Loyola, had his heart set on missionary work in Jerusalem in 1537 but had to settle for Rome due to Ottoman control of sea routes (So thank the Turks for the Jesuits!).²¹ Don John of Austria finally made a stand at Lepanto in 1571. Though touted by Europeans as a victory of Crusade-like proportions — Ali Pasha's head was ceremoniously mounted on a spike on the prow of a Turkish vessel while the crescent was replaced with a cross — the result hardly turned the Mediterranean into a European lake or the Ottoman Empire into a vassal. Rather, the two foes reached a naval stalemate of sorts. Hans Khevenhüller, who fought at Lepanto, seemed to realize as much in noting in his diary that the touted victory failed to secure a single additional yard of territory for Christianity.²²

Venetian Senator, Costantino Garzoni, who authored a report of his travels to Istanbul after Lepanto, wrote of the sultan: "This most powerful emperor's forces are of two kinds, those of the sea and those of the land, and both are terrifying." The Grand Turk continued to have the power "to torment all of Christendom."²³

In 1573 the Venetian ambassador to the Ottoman capital reported back to his government that the sultan lay poised to establish universal monarchy: "the Ottoman emperor has in the course of continuing victories seized so many provinces and brought so many kingdoms under his yoke and, in so doing, has made the whole world fear him, it is not beyond reason to wonder if he might not finally go so far as to establish a universal monarchy." The next ambassador insisted that it would be vain to think the Turks could be stopped (barring divine intervention). It should be added that these diplomatic reports were subsequently published (in French too) and widely read throughout Europe well into the seventeenth century.²⁴

As indicated, the Turks continued their ravaging campaigns on land. In 1499 they again occupied Otranto and then used that foothold to maraud villages surrounding Venice. Small wonder that Machiavelli lauded the discipline and morale of Turkish troops over and beyond that of Christian soldiers.²⁵ Large numbers of European plebeians came to believe in the prophesy that they would be overrun by the Turks — a sentiment Luther felt compelled to denounce in his "War Sermon" of

1529.²⁶ Meanwhile, the learned debated a controversy started in 1551 by a Jewish author, Rabbi Isaac Abravanel, who contended that the Ottomans were fulfilling the Prophecy of Daniel. The legend foretold that a universal monarchy of God on earth was destined to follow in the wake of the four great ancient pagan kingdoms (Babylonian-Assyrian, Persian, Greek and Roman).²⁷

Even half-hearted Ottoman excursions into Europe proved successful. In a series of Danubian campaigns the Turks first captured Belgrade (1521) and from there crossed the Hungarian plain to lay (unsuccessful) siege to Vienna in 1529. The Habsburgs were forced to tolerate in Hungary, long the critical buffer zone between them and the Turks, the Ottoman puppet regime of John Zapolyai. Over the ensuing decades the Turks lay poised to swallow up all of St. Stephen's dominions, including Buda in 1541, and beyond into southern Ukraine and Lithuania. Ferdinand I stopped the advance only by brokering a deal in 1562 whereby Hungary was partitioned into three parts – two loyal to the Turks.²⁸ The Treaty of Adrianople six years later brought further embarrassment to the Habsburgs, who were forced to pay annual tribute to Istanbul. Selim II generously referred to it as a "gift" to spare Maximilian II humiliation.²⁹

In this milieu, Venetian ambassadors to the Porte understandably reported back home that the Turks "are the greatest fighters in the world," utterly "invincible." "Henceforth, all Christendom should fear incurring a great extermination."³⁰ Things looked so dire that a French poet in 1555 exhorted Europeans to abandon their continent to the Turks and re-establish Europe in the New World.³¹ Five years later compatriot Guillaume Postel published his widely read *De la république des Turcs*, in which he concluded that France could only defeat the Turk by emulating him.³²

The Europeans had effectively accepted a border between Christianity and Islam in the very heart of Europe.³³ The Ottomans remained a thorn in Europe's side for at least another century. They raided as far north as Poland in 1620,³⁴ then again in 1672.³⁵ They took the Western Ukraine from the Poles in 1676 only to lose it to the Russians in 1681.³⁶ Most Europeans interpreted Halley's comet of 1682 as a divine signal of defeat at the hands of the Turks. The latter seemed to fulfill the prophecy the next year by laying final (but again failed) siege to Vienna. As late as the turn of the eighteenth century Sir William Temple called the Ottoman Empire "the fiercest...in the world."³⁷

That said, there is no denying that 1683 marked the end of further

Ottoman advances into Europe. Here began the gradual degeneration of the Turk into the "sick man of Europe," who had to submit to such disadvantageous settlements as the Treaty of Kuchak-Kainardji (1774). But keep in mind that the Turks took Crete from the Venetians in 1715, converted countless Christians to Islam, and did not relinquish the "miniature continent" until 1898.³⁸ The Ottomans also managed to repulse the Russians in 1711 and the Austrians in 1736-9³⁹ and again in 1787.⁴⁰ The Balkans remained under Ottoman control until the nineteenth century. It was not without good cause that Metternich said of the road leading east out of Vienna, "Asia begins at the *Landstrasse*."⁴¹

With the infidel constantly banging at their doors, Europeans took to scrutinizing the enemy. What they saw at the Porte impressed them. European diplomats, who regularly referred to European realms as "kingdoms" but the Ottoman as "empire," marveled that the sultan "rules in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe" in this "*vastissimo impero dei Turchi*." Istanbul was widely held to be the world's most splendid city, "the most beautiful thing in the world there is to see."⁴² Moreover, the sultan, or more accurately the Grand Vizier, controlled a gigantic, efficient and wealthy administrative apparatus in comparison to which European bureaucracies paled.⁴³

Nothing garnered more attention in the reports of European diplomats than the stunning fact that the sultan's revenues regularly exceeded expenses (in one report by 30 percent, another 47percent).⁴⁴ If that were not enough, the sultan had both the aristocracy and the clergy firmly under his thumb – things of which European princes could hardly boast.⁴⁵ "Obedience, considered by all to be the most solid foundation for any empire, maintains this one without a doubt," noted Antonio Errizo in his 1557 report on the Porte. "Revenues, peoples, and obedience," wrote Marco Minio in 1522, these were the sultan's key "powers."⁴⁶

It speaks volumes that Europeans, not Turks, called Suleyman "the Magnificent" and the sultan generally "the Grand Signor."⁴⁷ But the greatest compliment that could possibly be paid to the Turkish monarch was to acknowledge him as the rightful heir to the Roman Empire. In *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (1568) Jean Bodin concluded:

It would be far more just to regard the Osmanli sultan as the inheritor of the Roman Empire, for it was he who, after capturing the imperial city of Byzantium from the Christians,

went on to conquer from the Persians that region of Babylonia which is spoken of in the Book of Daniel, adding to the ancient provinces of Rome all the land across the Danube until the banks of the Borysthenes... we must recognize that the prophecy of Daniel can be most appropriately interpreted as applying to the sultan of the Turks.⁴⁶

Fifty-three years earlier Machiavelli counseled his prince that true greatness came only to those rulers "who command their expeditions in person as the Roman Emperors did in the beginning, and as the Sultan does at the present time."⁴⁹ If we look to the future instead of the past, we might say with Lucette Valensi that Europe's relations with the Turks were

not unlike those between much of the world and the United States in the period since the end of the Second World War. The political, economic, and military hegemony of this new power — this youthful *imperialism* — may be ill abided, but its achievements and its political regime dazzle and fascinate nonetheless. One might wish that it had less power, but no one thinks to challenge its legitimacy.⁵⁰

As with America today, fashion often followed wealth and power then. Davies notes a "craze for Turkish styles and artifacts" in sixteenth-century Europe.⁵¹ Through the eighteenth century European aestheticians claimed the most beautiful people were to be found in the Ottoman Empire.⁵² European rulers continued well into the seventeenth century the practice of sending envoys to the Levant with instructions to bring back materials of academic importance (The Turks sent no such envoys in the other direction.). Scholars the likes of Leibniz and Racine could not wait to study what the scouts retrieved.⁵³ Many chairs of Arabic were formed in European universities, beginning with Paris in 1529. Persian and Turkish studies followed.

It was Muslim control of the Mediterranean that forced the Portuguese and Spanish to take the circuitous routes to India that led them deep into the Indian and Atlantic Oceans and the "Age of Discovery." In the Americas small bands of Europeans easily overthrew whole empires like the Aztecs and Incas. They went on to found and expand colonies and spread European language, culture and religion among the Indians. This experience clearly enhanced the European self-image and even helped assuage some of the shame stemming from losses to the Turks.⁵⁴

The experience in Asia differed markedly. When da Gama rounded

the horn of Africa, he "entered a highly sophisticated trading area" full of "hostile...Muslim rulers or traders in all the harbours which he visited."⁵⁵ He only managed to navigate his vessel to India with the help of a Muslim pilot who knew the waters.⁵⁶ Wherever the Portuguese docked they found Muslim vessels already moored there. Furthermore, Christian wares "were crude and unattractive in Eastern eyes."⁵⁷ When da Gama returned to Lisbon in April 1499 and showed his king what he had acquired, the monarch replied: "it would seem that it is not we who have discovered them, but they who have discovered us."⁵⁸

European backwardness was to be expected. After all, the Europeans hailed from an impoverished economy in comparison to the prosperity, even opulence of Asia. Fernao Mendes Pinto seemed to confirm so much after his visit to the Orient between 1521 and 1558. There he walked the markets of Peking "as if in a daze" at the quantities of "silk, lace, canvas, clothes of cotton and linen, marten pearls, gold-dust and gold-bullion." "All these things were to be had in such abundance that I feel as if there are not enough words in the dictionary to name them all."⁵⁹

Over a century later the Director of the British East India Company, Sir Josiah Child, stated the obvious when he noted that Indian "trade with all the Eastern nations...is ten times as much as ours and all the European nations put together."⁶⁰ As late as 1750 the rest of the world still out-produced Europe and North America by a ratio of nearly 4 to 1.⁶¹ India's GDP still tripled Britain's.⁶² This vast economic advantage goes far in explaining why "from 1500-1800 relations between East and West were ordinarily conducted within a framework and on terms established by the Asian nations."⁶³

The geo-political climate was nothing like that in the Americas. In the Mogul and Ming empires the Europeans encountered truly mighty powers unlikely to succumb like the Aztecs and Incas. In fact, the Europeans were too busy expressing their awe and wonder of these majestic Oriental kingdoms to imagine subduing them.⁶⁴ The starry-eyed newcomers were lucky if the emperor even condescended to tolerate them within the realm.⁶⁵ Such things contemporaries knew thanks to the virtual "flood tide" of literature about the Orient that washed over Europe from the sixteenth century on.⁶⁶

European readers enjoyed marveling at descriptions of exotic places such as the grand Mogul court at Agra or the lavish Burmese metropolis of Pegu with its ten thousand elephants.⁶⁷ Geographies typically described Asia in glowing terms. "It was vast in size, rich in prod-

ucts, the seat of great monarchies and the cradle of the arts and the sciences." Cicero's remark that "Asia is truly so rich and fertile...(that) it easily surpasses all lands" frequently turned up.⁶⁸ India earned accolades like "the best and goodliest land in the world" or "an earthly paradise."⁶⁹ Until the nineteenth century it was not uncommon for Britons stationed in India to adopt Mughal culture, even convert to Islam.⁷⁰ Culturally, these Europeans were light years away from the arrogant Thomas Macaulay, who in the nineteenth century claimed one shelf of English literature superior to all that had ever been written in India.⁷¹

But no land bewitched Europeans quite like China. Commissioned by Pope Gregory XIII in 1583, Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza's *Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres del gran Reyno de la China* (1585) molded Europeans' image of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. He divided "this mightie kingdome...into fifteen provinces, that every one of them is bigger than the greatest kingdome that we do understand to be in all Europe."⁷² In the seventeenth century Isaac Vossius typified European amazement with Chinese science: "If any man should make a collection of all the inventions and all the productions that every nation, which now is, or ever has been, upon the face of the globe, the whole would fall short, either as to number or quality, of what is to be met with in China."⁷³ English Sinophile, Sir William Temple, deemed it "endless to enumerate all the excellent orders of this state, which seem contrived by a reach of sense and wisdom, beyond what we meet with in any other government of the world."⁷⁴

From the time of the first successful Jesuit mission in 1583 until the rebuke of Lord Macartney's trade mission in 1793, China mesmerized the European mind. Hundreds of books by European visitors to Asia were published back home. Of this body of literature Donald Lach and Edwin Van Kley write: "Few literate Europeans could have been completely untouched by it."⁷⁵ Philosophers the likes of Montesquieu, Quesnay, Fontenelle, Diderot, Rousseau, Leibniz, Bayle, and Voltaire idealized China as a veritable philosopher-kingship and used its example to heap scorn on benighted European ways.⁷⁶ Philologists keen to reform crude European vernaculars praised Chinese as a "paragon of linguistic rationality."

Artists embraced Chinese styles as a refreshing break from hide-bound European conventions.⁷⁷ Chinoiserie became the preferred decorative style in homes.⁷⁸ Sages sought to establish Chinese academies on European soil.⁷⁹ Officials envied the mandarins' uncontested authority. One of Louis XV's ministers averred that what France sorely needed

was "an injection of Chinese spirit."⁸⁰ Leibniz had counseled Louis' father: "...everything exquisite and admirable comes from the East Indies...Learned people have remarked that in the whole world there is no commerce comparable to that of China."⁸¹ Adam Smith concurred as late as 1776: "China is a much richer country than any part of Europe" (and he saw no change on the horizon).⁸² And Napoleon hoped to transfer his base of operations to the Orient because "Europe is a molehill. All great revolutions and empires have been in the Orient."⁸³

RIVAL TO THE WEST

Awareness of Oriental grandeur notwithstanding, evidence of a westward shift in the world's locus of power mounted during the eighteenth century. The Europeans, however, expressed fear that the shift was moving too far west, namely to America. America, not Europe, would become the place where the achievements of the modern era would be most fully realized. As far back as colonial times, Americans were predicting and Europeans dreading this very outcome. The premonitions especially crescendoed after 1776.

With the American Revolution the upstart republicans began sculpting a fully distinct society that threatened to become the envy of the world. Put differently, North America gave Europeans a glimpse into a likely future – one in which Europe would not predominate. We might say America robbed Europeans of their own sense of preeminence in the very years when the world's axis did turn around Europe. If Islamic civilization represented to Europe the classic archenemy, America came forth more like a rookie teammate who threatens someday to bench the squad's star player.

The American Revolution hardly overturned Britain, let alone Europe – a reason hidebound Europeans refuse to label it a "revolution." The rebels did not emerge victorious until 1783 (and only with the help of the French) and did not really neutralize the British until the Treaty of Ghent in 1815. Economically the United States remained in a "classical imperial relationship" with Britain, exporting raw materials, most notably cotton, and importing manufactured goods.⁸⁵ And, of course, the young bastard republic never invaded Britain or any other inch of Europe until the twentieth century.

But the defiant Americans did invade Europe's psychic space. Britain lay poised after vanquishing the French in 1763 to become the largest empire on the planet since the Roman. Continental Europeans, even the French, took to admiring and emulating mighty England.⁸⁶ The

Americans burst the British bubble. It was generally admitted in Europe that American independence signaled the complete abolition of the entire European colonial system.⁸⁷ George III seemed to have sensed so much in 1781 when he remarked: "the dye is now cast whether this shall be a great Empire or the least dignified of European states."⁸⁸

The ramifications of the War of Independence extended further. Success made it impossible for Europeans confidently to dismiss America's caddish self-aggrandizement. From the time the first pilgrims touched shore, American braggarts shamelessly boasted the prospects of their new homeland with such claims as establishing a "new Jerusalem" or "city on a hill." Tom Paine boldly predicted that "What Athens was in miniature America will be in magnitude. The one was the wonder of the ancient world; the other is becoming the admiration, the model of the present."⁸⁹ Edmund Burke agreed, if reluctantly: "Nothing less than a convulsion that will shake the globe to its centre can ever restore the European nations to that liberty by which they were once so distinguished. The Western world was the seat of freedom until another, more Western, was discovered; and that other will be probably its asylum when it is hunted down in every other part."⁹⁰

Burke was not alone. By as early as 1760, according to English clergyman Andrew Burnaby, the idea that the crux of history had moved from the Middle East to Europe and was headed west was widely held. "An idea strange as it is visionary, has entered into the minds of the generality of mankind, that empire is traveling westward; and every one is looking forward with eager and impatient expectation to that destined moment, when America is to give law to the rest of the world." Voltaire seemed to concur when he wrote of "that golden age of which men talk so much and which probably has never existed anywhere except in Pennsylvania."⁹² So did Horace Walpole: "The next Augustan age will dawn on the other side of the Atlantic."⁹³

The American Revolution turned any remaining heads in Europe that had hitherto ignored America. European visitors flooded into the United States as if into a zoo to see an exotic creature: democracy.⁹⁴ Most of them sent letters back home and even published their observations — so many, that early in the nineteenth century publications on America comprised "a major share of the European publishing industry."⁹⁵

"From St. Petersburg to Lisbon" Europeans heard sung the praises of the maverick republic.⁹⁶ From Switzerland: "I am tempted to believe that North America is the country where reason and humanity will

develop more rapidly than anywhere else."⁹⁷ From Venice: "If only the union of Provinces is preserved, it is reasonable to expect that, with the favorable effects of time, and of European arts and sciences, it will become the most formidable power in the world."⁹⁸ From Norway: "God help America to fight its way to liberty that mankind may not perish in serfdom."⁹⁹ From Poland: "only Americans in the whole world have the right to celebrate [freedom];" Europeans "are crushed whether by chains at home or by foreign bonds; from the Tiber to the Volga people groan in fetters."¹⁰⁰ From Germany: "America, you are better off than our continent, the Old."¹⁰¹

Nowhere, of course, did news of the American Revolution ripple as in France. Countless Frenchmen rallied behind the American rebels with declarations like that of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot in 1778: "They are the hope of the human race; they may well become its model."¹⁰² Four years later Crèvecoeur labeled the United States "the most perfect society now existing in the world."¹⁰³ The list of admirers stretches far: Lafayette, Chastellux, Robin, Duc de la Rochefoucauld, Condorcet, Lameth, Dumas, Comte de Seguer, Vicomte de Noailles, Saint Simon, Du Pont, Mirabeau, Pierre Louis, Comte de Roederer, Adrien Duport, Abbe Sieyes, Guy Jean Target, Talleyrand.¹⁰⁴ Needless to say, America had its detractors in France, but they comprised the minority.¹⁰⁵

The French Revolution drew hopeful attention back onto Europe. After all, the American Revolution took place on the edge of the civilized world. By contrast, the French struggle on behalf of *Liberté, Égalité*, and *Fraternité* transpired in the very heart of civilization. The momentous political event seemed poised to realize the ideals of the Enlightenment and usher in a new modern epoch with Europe in the vanguard. In the end, of course, the French Revolution dashed more hopes than it inspired. It failed where the American Revolution succeeded, namely in the promotion of liberty and democracy, and stormed a path toward despotism, whether progressive or reactionary, that bastardized Europe's experience with modernity. The facts are well known: *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* (1789), abolition of monarchy and establishment of the republic (1791), Robespierre's "Reign of Terror" (1793-94), *coup d'état* of Napoleon Bonaparte (1799), establishment of Empire and Emperor (1804), the defeat of Napoleon and Bourbon Restoration (1814). In the meantime, the Napoleonic Wars ravaged the continent, as Europeans everywhere were forced to take sides with or against the Revolution.

Because such elevated hopes attended the Revolution, its mutation into tyranny occasioned profound gloom. A mood of disillusionment spread over the continent.¹⁰⁶ Friedrich von Gentz lamented: "The door of hope seemed to me closed forever, to Germany and to Europe." For "the men of the Revolution intended to unite all of the nations of the earth in one great cosmopolitan confederation, but they succeeded only in unleashing the cruelest world war that has ever shaken society and torn it apart."¹⁰⁷ William Wordsworth mourned "this melancholy waste of hopes o'erthrown," while Chateaubriand felt "we are sailing along an unknown coast, in the midst of darkness and the storm."¹⁰⁸ Edmund Burke concluded: "The glory of Europe is extinguished."¹⁰⁹ Once defeated and exiled to St. Helena, Napoleon reflected that he had tried "to bring everywhere unity of laws, of principles, of opinions, sentiments, views, and interests. Then perhaps it would have been possible to dream for the great European family the application of the American Congress or of the amphictyonies of Greece."¹¹⁰ George Friedrich Hegel admitted that such hopes lay with "America...the country of the future...the land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical arsenal of old Europe."¹¹¹

America did not disappoint. As the infant republic matured it democratized much faster than Europe. To be sure, most of America's founding fathers opposed democracy and preferred "natural aristocracy" in which an elite cadre of genuinely virtuous and visionary men would wield the instrument of a strong centralized government to steer the commonwealth in an enlightened direction. These Federalists failed due to a wave of first Jeffersonian, then Jacksonian populism that swamped elitism in America. Proponents of the two anti-Federalists demanded expansion of the franchise, so that *de facto* universal (white) male suffrage obtained by 1820. They used the ballot box not only to put Jefferson in the White House in 1800 and Jackson in 1828, but to elect countless *hoi polloi* to public office at all levels.¹¹²

Success at the polls spurred more plebeians to vote. Turnout normally hovered below 20 percent before 1828 but climbed thereafter to over 70 percent.¹¹³ Jackson, in particular, exalted the ordinary man and helped spawn a general leveling in American society that extended far beyond politics to social, religious and economic hierarchies.¹¹⁴

"Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States," wrote Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835, "nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people."¹¹⁵ The Duc de La Rochefoucauld observed that

even backwoods wretches "consider themselves on an equal footing with the best educated people of the country, and upon the principle of equality they intrude themselves into every company."¹¹⁶ Fanny Trollope's popular *Domestic Manners of the Americans* of 1832 immortalized the picture of America as a vast bog of equality and vulgarity where the tasteless habits of the lowly asphyxiated the good manners of the respectable. In 1851 Heinrich Heine echoed her ridicule of America's equality:

I have sometimes thought to sail
To America the Free
To that Frædom Stable where
All the boors live equally.
But I fear a land where men
Chew tobacco in platoons,
There's no king among the pins,
And they spit without spittoons.¹¹⁷

Of course, slavery conspicuously stained America's democratic fabric but was finally abolished in 1865.

In Europe democracy continued to flounder. Charles Tilly discerns "no one-way path toward democracy to trace across Europe between 1815 and 2000. Almost every country that moved significantly toward broad, equal, protected consultation [representation] during one period or another veered back toward authoritarianism or petty tyranny during some subsequent periods."¹¹⁸

In 1848, in particular, democratic revolutions broke out across Europe and threatened to defeat inequality once and for all. As with the French Revolution, however, European democracy was soon stunted. In France Louis Napoleon trounced liberal opponents in the presidential election of 1849 and then used the office to purge the government and army of opponents, wheedled the National Assembly into disenfranchising three million voters most likely to oppose him in 1850, staged a *coup d'état* in 1851, and had himself declared emperor like his uncle in 1852. The French emperor dispatched a regiment to Rome to crush the newly declared Italian republic and reinstall Pope Pius IX. The Austrian army had already choked the democratic forces of Piedmont, a victory that paved the way in Tuscany and Lombardy for the return to power of sovereigns who set about abrogating the constitutions of 1848.

With the help of the tsar's army, the Hapsburgs extinguished the fledgling Hungarian Republic. Frederick William IV deployed troops to

quell democratic agitation in Berlin in 1848 and in Saxony and Baden in 1849. In Italy, Austria, and Germany, then, absolutist monarchy was again firmly ensconced within two years. In France, a modern police state had replaced democracy. Universal male suffrage would not reach Germany until 1871, France 1875, Britain 1884, Austria 1907, and Italy in 1912. Europe's second great experiment in democracy had, like the first, foiled visions of a new modern democratic age ushering forth from the Old World.

Modernity no doubt arrived in Europe in the nineteenth century, but it was a modernity scarred by the lingering sores of the *ancien régime*.¹⁹ Flaccid democracy helps to explain why Europe's sharpest students of society harmoniously predicted the inevitable failure of the political ideology and structure. Writing at the close or turn of the nineteenth century, Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels (the virtual fathers of sociology) each subscribed to a variant of the latter's "iron law of oligarchy."

Meanwhile, in America widespread commercialization followed by ubiquitous consumerism caused leveling in the economy akin to democratization in politics. The three taken together elevated the common man in ways he could only dream of in Europe and realize by immigrating to America.

America earned a reputation as a place where one could quite literally buy happiness. As far back as 1697, Sir Thomas Lawrence, secretary of Maryland, reported back to London, "they feed their Hogs with better than Dutchesses Eat in Hyde Park."²⁰ A century later a German immigrant wrote to her family back home that one could live "as well as a count or prince can in all of Germany."²¹ Adam Smith claimed, "there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than that of the English in North America."²²

Favorable economic conditions so fostered commerce that by 1820 America had blossomed into a profoundly commercialized society in which the ceaseless pecuniary pursuits of ordinary people predominated in a way unparalleled elsewhere.²³ This fact is sometimes lost on those who associate commercialization with industrialization, which sparked in America first in the second half of the nineteenth century. In reality, America experienced massive "preindustrial" commercialization as its people scattered across the continent brokering at every turn.²⁴

During the first century of the republic the American market underwent a change from a focus on production for local sale (often through

barter) to production for distant, eventually national sale (always for cash). This transformation further opened the door for the onslaught of consumerism beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Amidst these changes the economy rapidly expanded, its annual rate of growth doubling twice between 1812 and 1850 and reaching 3 percent soon thereafter.¹²⁵ By the 1840s New York City was the fastest-growing large industrial area in the world.¹²⁶ The Big Apple, combined with Boston, Baltimore and Philadelphia, mushroomed into an integrated market that enveloped the Northeast. Like tentacles, roads, bridges, canals, and rails reached out from these ports and carried their manufactured products into the hinterland. Trade on the Erie Canal multiplied thirteenfold from the 1820s to 1850s. Though its first trains did not roll until 1833,¹²⁷ by 1840 America doubled Europe in rail mileage.¹²⁸ To be sure, Great Britain led the world in economic production throughout much of our period, but America was constantly gaining ground, expanding nearly twice as fast as Europe.¹²⁹

By 1870 America's GNP equaled and by 1913 tripled Britain's.¹³⁰ By the 1890s America led the world in manufacturing as well as in coal, iron and steel production. By 1919 the United States cultivated and manufactured more than the rest of the world combined. New York replaced London as the world's financial center.¹³¹

Countless observers highlighted mammonism as Americans' most defining trait.¹³² The Duc de La Rochefoucauld, for example, deplored in America "an immoderate love of money."¹³³ Tocqueville had observed that Americans are "swayed by no impulse but the pursuit of wealth." Trollope held that no conversation took place in America without mention of the word "dollar." "Worldly pursuits," averred Heinrich Heine, "are their true religion, and money is their God, their only Almighty God." Dickens recalled from his visit that "all their cares, hopes, joys, affections, and associations seemed to be melted down into dollars." But it was left to Captain Marryat to make the most preposterous observation, maintaining that "dollar worship" affected Americans' physiology and caused them all to look alike. Herbert Spencer later advanced a similar argument.¹³⁴

Unrelenting commercialization eroded America's class structure and further differentiated it from Europe. Most notably, the lower class lost its defining characteristic (in Europe): acceptance of its station in life. America's poor and propertyless refused to settle for the status quo. Though they did not always succeed, they remained optimistic that they could one day prosper. As a result, America transformed into a middle-

class society rather than, as in Europe, a society with a middle class. The values emerging from the middle class were taken to be universal rather than specific.¹³⁵ "It happened nowhere else in the Western world quite like this."¹³⁶ No wonder, then, that his opponents, before ultimately opting for the guillotine, considered punishing Louis XVI by exiling him to Philadelphia, where he would have to live out the remainder of his life a drab and dreary bourgeois.¹³⁷

But industrialization alone did not further distinguish America in the world. After all, Britain's industrialization preceded and Germany's and Japan's coincided with America's. But industrialization in America did complete the establishment of a truly integrated continental market. Railroad companies, in particular, filled in the last holes in the nation's monstrous infrastructure, by 1885 connecting not big cities (which were already joined) but more significantly small towns like a Kewanee, Illinois or an Aberdeen, South Dakota. This turned virtually all 56 million Americans into objects of mass marketing and distribution.¹³⁸

The national market made an ideal breeding ground for consumerism. The tendency to evaluate life according to the products one purchased arose toward the end of the nineteenth century and came to dominate American life by the 1920s. Its influence stretched far outside economics into politics, religion, science, culture and beyond. This consumerist "revolution" further propelled America past Europe as the leader of modernity. Though industrialization surely deserves its place in the list of attributes of modernity, consumerism has proven more consequential.¹³⁹ "The commodity became and has remained the one subject of mass culture, the centerpiece of everyday life, the focal point of all representation, the dead center of the modern world."¹⁴⁰ Certainly by the end of the nineteenth century commentators like Thorstein Veblen, whose *Theory of the Leisure Class* was published in 1899, realized that the consumer was overtaking the producer as the most important economic actor in the modern world.¹⁴¹

America steered the juggernaut to consumerism not only because of its enormous market. After all, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan for that matter, marketed their products beyond their admittedly smaller national markets. America led because it democratized consumerism faster than competitors. Everywhere consumerism originated with the urban middle classes.¹⁴² But in America it spread quickly (though hardly immediately¹⁴³) down the social hierarchy and out into the countryside, becoming a shared national way of life. In Europe, by contrast, entrenched forces, often the same ones that impeded democracy, slowed

consumerism.¹⁴⁴

Put differently, America's modern *political* claim to fame, democracy, aided in the establishment of its modern *economic* claim to fame, consumerism. Indeed, Hannah Arendt disparagingly suggests that consumerism not only fed on, but virtually replaced democracy as Americans became more enamored of the opportunity to consume than vote:

The American dream, as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the impact of mass immigration came to understand it, was neither the dream of the American Revolution – the foundation of freedom – nor the dream of the French Revolution – the liberation of man; it was, unhappily, the dream of a “promised land” where milk and honey flow. And the fact that the development of modern technology was so soon able to realize this dream beyond anyone's wildest expectation quite naturally had the effect of confirming for the dreamers that they really had come to live in the best of all possible worlds.¹⁴⁵

In keeping with the consumerist ethos, Americans did in fact consume more during these years. Already by 1879 production of consumer durable goods was growing faster than producer goods.¹⁴⁶ Increasingly Americans elected to spend their earnings on what were once considered luxuries. For instance, the years 1900-1929 saw a 161% boost in spending on clothing (largely a necessity) compared to 199% on personal care products (mostly luxuries); 168% on housing compared to 322% on transportation (mainly cars); 164% on medical care compared to 285% on recreation.¹⁴⁷ Discretionary spending (beyond housing, clothing, food) jumped from 20% to 35% during the same period.¹⁴⁸

In all fairness, American consumers enjoyed an edge; they had more money. Between 1925 and 1929, for example, real wages in America exceeded those in Britain by 60%. Americans' incomes had two-and-a-half-times the buying power of French. America also benefited from a steady stream of immigrants arriving with little more than the clothes on their backs who needed and wanted to consume in order to fit into the “American way of life.” Understandably, Americans bought more. By 1929, one in five Americans owned a car, one in 43 Britons, one in 335 Italians. “American prosperity gave quite ordinary citizens cars, electric gadgets, telephones, and ready-to-wear fashions for which European masses would have to wait until mid-century.”¹⁴⁹

By this time, even though consumerism, like democracy, had its

roots in Europe, consensus abounded on both sides of the Atlantic that America represented the most advanced consumer society and that quality gave it an economic advantage over its European rivals.¹⁵⁰ European high brows eventually coined the term "Americanization" to stand for the increasing number of concessions to consumerism they witnessed at home. The concept of "Americanization" fully confirms the advanced nature of consumerism in America. No one there was referring to the phenomenon as "Europeanization." Europeans and Americans alike recognized the USA as the undisputed leader in this newest gestation of mass culture.

Understandably, then, nothing so incensed European intellectuals than to have to watch the influence and appeal of raffish American manners expand. Consensus continued to form in Europe throughout the nineteenth century that the future sided with America – for better or worse. J.S. Mill deemed Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* "all the more worthy of study in that it harbors within its depths the future of the world." Because of its capitalist potential, Marx called the United States "the youngest and yet most powerful representative of the West." "The Americans may reasonably look forward to a time," Herbert Spencer predicted in 1882, "when they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has known."

A few years later James Bryce maintained, "America has...anticipated European nations. She is walking before them along a path which they may probably follow."¹⁵¹ As Sigmund Skard concluded in his study of European attitudes regarding America, "in the best minds...there was a dawning realization that 'America' was no longer just America, but the spearhead of a general development, and that even the modern United States could only be understood in a global perspective and in the light of universal cultural problems."¹⁵²

America seemed destined for economic supremacy. Englishman Richard Cobden, as far back as 1835, deemed American management so superior that "our only chance of national prosperity lies in the timely remodelling of our system, so as to put it as nearly as possible upon an equality with the improved management of the Americans."¹⁵³ America's reputation as a house of ingenuity grew as it churned out critical modern inventions from the steamship (1807) to the telegraph (1832), to the telephone (1876), to the aero plane (1903).¹⁵⁴ Europeans jealously eyed the vast standardization of machine parts in America begun by the forward-thinking Eli Whitney.¹⁵⁵

In 1878 William Gladstone warned: "While we have been advanc-

ing with portentous rapidity, America is passing us as if in a canter. There can hardly be a doubt, as between America and England, of the belief that the daughter at no very distant time will, whether fairer or less fair, be unquestionably yet stronger than the mother."⁵⁶ With widely read and quoted books such as Andrew Williamson's *British Industries and Foreign Competition* (1894) or Fred McKenzie's *American Invaders* (1902), the warning turned to mantra. In 1902 Brooks Adams, in *American Economic Supremacy*, declared the American triumph a *fait accompli*.⁵⁷

Nothing attested to American economic appeal like immigration. The numbers are staggering: five million between 1815 and 1860; another 10 million by 1890; 23 million more by 1920. In 1917, one in three Americans was an immigrant or the child of one. The vast majority flooded into America from Europe, and the lion's share of European emigrants chose the United States over all other destinations. The stream headed in the opposite direction (America to Europe) amounted to a mere trickle (mainly of malcontented American intellectuals disgusted with America's philistine culture).⁵⁸ The almighty dollar alone did not draw immigrants to America. The flow continued apace during the recessions of 1856 and 1873. The newcomers came seeking as well the distinctive American way of life. Most embraced American norms and values and did their best to assimilate. *E pluribus unum* became a near reality.⁵⁹ Though the extent of assimilation can be exaggerated, certainly nothing like an Europeanization of America took place.

The love affair with America was not limited to immigrants. During our period America's appeal expanded across the globe, including Europe. Roughly speaking, American political institutions earned widespread admiration during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century only to be greatly overshadowed by American popular (that is, consumer) culture from the 1870s onward. The rebels of Tiananmen Square were hardly the first to invoke America. People around the world challenging despotism looked to America for inspiration and emulation. South and Central Americans fortified themselves with the success of the American War of Independence when throwing off the Spanish yoke in the 1820s.

Though less successful, the organizers of the Decembrist Revolt of 1825 in Russia against the controversially installed Nicholas I saw themselves as following in America's footsteps. *The Australian* dubbed the USA in 1831 "a model for all new countries."⁶⁰ Virtually all of the revolutions that rocked Europe in 1848 had palpable American over-

tones.¹⁶¹ Seven editions of the American constitution were published between April and September of 1848 in France alone.¹⁶² One Bohemian rebel expressed the reigning enthusiasm: "Their political doctrines have become the religion and confession of all countries, like the truths of Christianity [and are] destined to become the universal faith of mankind."¹⁶³

Even the uppish British had to admit the popularity of the *enfant terrible*. Charles Darwin observed in 1859:

There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection; the more energetic, restless, and courageous men from all parts of Europe having emigrated during the last ten or twelve generations to that great country... All other series of events – as that which resulted in the culture of mind in Greece... and the empire of Rome – only appear to have purpose and value when viewed in connection with, or rather as subsidiary to... the great stream of Anglo-Saxon emigration to the West.¹⁶⁴

Twenty-nine years later, James Bryce echoed the father of evolution.

The institutions of the United States are deemed by inhabitants and admitted by strangers to be a matter of more general interest than those of the not less famous nations of the Old World... for they are believed to disclose and display the type of institutions towards which, as by a law of fate, the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move, some with swifter, others with slower, but all with unrelaxing feet.¹⁶⁵

By Bryce's time, however, American popular culture was already upstaging American political institutions as the world's newest craze. From Buffalo Bill through Mary Pickford and Mickey Mouse, the American entertainment industry won loyal fans in Europe and beyond. At the outbreak of the Great War, 90% of the motion pictures seen in Britain were American.¹⁶⁶ The French were viewing 159 million feet of American film per year by 1916. By the end of the war America produced 85% of the world's films.¹⁶⁷ Hollywood's allure grew even stronger in Europe after the war, prompting Bernard Shaw to chide the American movie-making capital for "corrupting the world."¹⁶⁸ The French ambassador to Washington was more generous:

Your movies and talkies have soaked the French mind in

American life, methods and manners... The place in French life and culture formerly held by Spain and Italy, in the nineteenth century by England, now belongs to America. More and more we follow the Americans.¹⁶⁹

Prix uniques, the European version of Woolworth's, proliferated across Europe between the wars.¹⁷⁰ Jazz took the Continent by storm.¹⁷¹ Europeans started using American colloquialisms like "gee."¹⁷² American fashions from shirtwaists to short skirts to pointed-toe shoes came into vogue in Europe.

The exact origins of the notion "Americanization" elude us but by the turn of the twentieth century it was uttered everywhere (in Europe at least). Baudelaire was surely among the first coiners of the term when he referred to his century as "Americanised by its zoocratic industrial philosophers."¹⁷³ In 1870 his countryman, Edmond de Goncourt, lamented that the Paris hotels were being "Americanized."¹⁷⁴ "From the 1870s on," Fritz Stem relates, "conservative writers in imperial Germany expressed fear that the German soul would be destroyed by 'Americanization,' that is by mammonism, materialism, mechanization and mass society."¹⁷⁵ Nietzsche, for instance, in the *Gay Science* (1881), maintained that America "is already beginning ferociously to infect old Europe and is spreading a spiritual emptiness over the continent." "The faith of the Americans today is more and more becoming the faith of the European as well."¹⁷⁶ Rudyard Kipling, who married an American, predicted that America "will sway the world with one foot as a man tilts a seesaw plank."¹⁷⁷ So entrenched was the notion of Americanization that *fin de siècle* psychiatric literature created a "nosological" category called "Americanization," an illness of modern life.¹⁷⁸

The idea that Americanization, as contemptuous as it may be, could not be stopped, even in Europe, seized European intellectuals. Otto Landendorf's *Historical Subject Catalogue* of 1906 claimed, "the American, lacking ideals... will become the person of the future even in Old Europe."¹⁷⁹ In 1913 Elijah Brown forecast that Americanization "seems destined to swallow up Europe."¹⁸⁰ "We have absolutely no choice any more," shrugged Theodor Luddecke between the wars. "The American way of life is simply forced on us."¹⁸¹ Not just Europe lay imperiled by the "American invasion."¹⁸² W.T. Stead published *The Americanization of the World* in 1901. A German contemporary warned, "America represents a dreadful danger to all of humanity."¹⁸³ Georges Duhamel echoed the same theme in *America: The Menace* (1931). A year later compatriot Andre Siegfried claimed, "the United States is pre-

siding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the entire world."¹⁸⁴

CONCLUSION

Permit me to use the conclusion to return to Brague and speculate provocatively on the nature of modern European civilization. Brague contends that Europe's sense of secondarity propels it to improve to an extent other cultures do not exhibit. In contrast to more confident civilizations in the East, Europeans out of a sense of inferiority learned to appreciate non-European cultures and learn from them in an effort to advance Europe. Thus he writes, "the cultural poverty of Europe has been her good fortune. It obliged it to work and to borrow. On the contrary, the richness of Byzantium paralyzed it, got in its way, because it had no need to look elsewhere...no culture was ever so little centered on itself and so interested in the other ones as Europe. China saw itself as the 'Middle Kingdom.' Europe never did."¹⁸⁵ This curiosity and openness explains Europe's progress in the modern epoch.

Without rejecting this idea of European openness, I claim that modern Europe developed a third sense of secondarity in relation to America beyond that felt toward Jerusalem and Athens. I suggest that from 1776 on, America so distinguished itself in terms of potential and realized greatness, albeit in the European imagination, that European elites increasingly viewed the offspring as the (inevitable) geopolitical, economic and cultural center of the world. Put differently, America came to represent not only a civilization with global reach, but more importantly given Brague, one from which European intellectuals felt increasingly alienated. We see, then, in Europe's experience with America an inversion of the relationship to Jerusalem and Athens. Whereas Europe saw itself as secondary to the ancient civilizations and sedulously struggled to appropriate or even perfect them, it initially felt primary toward America (its progenitor) but increasingly secondary as the progeny matured and separated. A similar sense of secondarity, characterized by feeling connected to the world's center but at the same time potentially disconnected (and therefore irrelevant) emerged in modernity, if for different reasons, as it did in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. To use Brague's label, Europe indeed was *and is* eccentric, that is, a civilization on the edge.

ENDNOTES

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24. *Ibid.*, p. 29, 51 and pp. 14-15.
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26. Delanty, *Europe*, p. 37.
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28. Elton, *Reformation*, pp. 51, 89, 92, 119.
29. Elliot, *Europe Divided*, p. 118.
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36. Dennis Hupchick, *The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.171.
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94. Joyce Appleby, *Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 265.
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98. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 239.
99. Quoted in Skard, *American Myth*, p. 17.
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101. Though this line was written by Goethe in 1827, the same idea was hinted at much earlier in *Wilhelm Meister*. See Palmer, *Age*, p. 257.
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105. Gottschalk, "American Revolution," pp. 300-01.
106. Peter Fritzsche, *Stranded In The Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 24.
107. First sentence quoted in Fritzsche, *Stranded*, p. 30; the second in Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe*, trans. Norbert Guttenman (New York: MacMillan, 1966), p. 195.
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109. Quoted in Rougemont, *Idea*, p. 197.
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113. Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 200-01.

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126. Sean Wilentz, *Chants Democratic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 107.
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130. Albert Chandler, *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 52.
 131. Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States 1877-1919* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), pp. xvii-iii.
 132. Historians have more recently discovered commercial culture as far back as the eighteenth century: Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, J.H. Plumb, *The Birth of Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England* (London: Europa Publications, 1982)], even the sixteenth century; Chandra Mukerji, *From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)] But these revisions do not change the fact that America reigned in the modern European psyche as the commercial culture *par excellence*.
 133. Quoted in Woodward, *Old World's*, p. 19.
 134. The quotations from Tocqueville, Trollope, Dickens and Marryat can be found in Woodward, *Old World's*, p. 44, p. 40, p. 41, and p. 43 respectively; Heine's remark comes in Diner, *America in the Eyes*, p. 39.
 135. Appleby, *Inheriting*, p. 22.
 136. Wood, *Radicalism*, p. 347.
 137. James W. Ceasar, *Reconstructing America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 72.
 138. Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 47.
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