Space

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Space

Andrew Kania

Space is such a general feature of the world and our experience of it that spatial concepts get applied in a wide range of ways to almost any subject one can think of, music being no exception. But music is often said to be a paradigmatically temporal art (Levinson & Alperson 1991), with the result that the application of spatial concepts to music is often taken to be merely figurative. In this essay, I investigate a variety of ways in which music might be thought to be essentially spatial in relatively literal ways. I begin by considering whether certain spaces or spatial features are essential to musical works or performances. I then consider spaces “within” music, paying special attention to the notion of “pitch space” – the space in which we experience musical tones as higher or lower than one another and melodic lines as moving.

My main conclusion with respect to the first issue is that there is a distinction between (i) musical works and performances to which spaces are essential because they affect the sonic properties and thus aural experience of those works or performances (what I will call “acoustically spatial” music), and (ii) musical works and performances to which spaces are essential for other reasons, most notably because audiences must be aware of spatial properties of the performance, for instance the spatial arrangement of the performers, independently of their sonic or aural effects (what I will call “conceptually spatial” music). This distinction is worth drawing to the extent that we think of music as primarily a sonic or
aural art. There has recently been philosophical and musicological resistance to the notion of “pure” or “absolute” music (e.g. Ridley 2004), usually motivated by the assumption that to classify some music as such is to privilege it over other musical forms. (See Bonds 2014 and Bonds et al. 2017 for discussion of the long and complicated history of the rise of this view within musical aesthetics.) Nonetheless, some such distinction between the medium of (pure) music and other artistic media seems essential for understanding forms of music such as song, program music, ballet, film, and musical theatre – clearly artistic hybrids in some sense – even if it turns out that there are no actual examples of absolutely pure music. For instance, is it merely a contingent matter of linguistic history that we (typically) call songs “music” but not “poetry,” or that we don’t call films “music” even though in many films music plays almost constantly? It seems unlikely that we could answer such questions without adverting implicitly or explicitly to the notion of (pure) music as a component or aspect of these artforms. With respect to spatial features, I assume it is obvious that, for example, musical theatre is essentially spatial. You couldn’t have a (complete) performance of a theatrical work without some spatial arrangement of performers. The interesting question, then, is whether musical works that are not ordinarily thought of as theatrical can be essentially spatial in some respect. (For further discussion, see Karl & Robinson 2015, 26-9, and Kania, forthcoming.)

I should emphasize, in light of the resistance to the notion of pure music, that no evaluative conclusion about music (e.g. formalism about musical value) follows from such a distinction; nor does the distinction by itself tell us anything about the nature of the medium of music, including whether any kind of spatiality is essential to it. So we can, for the most part, set to one side the question of the nature of the musical medium. My main conclusion with respect to the second issue (of spaces “within” music), however, is that if one particular theory of
pitch space is correct, then imagined spatial experience may be central to at least Western music, including purely instrumental music.

1. Compositional spaces

One quite general and widely held view in philosophy of the arts (and musicology) is that the context of creation of an artwork is essential to its identity and hence often affects its aesthetic and artistic properties. (Classic philosophical sources include Currie 1989, Levinson 1980, Danto 1981, and D. Davies 2004; for dissent, see Dodd 2007.) The space in which a musical work is composed would seem to be part of that context, and hence essential to the work’s identity. But the kind of “space” relevant here is a social, historical, cultural, or political location, rather than a wholly objective, physical or topological location. Hence “place” may be a more natural term for this concept. For instance, the physical or geographical locations of Shostakovich and the Soviet Union are presumably less relevant to the sense of exhausted resignation at the end of his eighth string quartet than the composer’s social, historical, cultural, and political context. Much more could be said about this issue, but if our focus is on physical locations – spaces, as opposed to places – then those most plausibly linked essentially to musical works are not those at which, but rather those for which they are composed, that is, performance spaces.
2. Performance spaces

2.1 Works composed for particular spaces

Benjamin Britten’s *War Requiem*, one of the most popular and critically-acclaimed works of 20th-century classical music, was written for the consecration of the new Coventry Cathedral, built to replace the 14th-century cathedral destroyed in World War II. Arguably a pacifist requiem, it interpolates Wilfred Owen’s poetry into the Catholic requiem mass. The location of the first performance undeniably contributed to its impact, as did its ritual function and the “casting” of the three solo singers – English tenor Peter Pears, German baritone Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, and Russian soprano Galina Vishnevskaya – to represent the three major powers involved in the war. But note that, again, the importance of Coventry Cathedral here largely depends upon its cultural and historical identity rather than its physical or geographical location. Anyway, there have been many other performances of the *War Requiem*, as Britten clearly intended, in other venues, and by performers of various nationalities. Indeed, even at the première, the soprano part was sung by Heather Harper, a British vocalist, since at the last moment Vishnevskaya was denied permission to travel by the Soviet authorities (Cooke 1996). Some performances attempt to recapture something of the spirit of the première. For example, John Eliot Gardiner’s 1992 recording in St. Marienkirche, Lübeck, is “dedicated to the victims of war in former Yugoslavia,” and features an image of “ruined bells in the Marienkirche” on its cover. But there are many performances in ordinary concert halls. Indeed, this is surely the most common setting in which the work is performed, and there seems to be no reason to think it detracts one whit from these performances’ being (fully authentic) performances of Britten’s work (Kivy 1995, 91-2). The venue of the première, like the nationalities of the male soloists, may have
contributed expressive and other properties to that performance, but these are not essential to the work.

The polychoral music of the Venetian School of composers (particularly Andrea and Giovanni Gabrieli, active in the late 16th and early 17th centuries) may be a similar kind of case, though I will consider an alternative interpretation of these works below. The San Marco basilica, where these composers were music masters, possesses several spatially separated choir lofts, which seems to have inspired experiments in passing musical material back and forth between groups of performers situated in the various lofts. But while, unlike the case of Coventry Cathedral, it seems to be physical rather than cultural features of the space that are relevant to understanding the genesis of significant features of this music, the Gabrielis’ works, like the War Requiem, are regularly performed all over the world. Though it is common to spatially separate the groups of performers, this is by no means necessary; one hears the separation in the music, even if the groups perform side by side or even intermingled. (For a dissenting view, see S. Davies 1987, 41.)

2.2 Works composed for kinds of spaces

If a particular performance space is rarely, if ever, essential to a (non-hybrid) musical work, most musical works are surely composed for particular kinds of performance spaces. Bach’s cantatas were composed for performance in churches (and, moreover, for performance in a liturgical setting). Mahler’s symphonies were written for performance in concert halls. Are such location-kinds essential to these works? There is a growing consensus that the artistic content of many musical works cannot be separated from the quite particular kinds of sounds mandated by their composers, usually via instrumentation in a score. (For overviews of this
debate over authenticity, see Thom 2011 and Irving & Dodd in this volume.) And some argue, further, that the way in which these sounds are produced is similarly essential to a proper performance of such works (Levinson 1990; 2002). Either way, due to the complex nature of sounds (e.g. Casati & Dokic 2014), and the reasonable expectations of composers that their works would be performed in certain kinds of venues, it’s not obvious that the sound in question is simply that of a particular kind or combination of instruments, rather than that of those instruments in an acoustic environment of a certain sort. If these arguments are correct, then to perform in a dry setting (such as a community hall) a choral work written for performance in a richly reverberant acoustic (such as a large church) is as inauthentic as performing a Brandenburg Concerto on modern instruments (S. Davies 2001: 214-16). Call such works *acoustically spatial*.

These considerations would also apply to the works discussed in the previous subsection. But notice that they apply even more strongly to the music of the composers of the Venetian School if, as Lydia Goehr argues (2007), their compositional practices pre-date the work concept. If the practice of such composers was one of producing not works for multiple performance but rather singular “performance-works” (D. Davies 2011, 19), then it is even more plausible that the particular location of each such work would determine certain aesthetic properties of it, just as the physical context of a site-specific installation more plausibly affects its aesthetic properties than that of a traditional, “portable” sculpture does.

Nor should we forget that historically-informed performance practice is a matter not just of playing the right kinds of instruments in the right kinds of spaces, but also of doing so in the right kind of style – and in many cases these styles have developed in response to, or symbiotically with, the kinds of performance environments commonly used. So, for instance,
the vocal techniques of both classical opera and Polynesian ensemble-singing have developed
in part to maximize projection – in the one case to enable singers to rise above a full orchestra
in a certain kind of architectural venue, in the other to enable a full sound in an outdoor
acoustic (Grylls 2012, 178).

3. Spaces within musical performances

While works originally written for performance in San Marco may be contentious cases,
many works uncontroversially require a certain spatial disposition of performers or
ensembles. In the score of his Fantasia on a Theme by Thomas Tallis, for instance, Ralph
Vaughan Williams asks that the second string orchestra “should, if possible, be placed apart
from the First Orchestra” (1921, 2; for simplicity, I ignore the diffidence of Vaughan
Williams’s wording here, and treat this arrangement of the performers as mandated by the
score). This spatial separation may be “acoustic” in the sense just glossed, i.e. intended to
have a purely auditory effect, aiding the listener’s ability to distinguish various musical
elements from one another. But very often such spatial separation of musical forces makes an
additional contribution to some aspect of the work’s meaning. The War Requiem, for
instance, requires spatial separation between its three major ensembles partly for thematic
reasons: the tenor and baritone soloists together with the chamber orchestra represent the
combatants, the chamber organ and boys’ choir represent a traditional religious approach to
war and death, and the symphony orchestra with chorus and soprano soloist provide a kind of
choric commentary utilizing the traditional requiem mass text. Call such works conceptually
spatial. (If you think there is such a thing as pure music, then it is an interesting question
whether it is, or can be, conceptually spatial.)
One spatial technique notable for its frequency is the use of off-stage instruments in concert-hall works. The immediate sonic effect is a kind of muting, but because the absence of a performer is so unusual, there is usually an additional higher-order effect, having to do with some kind of metaphorical absence or distance. For instance, in Charles Ives’s *Unanswered Question*, the off-stage string ensemble represents “The Silences of the Druids—who Know, See and Hear Nothing” (Ives 1953, 2); the performers’ absence, no less than their distant sound, represents the druids’ removal from the everyday world to some arcane spiritual realm. The off-stage ensembles in various works by Mahler arguably represent realms in conflict with those represented by the primary, on-stage ensembles (e.g. Franklin, §§10-12), while the repetition of the opening Prologue by off-stage horn as the Epilogue to Britten’s *Serenade for Tenor, Horn, and Strings* suggests a recollection at the edge of sleep. In all of these cases, part of the effect would be lost were the performers to produce the same sounds— with mutes, say— while remaining on stage. (A corollary is that when we hear recordings of such pieces, in order to enjoy the same effect we must imagine the spatial distribution of the performers, even if, in fact, the “off-stage sound” is achieved by other means.) These examples are both acoustically and conceptually spatial.

Presumably we are not required to imagine that Ives’s druids, or any of these other things represented by off-stage instruments are literally spatially distant from anything else represented by the music, but there are many examples of such fictional space in music. One famous example is in the third movement of Berlioz’s *Symphonie Fantastique*, which begins with a dialogue between oboe and off-stage cor anglais. In this case we are presumably supposed to imagine two shepherds calling the cows home with their pipes while physically distant from one another. But the effect is not a simple one. For instance, the particular actual distance between the players does not determine the particular fictional distance between the
shepherds. After all, the end of the movement is haunting because the oboe returns to the
music of the duet but is answered this time only by silence, and we are not consoled by the
fact that we’ve seen the cor anglais player creep back on stage in the middle of the
movement. We are no more supposed to imagine that the shepherds are the same distance
from one another as the musicians than we are supposed to imagine that the shepherds play
keyed instruments, wear black gowns, or are separated by a wall. Simply mapping out the
various kinds of fictional spaces generated by program music would require an essay in itself
– think just of the particular environment suggested by the birdcalls Beethoven selects for
combination in the “Pastoral” Symphony (S. Davies 2012, 75), the train pulling out of the
station in Honegger’s Pacific 231, or the mini-genre of “caravan” pieces (those depicting
something slowly approaching and receding), such as Borodin’s In the Steppes of Central
Asia and “Cattle” from Ravel’s orchestration of Mussorgsky's Pictures at an Exhibition.

It is notable that the examples just considered are clear instances of program music. This is
unsurprising to the extent that the spaces “in” these works are not literal but representational,
whether what is represented is physical space, as with Berlioz’s shepherds, or a notional
space, such as the “distance” between two ideas. Other examples, however, such as Vaughan
Williams’s Fantasia, are not usually considered program music. But are appearances
misleading here? If an otherwise musical work required the performers to move about the
stage in various ways while playing their instruments (but not, or not merely, for sonic
effect), it would not be far-fetched to consider it, at least in part, a dance or theatrical work.
Does it really make much difference that the musicians in the Fantasia are merely spatially
separated, and don’t move about? For that matter, what about a passage in an orchestral work
where a theme is passed down the strings and we hear and see it moving furiously across the
stage, or where there is a dialogue between wind and strings or concerto soloist and
orchestra? The answer to these questions seems to turn on whether the sources of the music – the performers and their instruments – must be experienced as spatially related in a certain way. If a theme is passed down the string sections of an orchestra, it typically makes no difference whether the sections are spatially arranged in descending order or whether, say, the second violins are placed opposite the firsts, with the violas and cellos in between them, as long as one hears that the theme is descending in *musical* space (to which I turn shortly).

Vaughan Williams’s *Fantasia* is a tricky case. It doesn’t seem to be program music, since it has no accompanying text or other representational components, but the fact that it takes a Renaissance English theme as its subject might suggest, particularly considering Vaughan Williams’s musico-historical context and compositional practice, that the piece represents historical relationships, including relationships of memory (like some of the off-stage effects discussed above). If the point of spatially separating the two string orchestras is that (for certain higher-order artistic reasons) we should hear the music each plays as spatially separated, just as (for different higher-order artistic reasons) we should hear the cor anglais as spatially distant from the oboe in the *Symphonie Fantastique*, then the *Fantasia* is a kind of program music – perhaps the placement of the orchestras represents, say, the distance between the musical worlds of Tallis and Vaughan Williams. It would follow that a performance that did not spatially separate these forces would be less than ideally authentic, a little like a concert performance of an opera. But if the point of the spatial separation is merely to clarify in the listener’s ear the various musical masses in play, the *Fantasia* is no more program music thereby than is a piece for double choir just because the two choirs stand side by side rather than intermingled. (Note that even if the spatial separation of the performers is essential to hearing two musical masses as distinct, it doesn’t follow that our experience of the music represents the musical masses as spatially separated.)
The discussion thus far can help us to think about virtual spaces created by electronic manipulation of the sounds of a performance on a recording (and in some modern concert halls). The addition of acoustic effects such as longer reverberation times to recordings of works of pure music for live performance is typically intended to give the illusion of the sounds’ being produced in the right kind of space for the work. By contrast, the use of stereo space in an opera recording, for instance, is typically intended to help the listener to image the spatial arrangement of performers on stage (and thus, often, characters in the opera’s fictional world). In both cases we arguably have a technological surrogate for aspects of the kind of live performance appropriate for the work in question.

Some musical works, however, are created not for live performance, but as recordings for playback (S. Davies 2001, 1-44). Classical electronic works fit this description, but according to a growing consensus (following Gracyk 1996), so do most works of popular music from the 1960s onwards. Such works typically contain a virtual space in which the sounds appear to originate and resonate, especially if they are created for playback through more than one channel (e.g. stereo). In some cases, the ultimate effect is one of an illusionistic or imaginative experience of a live performance – a live performance that never occurred – but in others the sonic possibilities are exploited in order to create non-naturalistic auditory experiences (Walton 2015), for instance of a voice circling one’s head while its timbre changes psychedelically. (For an extended discussion of these techniques in rock music, see Zak 2001.) If the distinction between acoustically and conceptually spatial music for which I have argued holds water, then we should be able to extend it to such works for playback. If appropriate experience of the music requires imagining certain spatial relations between the sources of the sounds or those sources and oneself independently of the (imagined) sonic effects of those (imagined) relations, then the work is conceptually spatial. But if the music
requires no such imagining, then it has, at most, a kind of derivative (because imagined) acoustic spatiality.

(Much of the discussion in this section skips over complex issues of musical representation. Helpful recent treatments include Kivy 1991; S. Davies 1994, 1-166; and Scruton 1997, 118-39.)

4. Pitch space

In the previous section, we moved from considering the spatial distribution of performance forces to spatial experiences of music, veridical and otherwise. One basic and particularly puzzling such experience is that of pitch space. Various phenomena are discussed under the general rubric of *tonal* or *pitch* space. One kind familiar to music theorists is that of *harmonic* space, but I focus in this section on the more basic phenomenon, already mentioned, of notes’ being higher or lower than another, the “pitch space” in which music is heard as *moving*. Our experience of this musical space seems quite robust, and to underpin our experience of many other important musical features. If one could not hear whether a melody rises or falls, one could be accused of not grasping its essential character (Scruton 1983, 80-1). The cheap thrill, found in some popular music, of an unprepared modulation up a step would be undercut if it were replaced with a step *down*. And all philosophical theories of music’s emotional expressivity appeal at some point to music’s dynamic character (Kania 2015, 157-8). By contrast, the language of “harmonic space” is generally accepted to be less literal than that applied to pitch space. To consider just two recent examples from leading theorists of harmonic space: Fred Lerdahl explains that “the starting point” for his book *Tonal Pitch Space* “was not the obvious spatial aspects of music, such as room acoustics or pitch height,
but empirical evidence that listeners hear pitches, …, chords, and regions as relatively close or distant from a given tonic …” (2001, v). A central claim of Dmitri Tymoczko’s *Geometry of Music* is that “geometry provides a powerful tool for modeling musical structure” (2011, 19, my italics). When defending this claim (and throughout the book), Tymoczko is careful to put many central spatial terms (e.g. “distance,” “maps,” “chord spaces”) in “scare quotes” to indicate that they are not used literally. (For useful introductions to harmonic space, see Scruton 2012 and part III.A of Christensen 2002.)

But is the more basic pitch space – the space in which a melody is passed “down” the orchestra, in which one note is higher or lower than another, in which a melody leaps or plunges – any more literal than the harmonic space in which keys are arrayed? Clearly this musical space is not ordinary physical space; if the cellos are on risers and the violins on the stage floor, we still hear the melody *descending* from the violins to the cellos. Some theorists have denied that space or spatial concepts are essential to our experience of music at all. Such “eliminativists” claim that our use of spatial terms to describe music is merely a metaphor that could in principle be eliminated in favor of a neutral, more objective description (e.g. Budd 1985; see also De Clercq 2007). Though he never assays such a description of pitch, in an early paper Malcolm Budd does so for rhythm (1985, 243), and in a later paper he draws an analogy between pitch and timbre. He points out that it is very difficult to give a characterization of the timbre of a particular instrument without resorting to metaphor (e.g. the piercing tone of an oboe), and yet we do not think the metaphorical concepts (e.g. *piercing*) are in any way essential to our experience of such timbres. Similarly, he argues, “sounds have a character, *pitch*, that can be heard, recognized, discriminated, without this character being brought under spatial concepts” (Budd 2003, 251, original italics).
But Budd glosses over an ambiguity concerning “pitch” here. For while we could say that all sounds have a pitch, meaning something like their frequency or our typical experience of that sonic feature, there is more than this to the musical feature known as pitch. For instance, “untuned” percussion instruments, such as bongo drums, emit sounds with pitches in the first sense, but the very fact that they are considered untuned shows that to have a pitch in the second sense requires something more. Exactly what more is difficult to say, but here are two relatively uncontroversial aspects of pitch, in the musical sense, that seem to be quite universal (Stevens & Byron 2009): First, in all musical cultures, sounds with frequencies related by a factor of two are heard as “of the same kind” in some sense (i.e. what Western music theorists call “octave equivalence,” or belonging to the same “pitch class”). Second, musical pitches are subject to “categorical perception.” That is, they are heard as falling within certain qualitative categories with relatively sharp borders that have no basis in the objective frequency spectrum. Imagine, for instance, two pairs of musical pitches, each separated by the same distance on the frequency spectrum. Because of where the pairs fall on that spectrum, together with the musical system in which they are perceived, one pair may be heard as two Ds – one slightly flat and the other slightly sharp – while the other pair may be heard as a very sharp E and a very flat F. To the extent that these features seem less amenable to the eliminativist strategy, because, say, it is difficult to characterize octave equivalence without appealing to one G’s being higher or lower in pitch space than another G, we will be motivated to pursue other theories of musical space.

“Literalists” argue that we cannot eliminate spatial concepts from our descriptions of music, but that this presents no philosophical problem. Stephen Davies points to cross-cultural evidence of the application of spatial concepts to music, which suggests a “conceptually deeply rooted” connection between the two domains. Combining this claim with the
relatively uncontroversial notion that terms may have primary and secondary senses, Davies argues that our application of spatial terms to music is an example of “polysemy”: The notes of a piccolo are literally (if in a secondary sense) higher than those of the double bass, and a theme may literally swoop down, just as one’s career may literally be on the rise or one’s grades falling (S. Davies 1994, 229-39; 2011, 25-30). For Davies, “music is an art of temporal process. A theme is constituted by movement in the way that the progress of the Dow Jones Index is” (1994, 235). This view is to be contrasted with eliminativism in that for the eliminativist the use of spatial terms is a dispensable, merely contingent metaphor. To be sure, these metaphors may be “dead,” but the eliminativist must allow that a different metaphor might just as easily have been taken up originally; for instance, we might have talked of what we call pitch “space” in terms of colors, with each pitch class named for a particular shade, and octaves distinguished in terms of their “hue.” In linguistic terms, this would be homonymy rather than polysemy. (As it happens, Budd has recently shifted towards literalism, citing Davies’s arguments (Budd 2003, 220).)

Like eliminativism, literalism is certainly a coherent view. Its weakest point seems to be precisely that it accords secondary status to the use of spatial terms to describe the musical features in question, when some might aver that they experience notes as higher or lower, and melodies as moving, in the primary senses of those terms. It’s worth noting in this connection that the cross-cultural evidence Davies cites includes terms not commonly used in the West: Low notes are described (in translation, of course) as “big” or “strong,” high notes as “small” or “weak” (1994, 231-2). We do use such terms to describe music in English and other European languages, but not typically to describe relative pitch. It might be argued that to hear a melody that begins high up and plunges to the depths as, instead, beginning very small and inflating to a great size would be to misunderstand it (Scruton 1983, 80-81). But if the
literalist is correct, these are simply alternative – but crucially still spatial – ways of
describing the experience of a temporal process that is non-spatial (in the primary sense).

If one finds compelling the criticisms of eliminativism and literalism raised above, one might
feel the attraction of “metaphorical” theories of musical space and movement. Whatever a
metaphor is, it seems to involve the non-literal application of a concept, so the hope would be
to have one’s cake – the primary sense of the relevant spatial concepts – yet eat it too, in
denying that these concepts apply straightforwardly. Of course, if the idea is just that we use
spatial metaphors in describing music (in thought or publicly), then the view collapses into
eliminativism. To be an alternative to the theories already discussed, the metaphor must be
embedded somehow in either the music itself or our experience of it. Nelson Goodman has a
theory of expressive properties of the former kind, which might be extended to spatial
properties (1976, 45-95): a musical passage is sad just in case it metaphorically exemplifies
sadness. Unfortunately, the central concept of “metaphorical exemplification” is no less
puzzling than the phenomenon it aims to explain (S. Davies 1994, 137-50). Roger Scruton
and Christopher Peacocke have theories of the latter kind: our perceptual experience of music
is somehow metaphorical (Scruton 1983, 77-100; 1997, 1-96; 2004; Peacocke 2009, 257-75;
2010, 189-91). (Like Goodman’s, Peacocke’s theory explicitly addresses only expressive
properties, but Peacocke does not rule out its application to spatial properties.) Scruton claims
that when we hear a melody as moving or a chord as widely spaced, our perception involves
an “unasserted thought” with a content such as “that melody is moving,” as opposed to the
judgment “that car is moving” involved in a non-metaphorical perception. Peacocke’s theory
is that such perception involves the subpersonal detection of a rule-governed isomorphism
between the actual (e.g. sonic) and metaphorical (e.g. spatial) domains, with the result that
concepts from the latter “are copied to some special kind of storage binding them with …
mental representations [in the former] domain … in the subpersonal state underlying an experience …” (2009, 267). That is, a part of our mind inaccessible to conscious thought “notices” a certain structural similarity between sounds and space, and thus uses spatial concepts to structure our aural experience.

Although Peacocke’s theory of metaphorical perception is more detailed than Scruton’s, it is still crucially unclear how the concepts from the metaphorical domain enter into perceptual experience (Boghossian 2010, 71-6; Budd 2012). Stephen Davies pushes the problem back a step, arguing that Peacocke’s view mischaracterizes the phenomenology of the experiences he seeks to explain in the first place. Taking one of Peacocke’s central examples, Davies argues that it is not part of our perceptual experience of a picture of anthropomorphous pots that they are people (S. Davies 2011, 22-3).

A final alternative to be considered claims the advantages of metaphorical theories (positing an experience involving both sonic concepts that literally apply to the object of experience and spatial concepts that do not), while avoiding their disadvantages (a bedrock appeal to metaphor or an unfamiliar kind of mental process). According to imaginative accounts of musical space and movement, we imagine of the sounds we hear (or our experience of them) that they are spatial or mobile (or of spatial or mobile things). Imagination has always played a role in Scruton’s theory as the capacity that underlies metaphorical perception, and in Scruton’s recent work one might see imagination taking over from metaphor as the more important part of the theory. (By contrast, Peacocke explicitly distances his theory from Scruton’s on the grounds that our experience of expressive features of music, at least, is more directly perceptual than any imagination-based theory could account for (2010, 190).) Rafael de Clercq has suggested that one charitable way of interpreting Scruton is as arguing that we
simply perceive the sounds or tones of the music and then imagine of them that they possess spatial characteristics such as height or motion (de Clercq 2007: 158-63). This interpretation bears strong affinities with Kendall Walton’s theory of fiction (1990). According to Walton, fictions are “props” in games of make-believe. That is, when we watch the opening of *Citizen Kane*, though we know we are seeing a photographic record of an actor on a set (the “prop”), we spontaneously imagine there is a man dying. Though the general shape of Walton’s theory is widely accepted by aestheticians, the details are disputed. For instance, Walton argues that our mode of imagining depends on the medium and content of the work. When we experience visual fictions, such as *Citizen Kane*, we imagine seeing Kane die, that is, we imagine of our visual experience of the moving images that it is a visual experience of a dying man. But if we read a novel including a similar story, we need not imagine seeing (or reading) anything; we need only imagine that a certain man is dying. However, depending on the narrative strategy of the novel, we may imagine being told a story in some unspecified way. Others have argued that we simply imagine the fictional events to occur, regardless of the medium (e.g. Currie 1991). In both the verbal and visual case, we imagine that a man is dying, and the medium only affects the content of the imagining (e.g. in the visual case, we imagine that a man of such-and-such an appearance is dying, where the “such-and-such” stands in for the rich visual information presented in the film).

Walton applies his theory to music in the course of discussing whether music is representational or abstract (1988; 1990, 333-41; 1994). His answer, in short, is that although we may, in experiencing a piece of pure music, appropriately imagine of some aspect of that experience that it is an emotional experience (e.g. we imagine of our experience of a slow minor theme that it is an experience of sadness), the music does not represent anyone as undergoing that experience. In the course of defending this answer, Walton briefly touches on
the topic of musical space and movement. He points out that our experience of musical space and motion is non-perspectival, that is, we may hear one note as higher than another, or a melody as rising, but we do not hear the notes as higher or lower than ourselves or rising towards or away from our location. Walton argues that this implies, at the very least, that we do not (typically) imagine hearing sounds when we experience music, since hearing, like seeing, is essentially perspectival (1988, 53-4). He stops short, however, of offering a positive explanation of the basic experience of musical space and motion.

Nonetheless, we might apply Walton’s general theory to this phenomenon. (In addition to de Clercq’s interpretation of Scruton, such an application is suggested in Kania 2007, §4 and Trivedi 2011, 188, and developed in Kania 2015.) Taking Walton’s observations on board, we would have to say that when we hear sounds as music, we imagine of those sounds that they are spatially arrayed and, often, moving. Budd objects that, since the identity of a musical tone is given by its position in pitch space, we cannot hear musical tones as moving (2003, 216). (Scruton also makes this point, which militates against ascribing this theory to him (1983, 84).) We might reply that even if a musical tone’s identity is tied up with its pitch, the identity of an ordinary sound is not tied up with its pitch (in the musical sense). Indeed, it might be that the imaginative experience of hearing sounds as spatial is part and parcel of hearing them as music.

Of course, the identity of ordinary sounds might be tied to their frequency, or some phenomenal correlate of frequency, and Budd might argue that even with this clarification the objection resurfaces once we hear the sounds as musical tones. But a second reply to Budd points to the fact that our imaginative experiences need not be logically coherent. This is most obvious in the case of narrative fictions, where we often imagine things we believe or
know to be impossible (just think of science fiction or ghost stories). Walton introduces the quasi-technical term “silly question” to refer to questions about the content of our imaginings that have no answer within the fiction and may, if pressed, disrupt our engagement with it (1990, 174-83). It may be, then, that in experiencing a soaring melody we imagine of the sounds we hear that they are, or include, something moving through space in a certain way, but without imagining anything about what this thing is or how the space it moves through is related to the space we, or the sounds, actually inhabit. Budd thinks that such a characterization raises questions about the coherence of the experience (or the theory of it), but perhaps such questions are in Walton’s sense, silly.

I suggested in the previous section that if appropriate experience of a work for playback requires imagining spatial relations between the sounds’ sources or those sources and oneself, then it is conceptually spatial. Does this imply that if an imaginative theory of musical space and movement is correct, then all music is conceptually spatial? One difference between the cases is that the imaginative theory of musical space and movement involves imagining spatial properties of the sounds themselves, rather than their sources. This might militate against counting musical space and movement as conceptual (in this sense), even if the imaginative theory of it is correct.

5. Music, space, and musical space

Though I have by no means offered an incontrovertible argument for an imagination-based theory of pitch space and musical movement, it is worth noting that if such a theory is correct, spatial experience may be central to at least Western music. For pitch is surely central to such music, and the imagination theorist argues that to experience pitch is to have an imagined
spatial experience. This may lend weight to those theories that attempt to draw a principled
distinction between music and other arts of sound, where such an experience is no so central
(e.g. Hamilton 2007, Kania 2011). (For a careful discussion of other possible connections
between spatial concepts and musical experience, see de Clercq 2007.) Regardless of one’s
views on the nature of pitch space, the conclusions argued for earlier in this essay suggest
that there is a further distinction to be drawn between acoustically spatial and conceptually
spatial music. This distinction is useful for appreciating different ways in which music can be
spatial, but if the notion of pure or absolute music is defensible, anyone interested in limning
its boundaries must also address the question of whether both acoustic and conceptual
spatiality fall within them.¹

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Thanks to John Dyck for sharing his work in progress on this topic, which I look forward to seeing in print, and
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Works cited


**Further reading**


A wide-ranging collection of new musicological essays on the politics of space in music and sound.


A response to Peter Kivy’s objections to narrative interpretations of some instrumental music, containing an argument that we should consider the distinction between absolute and program music to be one between poles on a continuum, rather than a sharp dichotomy.


A beautifully illustrated architectural history of musical performance spaces.

An excellent collection of new essays on the philosophy of sounds and auditory perception.


An ambitious and singular philosophical theory of music, one central idea of which is that in experiencing music we have an imagined spatial experience.