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RACE IS DEAD

Peter O'Brien

Implied in the work of Marx, Nietzsche and Weber is the declining significance of race in modernity. The field of cultural studies, led by the likes of Edward Said, sees race as constitutive of modern (European) identity. Oddly, however, Said's work is inspired by both Nietzsche's and Marx's thought. I explain this curiosity by arguing that, ironically, scholarly study of racism is actually made possible by its waning significance. Moreover, due to this increasing insignificance, students of racism must exaggerate racism's importance in order to justify their research.

Introduction

I intend the title to sound Nietzschesque. Like so many of Nietzsche's epigrams, this tittle seeks to provoke more than convince. I am interested in what we can learn if we, even despite evidence to the contrary, view our contemporary world as raceless at the core. This does not mean I suffer from some illusion that racism has disappeared. Rather, just as the great anti-Christ knew practiced religion was far from extinct when he proclaimed "God is dead," I know perfectly well that racism has hardly vanished. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche wrote: "After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave—a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown."¹ Similarly, racism can be expected to cast its gruesome shadow for a long time despite the death of race.

Max Weber ranked Nietzsche with Marx as the greatest interpreter of modernity.² Most of us today would not shrink from adding Weber to the celebrated list. These German luminaries devoted little attention to racism. And none made it a systematic part of his analysis of the modern experience. As I explain below, this had much to do with the fact that all three were racists. Yet, ironically, all three pundits' interpretations of modernity, however different and even opposing, imply the demise of race as a significant factor in modern life.

Scholars who work in the field of cultural studies have sought with some success to revive the role race has played in modernity. They see its persistent influence and declare racism constitutive of modern European identity. No one has made this claim as impressively and as famously as Edward Said. In *Orientalism*, for example, Said writes: "It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, and imperialist, and most totally ethnocentric."³ This remark implies, of course, that Marx, Nietzsche and Weber were racists, since all three had something to say about the Orient.

Curiously, though, Said's work is deeply inspired by at least two of these three great thinkers. As will be discussed in detail below, he openly acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche

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and even refers to his own analysis of Orientalism as a “genealogy.”⁴ And he has steadfastly refused to abandon, in his scholarly and political activities, Marx’s goal of the eradication of human oppression.

Said, then, represents a most queer case: a non-racist himself who contends that race is constitutive of modern (European) identity but who shares much of the epistemology, methodology and politics of (European) racists whose work points to the ultimate insignificance of race for modernity. I hope to explain this seeming oddity by arguing that Said relies so heavily on racism precisely because he lives in the kind of world foreseen by Marx, Nietzsche and Weber, that is, one where race is increasingly insignificant.

Race and Racism Defined

Race does not exist independently. It is a socially constructed meaning or significance and therefore always dependent on context.⁵ Racism begets race, not vice versa. For this reason, race can take on many forms from one context to the next. Thus, religion can determine race (the Jews); so too can ethnicity (the Poles), skin pigmentation (the Negroes), mother tongue (the Hispanics) or location (the Orientals), to name a few sources of race. Although race has many expressions, it has some characteristics which are the same across the different expressions. One normally inherits one’s race at birth and has no choice in selecting it. One is born into a specific ancestral grouping which others deem socially significant. Race, in other words, is an ascriptive attribute.

Racism involves a move from tangible to intangible traits. The racist identifies a person as a member of a specific race by an obvious characteristic (skin color, wardrobe, name, accent) but then attributes to the person certain attitudes or aptitudes that all members of the race presumably share. “Jews are thrifty.” “Poles are stupid.” “Hispanics are lazy.” “Orientals are shifty.” “Blacks are horny.” For the purposes of this essay, each of these remarks is racist, even though the source of race in each differs.⁶ Racism tends to involve a belief in absolutes. “All Jews are thrifty all the time.” The racist does not allow individual Jews a choice in defining themselves. Said often uses the adjective “essentialist” to characterize this attitude. The racist believes there exist immutable, insurmountable and, therefore, eternal differences between races. Thus, Westerners, according to Said, have long held the conviction that people from the Orient have a certain constitutive essence (which they can neither alter nor shake), while those from the Occident have a different essence. Julius Langbehn’s remark that “a Jew could no more become a German than a plum could become an apple” invidiously but aptly expresses the kind of essentialist racism I have in mind in this essay.⁷ It is any and all forms of irrational essentialism—of belief in absolutes—that wane in the visions of modernity offered by Marx, Nietzsche and Weber.

Marx, Nietzsche and Weber

For Marx, capitalism knew no bounds. Nothing could resist it. “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind.”⁸ The driving force for change is, of

course, profit. But the unprecedented and relentless competition of the capitalist epoch forces all bourgeois incessantly to innovate, to abandon the old and create the new. Although originating in the economic sector or “productive relationships,” the unstoppable drive to change spills over into other aspects of life, eventually transforming “with them all social conditions and relationships.” Use of the word “all” had to be deliberate because it appears so frequently in Marx’s passages concerning the impact of the bourgeois revolution on the world. Surely race would count among the “ancient... prejudices” capitalism would devour.⁹

For Nietzsche, not capitalism, rather nihilism represented the driving force in modernity. Nietzsche distinguished modernity from all other epochs because of its historicism – the awareness of the distinction between different epochs and cultures. Historicism bred nihilism because historical man perforce ceases to believe in transcendental and universal truths and identities because he has grasped their limits. Eventually scientific historicism will uncover even the unconscious contradictions at the foundation of modern man’s own identity.¹⁰ In *Will to Power*, Nietzsche writes that nihilism is ultimately “unfaithful to its memories, it lets them fall, lose their leaves.”¹¹ The scientific study of the species and its history will eventually overturn all convenient memories of the kind race is. Science aims “to abolish all limitations of horizon and launch humankind upon an infinite and unbounded sea of light.”¹² Surely in that sea the dark irrational memory of race would drown.

From the perspective of Weber, rationality must one day become race’s assassin. In his vision of modernity, the advance of rational authority defined and distinguished the epoch. Furthermore, “bureaucracy” represented the embodiment of rational authority. “Everywhere,” Weber explains, “its origin and its diffusion have...had ‘revolutionary’ results... This is the same influence which the advance of rationalism in general has had. The march of bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no rational character...”¹³ For

bureaucracy is “dehumanized”...it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation...The more complicated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its supporting external apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly “objective” expert, in lieu of the master of older social structures, who was moved by personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude.¹⁴

Due to its “purely technical superiority over any other form of organization,”bureaucracy is destined to triumph in all walks of life.¹⁵ Everything in modernity stands to be rationalized and bureaucratized. As is well known, Weber discerned and decried the inevitable “disenchantment” of the world, leaving our lives devoid of the irrational emotions, superstitions, and obsessions which make them worth living. Surely, racism counts among those enchantments doomed to expire in the “icy polar night” of modernity.

Three Racists

Marx, Nietzsche and Weber were doubtless each racist. They harbored the very kind of prejudices against non-Europeans that their theories imply are doomed for extinction. An

army of cultural studies scholars, following the lead of Said, have helped us to understand and uncover these unconscious biases operating in each to form their own identity and their understanding of European civilization. Said, for instance, refers to Marx as a “non-Orientalist [whose] human engagements were first dissolved, then usurped by Orientalist generalizations.”¹⁶ And many others have shown how Marx’s category of “the Asiatic mode of production” was steeped in racist presumptions.¹⁷ Weber fares no better by Said.

Weber’s studies of Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism blew him (unwittingly perhaps) into the very territory originally chartered and claimed by the Orientalists. There he found encouragement amongst all those nineteenth-century thinkers who believed that there was a sort of ontological difference between Eastern and Western economic (as well as religious) “mentalities.”¹⁸

We also know that Weber was a card-carrying member of the virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Polish Pan-German League. Said spares his hero Nietzsche the charge of racist but did indirectly implicate him in the passage cited above in the introduction. But other racist hunters have found Nietzsche easy prey. Michel Hulin concludes that “Nietzsche was ultimately a victim of the lacunae in his information concerning Indological matters, and a prisoner of a certain stereotypical image of India carried by the culture of his time.”¹⁹ As brilliant as these men doubtless were, they nevertheless depended on ultimately racist notions about the differences between Europeans and non-Europeans in the formulation of their theories.

The three thinkers’ racism should not, however, discredit their respective theories, even as they pertain to race itself. To be sure, racism vis-a-vis non-Europeans permeated the Europe of their day so thoroughly (for just the kind of reasons Said cites), that even minds as sharp and seemingly independent as theirs could not avoid its sway. Marx himself wrote that “the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”²⁰ Granted, the three were not only visionaries of the future but prisoners of the past as well. And the power of racist attitudes inherited from the past prevented each from fully working out the implications of their more general theories for race in particular. But this should not prevent others from drawing out those implications by extending the insights of the three, even if doing so means exposing racist attitudes in Marx, Nietzsche and Weber themselves. Doing so testifies to their genius rather than against it. So strong are these theories of modernity that they can be stretched beyond the horizons in which their authors themselves lived.

To put this line of thinking differently, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber lived in a less mature modernity than ours. Much like someone who sees in a child a certain trait and rightly judges that the trait will profoundly shape adulthood without, however, being able to predict the details of that adulthood, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber each saw critical qualities of modernity without discerning its full trajectory. Capitalism, nihilism, and rationality did, in fact, do little in the nineteenth century to erode the foundations of racism. But this did not mean that they would and could not do so as modernity matured in the twentieth century.

Non-Racist Said

Said lives in a more mature modernity (some would say in postmodernity). And Said is an avowed non-racist. He bluntly rejects all forms of essentialism, race and other. He sees his work as a continuation and extension of Nietzsche's "genealogical" approach to truth claims which reveals their inevitable cultural, historical and political situatedness or contingency. "No reading is neutral or innocent, and by the same token every text and every reader is to some extent the product of a theoretical standpoint, however implicit or unconscious such a standpoint may be...theory has to be grasped in the place and the time out of which it emerges as a part of that time, working in and for it, responding to it..."²¹

Said's principal goal in *Orientalism* and its sequel *Culture and Imperialism* is to debunk the idea of essential, permanent differences between races by revealing the contexts and motives behind the representation of the differences. At the same time, he has resisted and rejected both "nativism" and "nationalism" as appropriate responses to Western imperialism on grounds that they too suffer from essentialism.²²

Despite his general rejection of transcendental truths and his particular criticisms of Marx's eurocentricity, Said has never been able fully to distance himself from Marx. He is drawn to Marx's compassion for the exploited and to his dream of universal human liberation. He has chastised Foucault and Derrida, who (he believes) wrongly abandon the possibility of human voluntarism.²³ He refuses to stop believing that "there is always something beyond the reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society, and this is obviously what makes change possible."²⁴ And throughout his life, whether in his countless essays or his efforts as a member of the Palestine National Council, Said has struggled tirelessly for change in the form of national sovereignty for his Palestinian brethren.²⁵ Tellingly, he closes his magnum opus with a humanistic appeal against exploitation of all kinds:

No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and the distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about...It is more rewarding—and more difficult—to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, about others than only about "us." But this also means not trying to rule others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly reiterating how "our" culture or country is number one....²⁶

One could scarcely find stronger evidence supporting Nietzsche's, Marx's and Weber's readings of modernity than Said's own career. Said's claim to fame – his disclosure of the self-interested motives behind centuries of European assertions about the Orient – is blatantly "unfaithful to the memory" of entrenched Orientalism and clearly seeks "to abolish (its) limitations of horizon." If Orientalism once seemed "solid," it has certainly undergone considerable "melting" since Said's intervention. That unquenchable capitalist urge to change anything and everything to create new markets for new profits has led editors of books, newspapers, radio and television to see the "value" of Said's work. Today he is as well known, read, heard, seen, sold, admired, interviewed as any Orientalist. Said's rise to Old Dominion Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University stands as

powerful testament to the Weberian nature of the academy. Apparently, in his promotion through the ranks, Said's non-Oriental colleagues had to eliminate "from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation."²⁷

Said's Genealogy

Why then does Said so fervently insist that racism is central to and constitutive of the modern epoch? At one point in *Culture and Imperialism* he goes so far as to call "the ontological distinction between the West and the rest of the world...so strongly felt and perceived...that we may consider these boundaries absolute."²⁸ Earlier he refers to the distinction as "the major, I would say determining, political horizon of modern Western culture."²⁹ The most obvious reply to the query is that Said focuses his research on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European literature; and there racism is indeed central. But this answer will not do, for Said deliberately and repeatedly stretches his argument far beyond the confines of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European literature. In 1981, he published *Covering Islam*, which contends that distinctions fundamentally similar and related to those prevalent in European literature continue strongly to influence the media's coverage of Islamic peoples and governments³⁰ The final chapters of both *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism* (allegedly the work where Said was to excise the gross exaggerations of the earlier work) extend the argument about the centrality of racism to the present day.

The answer must be more nuanced. In fact, it must be "genealogical." In order to understand the genesis, function and (I would like to think) appeal of Said's work, we need to situate it. We need to grasp it "in the place and time out of which it emerges as a part of that time, working in it and for it, responding to it."³¹

As suggested above, Said is a non-racist and has led a life in which personally race has mattered far less than in the time of Marx, Nietzsche, and Weber. But the non-racist willy nilly needs racism just as the Occidental needs the Orient. If Europe's great self-defining mission was world domination, Said's is the eradication of racism. But that means Said needs racists and a culture of racism to subdue and reform just as Kipling needed non-whites to legitimize his great burden. But at roughly the same time as Said's enterprise has gathered momentum, racism, for reasons Marx, Nietzsche and Weber signaled, has been losing steam.

Full demonstration of this controversial assertion naturally exceeds the scope of this short essay. Many works exist which, to quote one prominent title, argue for the "declining significance of race."³² Here I limit my remarks to an area dear to Said: U.S. foreign policy.

The end of World War II marked a watershed in Western foreign policy. Not only did its leadership shift from European to U.S. shores, the experiences of the war profoundly modernized the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. By the end of the war, the Japanese and German peoples were as demonized in the West as Orientals had ever been. The representations, scholarly and popular, of these two nations presented in the West exhibited many of the same kinds of traits Said exposes in *Orientalism*. Theses of German and Japanese "backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West" were rampant.³³ These representations too were designed to glorify the West and justify its domination of the Germans and Japanese.³⁴

As victory appeared imminent, the Western Allies had to decide what to do with their vanquished enemies. Had they followed the racist stereotypes prevalent at the time which suggested that the two races were immutable, they would have laid waste to both lands; and this option was seriously considered (for example, in the Morgenthau Plan to “pastoralize” Germany). The option was, however, ultimately rejected, and the Allied leadership opted to rehabilitate, re-educate and integrate the two polities and peoples into the “Western community.”

Both the decision for and the experiences with the second option amounted to profound Marxian, Nietzschean and Weberian awakenings for the Allied leaders. The permanent crippling of Japan and Germany, for instance, also would have meant the loss of two giant capitalist markets and all the potential profits that went with their revival. The profit motive proved able to melt the seemingly solid enmity between the warring races. Nietzsche once wrote that “truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.”³⁵ The magnificent leaps forward in the science of warfare during the first half of the twentieth century made it impossible to maintain the convenient illusion that inveterate hatred of and ceaseless revenge against one’s enemy were noble qualities. The recurrence of a world war, the Holocaust and Hiroshima generated a nihilism “unfaithful to the memory” of noble racism and nationalism. Weber entered the picture in the way of the solution. The modern era distinguished itself from others, he averred, in the predominance of acquired over ascribed traits. Perhaps the Germans and Japanese were not incurable after all. Perhaps they could learn new norms and values agreeable to the West.³⁶ Unprecedentedly massive re-education campaigns were launched in both occupied countries. The enormous success of these campaigns taught U.S. foreign-policy bureaucrats the benefits to be had from “eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements.”³⁷

It would be just as silly to suggest that all traces of racism have disappeared from U.S. foreign policy as it would be to claim there remain no pre-capitalist characteristics in our economy, no religious dimensions to our secular culture, no irrational moments in our bureaucracies. But as our societies have become more capitalist, secular and bureaucratic, more modern in a word, so too has U.S. foreign policy. The handling of Germany and Japan after World War II established the precedent and led to modern foreign policy strategies ranging from détente through Nixon’s visit to China, Camp David, opposition to apartheid, Oslo and the expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

Said has lived through all of these events and has experienced the decline in importance of racism on the global as well as personal scale. In order to keep his great project alive, Said has had ontologically to fashion “racism” by means of distortions and representations not wholly dissimilar from those Europeans used to create “the Orient.” For instance, Said criticized Orientalists for the imperialistic scope of their studies. “A classicist, a Romance specialist, even an Americanist focuses on a relatively modest portion of the world, not on a full half of it. But Orientalism is a field with considerable geographical ambition...we must learn to accept enormous, indiscriminate size plus an almost infinite capacity for subdivision as one of the chief characteristics of Orientalism—one that is evidenced in its confusing amalgam of imperial vagueness and precise detail.”³⁸

Yet, Said himself possesses considerable historical ambition, particularly in his claim that there exists an uninterrupted tradition of Orientalism stretching back to Homer.³⁹ As

Said ventures (way) beyond his own period, he remains prisoner to it. For it is well established that the idea of a direct link between modern Europe and the ancient Greeks is a nineteenth-century invention with no basis in reality.⁴⁰ Said similarly stumbles when he moves beyond his discipline from the study of literature to the study of U.S. foreign policy. In literature it makes sense to seek an underlying meaning or motivation to a text because it has a single author. But U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century can hardly be traced to one compelling motive. Nor can it be explained by the intellectual influence of five men: "Huntington, Pye, Verba, Lerner, Lasswell."⁴¹ In addition to their sweeping generalizations, Said's works are famous for their attention to detail where the author shows off his celebrated erudition. Though few can bring out the nuanced detail of *Mansfield Park* or *Aida* like Said, critics have fairly labeled his assertions that Austen's or Verdi's works are first and foremost about European domination of the Orient gross simplifications.⁴²

My aim here is not to question the validity or value of Said's scholarship. Rather, I seek to situate his ideas in his time, just as he suggests should be done with all theories. Said distorts the extent of racism precisely because he has witnessed its decline in his time. By representing racism as virtually omnipotent, Said fashions a bigger-than-life adversary which in turn enhances the legitimacy and importance of his own struggle. By representing it as virtually omnipresent, Said has encouraged countless followers in cultural studies and other disciplines to join him in putting in the hard work necessary to uncover racism in its many guises. Said has produced and achieved much of quality and worth in his lifelong mission to define and shoulder the non-racist's burden.

Conclusion

The essay's title has two intended meanings both of which merit some explanation. First, race not racism is dead. I mean this in the same way as Nietzsche meant God but not religion was dead. By Nietzsche's time, countless people continued to believe in God but they no longer could hold their belief with a sense of absolute, unshakable certainty. Too many atheists and agnostics lived perfectly normal, even happy lives for believers not to entertain some doubt about their faith. Too many atheistic and agnostic practices soaked into the fabric of society not to undermine in part even the zealot's sense of certainty. If God existed and was omnipotent, why would He not smite the heathens or halt secularism? Nietzsche realized that when God could no longer demonstrate his omnipotence, he lost his constitutive quality. Similarly race has failed racists. Its alleged characteristics have not proven eternal and immutable as racists wish to believe. As a result, they must now hold their ideology with inescapable doubts. Decades ago, before the death of race, a racist who believed whites and blacks should not conjugate could look everywhere in his world and not find a single interracial couple. Today he must hold his belief with knowledge of countless interracial couples (often quite visible ones like Kofi Annan and his wife or Rodman and Madonna). Earlier a racist could maintain that a black should never hold a position of power over a white and look around and find no black bosses. Today they have to live with a nation's infatuation with Colin Powell. Racists today must repeatedly live humbling experiences of the kind Jesse Owens forced on Hitler in the 1936 Olympics in Berlin. Race as a factor one can count on always to produce the difference(s) attributed to it by racists is dead.

Second, the title is intended to provoke and not necessarily convince. Nietzsche wrote much of his philosophy in brief aperçus. This style allowed him enormous license to express ideas without offering a lengthy traditional demonstration. Nietzsche's method hardly predominates in the sciences today. However, there are serious methodologists who advocate a methodological strategy not wholly dissimilar from Nietzsche's. Before his death Imre Lakatos warned that premature testing of new ideas could impede progress in the sciences. He opposed putting newer "research programmes" to the same tests expected of older, established paradigms. Proponents of the older paradigm, he complained, had had much more time to amass supporting evidence and could therefore most often easily refute a fledgling competitor. He endorsed a methodological protective shell to be wrapped around a new paradigm's core. In the core would lie protected from refutation the paradigm's key and founding assumptions. Eventually, if they wish to be taken fully seriously, proponents of a new, challenging paradigm must venture beyond the core and pit their evidence against that of their competitors. However, to do so prematurely could be needlessly detrimental to the new paradigm and the cause of progress as well.⁴³

In this essay I have tried to articulate the core of my idea knowing well that mountains of evidence exist to refute it. That core has two parts. First, scholarly focus on racism intensifies when racism begins to wane. It is as if we only notice it when it begins to fade. When it is strong and convincing, we take it for granted. This suggests that genuine racists cannot study racism; that one has to become a non-racist before one can study racism (just as one has to become agnostic to study rather than practice religion). Second, students of racism, precisely because it is in decline (in their own worldview at least by the fact that they study it), must artificially amplify its influence in order to legitimate their research. I have (freely no doubt) used this rather curious constellation of Marx, Nietzsche, Weber and Said primarily because it was in considering these authors that the core ideas came to me. Put differently, I have simply shared with readers the processes of my thought which led to the core ideas. I hope, therefore, that the reader will approach the essay as it was intended – as provocation more than proof.

Notes

- 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 3: 108.
- 2 Reported in David Owen, *Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1995), p.1.
- 3 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 204.
- 4 Said, *Orientalism*, pp. 131-32 and 203-204.
- 5 For a thorough discussion of race and racism, see Marvin Harris, "Race," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (London: Macmillan, 1968), 13: 263-69.
- 6 There do exist ascriptive, outwardly visible traits around which persons are grouped but which do not fall under the rubric of race (for example, gender or age). We have common expressions to describe discrimination based on such traits ("sexist," "ageist") which distinguish them from racism. For whatever reasons we have not such common expressions for many of the traits I have included under race (for example, "religionist" or "ethnicist" or "languageist"). Hence, race and racism are broadly defined in this essay. We do, of course, have the common term "nationalist." Whenever "nationalism" involves the belief in immutable differences between nations of people, I consider it racist thinking (as in "The Japanese cannot be trusted.").

- 7 Quoted in Arno Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), p. 295.
- 8 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), p. 12.
- 9 For a more thorough account of Marx's views on endless change than is possible in this essay, see Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 87-130.
- 10 See Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans., R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- 11 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 12.
- 12 Nietzsche, "On the Uses," *op. cit.*, par. 10.
- 13 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 244.
- 14 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 216.
- 15 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 214.
- 16 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 156.
- 17 See, for instance, Anne Bailey and Josep Llobera, eds., *The Asiatic Mode of Production* (London: Routledge, 1981).
- 18 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 259. Also see Jack Goody, *The East in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4-5, for a discussion of Weber's ethnocentricity.
- 19 Michel Hulin, "Nietzsche and the Suffering of the Indian Ascetic," in *Nietzsche and Asian Thought*, ed. Graham Parkes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 66.
- 20 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 595.
- 21 Edward Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 241-42.
- 22 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), pp. 275-76.
- 23 Said, *The World*, pp. 186-88.
- 24 Said, *The World*, pp. 246-47.
- 25 See, for instance, Edward Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage, 1979); or *Peace and Its Discontents* (New York: Vintage, 1996).
- 26 Said, *Culture*, p. 336.
- 27 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 216.
- 28 Said, *Culture*, p. 108.
- 29 Said, *Culture*, p. 60.
- 30 Edward Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon, 1981).
- 31 Said, *The World*, pp. 241-42.
- 32 William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); for the European scene, see Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), or Peter O'Brien, *Beyond the Swastika* (London: Routledge, 1996).
- 33 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 206.
- 34 See, for instance, Richard Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1943).
- 35 Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 46-47.

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- 36 In 1942 Talcott Parsons, the major purveyor of Weber to the English-speaking world, argued that the Germans could be changed if they were provided with the same institutions prevalent in the West: "The Problem of Controlled Change," reprinted in Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949).
- 37 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 216.
- 38 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 50.
- 39 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 56.
- 40 Martin Bernal, *Black Athena*, vol. 1 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).
- 41 Said, *Culture*, p. 290.
- 42 Neil McInnes, "Enough Said," *The National Interest* (fall 1993): 103-108; or John MacKenzie, "Occidentalism," *Journal of Historical Geography* 19 no. 3 (1993): 339-44.
- 43 Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).