The "Uncontacted" as Third Infamy

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The “Uncontacted” as Third Infamy

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Introduction

Could what we call “the Uncontacted” peoples of the Amazon rain forest also be referred to as a “force of life... thought through and lived out as a multiple death” (Deleuze 1999:79)? Here and throughout this essay, my use of the “we” has the featured purpose of referencing us individuals who live or have historically lived within the social categories of personhood dominated by the cultural influences of Western rational thought. My focus is not, however, on such individuals or, indeed, even on the culturally constructed categories of personhood within which we live, but rather on our specific rationalist way of thinking about such categories. Hence in my continual use of the collective “we” (which obviously includes us anthropologists) I seek to return repeatedly to this given way in which our thinking and expressing of ourselves has its dominant historical and socially shared realities within our Western Euro-American knowledge forms. In addition, as well as more immediately relevant, in my repeated deployment of the collective “we,” I wish (without the preposition of a judgement) to acknowledge that the current debate about indigenous Amazonian peoples is completely of our own making and not necessarily the product of their direct discourse. With this confession, let me also add, that to join in the present discussion on the issue of the so-called Uncontacted Peoples I, like many other authors, have had to succumb to certain constrains. The first of which you have just encountered.

In our present academy (despite what many might to the contrary imagine), we scholars act within culturally constrained categories that insist on expectant normative procedures. Even for those who claim to study culture professionally, “serious” scholarship seemly cannot be entered into without “proper” procedure. Having “A Question” is one of them. Interrogation, we frequently argue, must take place. To be taken seriously (and let me quickly insert that what I mean by this is to be respected for the intellectual work one does and hence sustain a reputation for such endeavors), scholars have been taught to ask rigorous questions of the world. For in our culture of scientific reasoning, we knowledge-seekers hold “truth” to be of a higher status to “untruths,” and what we want most, from the interrogated world, is this highly valued quality of its professed truths (Foucault 1984). Hence, under the presumption that the world holds its own independent existence, that is, separate from our own human presence, we modernist-trained scholars invariably seek to extract and possess, for our own knowledge forms, the confessed truths of the world. Science, or its particular use of rational thought, thus becomes credited with the extractive power of being able to know the world most truthfully. But, to play this specialized game of knowledge appropriation effectively, as well as to believe in its procedures of productivity wholeheartedly, we also have to succumb to its cultural rules of practice. And, of course, as we have been informed over and over again, the most effective cultural means for achieving such capitulation derive from the constraints that operate within the game of human language (Holbraad and Pedersen 2017).

It is not enough, therefore, that we would want rational thought to serve as the “truth-tracking faculty” (Rorty 2016:4)—and not simply as a “social practice” (ibid.)—but that it should (indeed, with some stark irony) acquire its knowledge directly, that is, unmediated by culture. This hermeneutical game we play with the world, whereby we claim to interpret its presence by first providing it with representations that we ultimately can decipher, has allowed us some comfort in satisfying our desire of knowledge acquisition. But it still remains a game we play with ourselves within the realm of our own language.

So, rather than a war of words,
which best to interpret the world?

“Uncontacted,”
“voluntary-isolation,”
“self-isolation,” even
“controlled isolation”?

From our storehouse of modernist thoughts,
from our archive of Western knowledge,
from our moral judgements and privileged voyeurism,
from traces of The Tribe that Hides from Man (Cowell 1974),
First Contact Tourism (Bell, Brown, and Gordon 2013),
Human Zoos, even Black Face Minstrelsly (Stasch 2016),

the “problem,”
the “question,”
is not in the world,
but in our interpretations
of the world.

Thus, for the purpose of this debate,
I acquiesce to “Uncontacted” and
to an anthropology hermeneutically
sealed off from the living world.

This, then, is the humble purpose of my contribution. Not to engage in warring polemics,
not to direct in a fusillade fashion factual evidence against opposing ideas and, certainly not,
through such tactics of our particular “regime of truth,” to somehow claim a shallow victory
and a vain supremacy. This essay offers but a humble reminder. It is a modest attempt, in a
lemniscate-like way, at recurving and recalling what anthropology itself teaches. It should never
be forgotten that we are ourselves culture-bound and, as such, always-already in possession of
that incredible creative power of the human imagination, which enables us an envisioning of
both the limits of our cultural confinement and our capacity to resolve the very questions we
invent for ourselves (Wagner 1975). Without compunction, therefore, this essay strives not to
access and present any absolute truth(s) about indigenous Amazonian peoples but, rather more
modestly, it endeavors to trace the folding of Euro-American rationalist thinking as it produces
its ideas about the so-called indigenous Uncontacted Amazonian Other.

In doing so, let me here additionally plead guilty to having taken for granted and left
mostly unengaged the way scientific rationality and the history of Christianity have, despite
much denial, sustained their shared interest in the act of interpretation (Gargani 1998; Vattimo
2005). Left largely unmentioned, yet always-already informing my ruminations, this longstand-
ing biblical tradition of the West is, I admit, like the colorfully referred to “elephant in the
room.” So please keep this “presence of an absence” in mind and kindly allow me an awareness
of such a persistent convention. Even when it remains patently obvious, interest in the death
of God (particularly from influences by Friedrich Nietzsche [1999] and Antonin Artaud
[1976]) must nonetheless entail reflectiveness from a well-endowed religious orientation and
must additionally contribute to the very idea of human subjectivity and its interiority. It is,
therefore, within this continual flow of Western interests in the interpretative, that I meta-
discursively consider modern rationalist thinking as carrying with it its entwined moral biases
(Derrida and Vattimo 1998). Mine, then, quite frankly, is an implicit yet guiding opinion that
scientific rationalist thought shares with the “Axis Faiths” their constant concern for “The
Text,” its presumed developed vision of “Oneness,” its accompanied transcendence and dom-
inance, and its functioning contributive force for knowing the right and wrong of being in the
world.
What we categorize anthropologically in our trained academic thoughts and in our crafted text, with words like “Uncontacted” and “Amazonian peoples,” serve to help us produce, for distribution amongst ourselves, narratives about real people actually living in the real world, right now, at this very moment. And these narrated words come with their conventionally prescribed and expectant meanings. Words which, when interpreted to mean what they have traditionally long conveyed, also simultaneously represent a certain kind of obedience and judgment. Obediently rendered as “productive” and “distributive,” they allow us to claim some sense of self-worth and fulfilled achievement.

Making and exchanging have become treasured values. But not necessarily by recognizing the creative use of words and their indirect access to the reality of the world—in this case to the lived reality of Amazonian peoples. To the contrary, the making and sharing merely serve to heighten the dread that such creativity, such powerful imaginative use of vocabulary, is all that we have (Rorty 2016). Wanting desperately to believe that we—logical-thinking academics in particular—have actually gained unmediated access to reality in our use of language, the suspicion appears ever-present that without this immediacy, without this playing of the rationalist language game, any interpretation might do, any vocabulary might end up as true description of the world. No longer suspect, is the fear deserving?

“Truth cannot be out there –
cannot exist independently
of the human mind –
because sentences cannot
so exist, or be out there.

The world is out there,
but descriptions of the world are not.
Only descriptions of the world
can be true or false.” (Rorty 1989:5)

With obsessive attempts at producing and distributing “true” descriptions of Uncontacted Peoples, rendered words obey their user’s desire to achieve direct access to the reality of indigenous Amazonians. With some irony, indeed, they seek unmediated contact to their force of life (to their empowered existence of embodied experience). A force of life brought into discourse by way of spoken or textual words. A force of life conceived of as having its own productive power. A force of life imagined to be of an independent source. A force of life imagined as having its own origin point in the bodies of indigenous Amazonians. A force imagined as having its own causal determinant, from which all manner of autonomous affects come into being. A force even often uncritically imagined as gendered which,

as in our bibliocentric tradition,
manifests as masculine,

hermeneutic conjectures
about/from male divinatory character,

god-like progenitive power,
productive of inherent edicts,
expectant of reverent obedience.

Contained within and communicated through truth-seeking renditions, thoughts and words about indigenous Amazonia life forces not only construct and express desirable meanings, they also simultaneously provide a way of passing judgment. As in biblical hermeneutics, so too in modernist interpretations: meaning and judgement fold to each other. Repudiated Christian moral tenets remain, nonetheless, tightly festooned within all rational scientific discourse.
Inalienable sin,
inalienable rights,
inherent truths,
like those about Supreme Being,
String Theory, and aspirations for
the “Theory of Everything.”

Being judged guilty of the “sin” of disobeying the “laws of gravity” or the “laws of thermodynamics,” like disobedience of the commandments of God, amounts to a truth, the status of which rationalist thought finds difficult if not impossible to disavow. Rendered discourses deliver their judgements, solemnly escorted by strongly held cultural beliefs, not only about indigenous Amazonian life but also about the way such life is lived.

Within modernist renderings, reasoned and generalized thought convey the meaning of life forces anticipating and resisting death, having thus, in consequence, to deploy in itself the discerning cultural tactic of constantly repeating death. Note how its interpretations fold back, not so much to “mirror” the mode of its interpretation, but to be the actual rendering of itself. Hence, when speaking and writing about the force of indigenous Amazonian life, the continuous coming and going of words used, do not so much “mimic” the life force; they literally create them. They bring them into the life and death of words and, of course, as with all intentional hermeneutics, empower their creator.

And God said,
“Let there be light”:
and there was light.
And God saw the light,
that it was good:
and God divided the light
from the darkness.
And God called light Day,
and the darkness he called Night.
And the evening and
the morning were
the first day.

And God said, . . .
And God said, . . .
And God said, . . .
And God said, . . .
And God said, . . .

And God blessed them, saying …
And God said . . .
And God said . . .
And God said,
“Let us make
man in our image . . .”
(Genesis 1:3–26).

The command produces an expectant obedience. For in the same way that “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1); the command as word and the word as command provide for the presumed necessary authentication of the producer and the producer’s force to produce. They deliver the opportunity for claiming that whatever gets produced must be the true product of the producer, as well as the evidential truth of its producer. Here the product as fact serves to indicate the truth in existence of its producer. It does so by its obedient testimony to the origins of its coming into being. This is an obedience made always expectant of command. Servile in this manner, it clearly functions as an ideal realization of force; it is, after all, in its manufacture, not only
proof of a force possessed with its own direct and immediate effects, but also evidence of a force deployed specifically to verify the reality of its producer. Here the coming-into-being of the product satisfyingly confirms its own identity and the authenticity of its producer. In this regard, preceded by the producer as original site of productive force, the made product manifests as a copied aspect of its maker. Keep in mind that it is only when recognized as copy does the copy fulfil the heavy work (if not also its duty) of authenticating the “truth” of the original. For without the copy, indeed, without the mimetic quality of the copy, the original cannot maintain its authentic status. As the so-called origin site of force for the production of the product, the producer can only insist on claims of authenticity by always having the status of the unreal or the untrue at its command. Thus, does copying allow fulfillment of such an ideal. For with the copy comes recognition of a double original source: of a twinned “real,” a twinned “authenticity,” a twinned “true” means of production. In both the imagined ideal of the force to command and its venerated replication, a coupled sense of inborn feebleness and of empowered superiority manifests equally. The producer Himself obeys the Word. Copying retained, unmistakably, as the product even of a modernist will.

Here, in this specific instance of seeking to command into memetic description the so-called indigenous Amazonian Other, rationalist thoughts about life and death tandem into the rendered vocabulary. In this scenario, that is, in “presenting death as being coextensive with life” (Deleuze 1999:79) death becomes folded to life.

So consider the trained tradition of thinking in dichotomies and binaries, processes which tend to extend yonder, beyond Euro-American selves, to all other humans (and, with some recent experimental flair, even to “emerge in a world of living thoughts beyond the human” [Kohn 2013:72]). This tradition has normalized the disappearance of the gap between the world and the representations of the world. In thought, the effect is often the desired collapse of the real world into the virtual world of the cultural experience of language. But the real and the virtual, while always-already in a forced relation to each other, nevertheless, retain their differentiation. It seems that without this difference, made within language (and not the world it seeks to represent), there can be no produced meanings. But, in and of itself, this very presumption—functioning as it does in ways similar to divine transcendence—confirms its own delivered presence of truth.

“What remains unsayable and unsaid in every language is therefore precisely what every language means and wants to say: pure language, the expressionless word” (Agamben 1999:54).

In other words, all discourses about the life and death of Amazonian peoples remain just that: vocabularies more productive of modernist collective thoughts than the actual lived realities they seek to represent. Consequently, in affirmation of guilt, even my own reference here (in this text), to an Uncontacted Amazonian force of life, similarly amounts to no more than words which seek to name and, in the naming, claim to know what has been named. The interpretative act of naming empowers the cultural presence of words and naming, taken from a Euro-American social practice of language making and remaking. By the persistence of the severance between the “real” and the “unreal,” the “true” and “untrue,” this particular interpretative act empowers more the representations of the “me,” the “us,” and, consequentially, our cultural tradition, than it does (in this moment) any similar production by the purportedly uncontacted indigenous Other: an admittance, perforce, of the “Truth of the Word.”

A Telling Intervention

So, my reference to an indigenous uncontacted force of life attempts, therefore, to configure folded thoughts about ‘an anonymous life that shows up only when it clashes with power, argues with it, exchanges ‘brief and strident words’, and then fades back into the night, what Foucault called ‘the life of infamous men’ whom he asked us to admire by virtue of ‘their misfortune, rage or uncertain madness’” (Deleuze 1999:79). Thus (to return in another way to the initial posed question) have we, within the confines of our thoughts, introduced and now consider uncontacted indigenous Amazonian peoples as constitutive of the Foucauldian third infamy? That is, an infamy “which is properly speaking an infamy of rareness, that of insignificant, obscure, simple men, who are spotlighted only for a moment by police reports or complaints” (ibid.:121)? Let us agree, within this discursive terrain, that perhaps we have indeed produced this meaning and have, in the process, additionally delivered a judgement.
Being the last of a kind, signifies the presence of an infamy.

Living subjectivity as insignificant, signifies the presence of an infamy.

Not drawn to the glorious limelight of Western Being, not even contesting the need to be represented, also signifies the disquieting presence of an infamy.

Simple savages, at the mercy of complex rationalities, made small and difficult to see as energized particles, signifies an infamy.

And yet an admiration couples and pirouettes with this inglorious infamy. For dancing within descriptions of their particular infamy of misfortune, rage, and possible uncertain madness is an intrusive ghostly partner.

In modernist understandings of their rareness, their insignificance, their obscurity, and their simplicity—which rationalist laws and grievances momentarily spotlight—such existence of the Uncontacted Peoples of Amazonia appears not only as the consequence of a verdict cast but also as the achieved possession of a power seemingly beyond its positive moral markings. The negative judgement passed on their existence floods the scene and highlights from our point of view their serious moral failings. They live notoriously not merely beyond our experiential terrains but, perhaps more dangerously, beyond their own possible means of being subjected to our modernist ethics and to our generous offer of human rights. Yet it appears we also begrudgingly admire this infamy. It appears we simultaneously hold with vicelike intensity that very public secret desire for a liberty-finally-achieved, to be ultimately and completely free from all perceived constraints. It appears we extend to and deduce from ideas about Uncontacted Peoples a certain kind of release from the forceful grip of negative power. But, as we do so, we also appear to judge their presumably obtained liberty to be dangerously precarious and, in the end, to be in desperate need of taming by our supposedly more secure methods of stability. In other words, the “crime” or “horrible deed” committed by the Uncontacted Peoples has to do with them being deprived of our Western forms of modernity while, at the same time, being the guilty object of our admiration during their momentarily perceived abominable audacities.

Being thus well known for this particular infamy, Uncontacted Peoples have been condemned in absentia as repudiators of our truths about the world and about their presence within it. This, I am humbly suggesting, is what lies at the very heart of our current and ongoing anthropological discourse on their infamy. But, for this repudiation to become analytically known and to be both abhorred as well as admired morally, it has to enter into a discourse that can retrieve the lives of the repudiators as “fabulous-exemplary” (Foucault 1979:90).

As this infamy of the lived banality of Uncontacted Peoples enters the discursive terrain of the fabulous, it is forced to leave its banality behind. It must depart. If it did not disappear, there would be open laughter in the aisles at its sheer mundanity.

Ethically, if the reality of the lives of the Uncontacted are to be taken seriously, their lives must be spoken of with grand academic solemnity. Yet, as they are spoken of in this way—allowing the productive power of the discourse to perform the transformative work of installing the grandeur and brilliance to their now-extraordinary heroics—an additional and simultaneous empowerment accrues to the producers of the discourse. The presumed possession of a capacity to produce a supreme intrusion is seemingly obtained. This discursive power to intervene in this manner permits the producers “to tell about that which does not tell itself, of that which merits no glory” (ibid.). This is the producers’ most imperative ethic, whose ritual function commands one “to seek what is the most difficult to perceive, the most concealed, the most discomforting to show and tell, finally the most forbidden and the most scandalous” (ibid.).

Put quite plainly, I am here proposing that the modern rationalist-produced discourses about the lives of the Uncontacted-living-as-infamy always-already fold as thoughts about their producers. Coupled thoughts about their producers are produced simultaneously within these
discourses. And one such principal thought is that the lives of those who produce the life-producing words remain famously better experienced and empowering. Lives we consider even more real than the “reality” they invent for the indigenous Other. Our lives which, when in the creative process of production, come into possession of perhaps the only possible certainty of self-presence available. (And, I might add, this is so even when the producers’ very own lives could, in counter-discourse, be said to be mundane or even perhaps be subject to versions of a comparative lack of well-being. For instance, in the generalized productivity and distribution of academic scholarship—let us say, in celebrated studies about incarceration, segregation, loneliness, isolation, depression, or suicide—all would boast of possessing a superior contemplative and reflexive position, one frequently denied to the histories and social-}

In the specific instance of thoughts and discourses about the infamous lives of Uncontacted Amazonians, the implicit claim—twined to that made about them living their lives differently from those of modernists—is that they live an intolerable lie. While made to appear as “real” in the discourse of the rationalist interpreter, the “difference of life” of the Uncontacted, nonetheless, always-already means the “unreal” and “untrue” when implicitly compared to the living reality of the producer. Accompanying this interpretation of their lives, one made by the only immediately verifiable truth—that of the present living reality of the interpreter—the judgment passed is one of their guilt. The indigenous Other, here accused of an infamy, appears guilty not merely of a woeful precariousness but, more deeply, of an inherent inferiority. For the modernist interpreter, the moral status of the unreal and the untrue always already remains inferior to the superiority of the real and the true. To have arrived at this presumption, as you have no doubt already ascertained, I have myself indulged rather speculatively in the theorizing of thought as folded, rather than thought as dialectical process.

**Theorizing the Fold, Folding the Theory**

First let me explain that I am using the metaphor (or poetics) of the fold or “invagination,” (see Deleuze [1999] and Gell [1996] who follows Anzieu [1989]) not so much as a counter or replacement to the equally metaphoric (or poetic) image of the penetrating phallic dialectics of dichotomous and binary thinking (Cixous 1976), but rather as supplementary observation about how the former functions vicariously around the latter. This is not then a superordinate reliance upon the double-pronged production of meaning, made possible by dialectic thought, manifesting seemingly transcendent in a language used to describe, interpret, and pass judgement. And it is not so much a dependency upon a way of thinking that is so like a divine masculinity that takes command and initiates progeny into discursive life. The hope is for a preferred recursive thinking process—one more lemniscate-like than lineal.

Intellectually grasped by the cultural exteriority of our measured thoughts, the interiorly lived reality (that which can only be experienced by the living body) of embodied indigenous lives becomes an “inside which is merely the fold of the outside” (Deleuze 1999:81). Thus, in our particular descriptions of indigenous Amazonian peoples, our thoughts can no more project the inside reality of their lived experience than they can mirror the actuality of such felt being (Rorty 1979). The most they can possibly achieve is an “interiorization of the outside” (Deleuze 1999:81) or a “redoubling of the Other” (ibid.) as thought alone.

This being-thought-alone permits the movement of a curious repetition.

Brought to the surface of our thoughts, by way of a loop outside of self, the idea of the Uncontacted-ness or precariousness of the indigenous Amazonian Other repeats the interiorizing of self

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Repeated twice, in other words, doubled by the process of folding, this interiorization of self, for us as well as for the Other we have invented, helps produce that morally necessary sameness of subjectivity—the common ground, if you like, of Humanness.

At the same time, however, this common human subjectivity, which we share with the other, is made to become differentiated from us by our exteriorizing process of self.

We create the other self, exterior to our own, manikin-like in our ventriloquist act. We make the other self, create its own other world.

A repeating of repetition, not necessarily replicating the other merely as other, for in this doubling process “it is a self that lives me as the double of the other” (ibid.).

Put personally, I do not meet me on the outside: I discover myself in the doubling of the Amazonian Other. Thus, in this particular discursive instance of folding self with other, of doubling contact with Uncontacted-ness, of the coextensiveness of nearness with distance, life resuscitates self from the “multiplicity of partial and particular deaths” (ibid.:79).

So, to reiterate, it is in this regard that the infamy of the life of indigenous Amazonians exists only in our bringing of it into life within our discourses: ostensibly about them, but ultimately about our modernist subjectivities and their capacities to resist death by redoubling the Otherness of the indigenous Other. Yet still folded to the act of resuscitation is the deliberate serial killing of the self-Other. This takes place every time we cease to speak and think about them, as well as when our codes and algorithms about them—hidden (though sometimes not so hidden) in our rationalist interpretations about them—no longer need the presence of their lived realities to be able to have a discourse about them.

These multiple deaths (that which can be done to life, over and over again) or these sufferings, in our empathetic thoughts about their lives, clearly are of concern to us, a concern most likely generated from our always-already well-invested cultural truths about pain and dying being possible only from inside of embodiment’s treasured force of life. Consider, then, how, being similarly capacitated by the fold of thought to exist only in life, power too becomes delimited by death from inside of life.

Death and power thus lose their effects for us when not exercised within life. No surprise, then, at our anxious modernist dependency upon the management of life performed by an exercise of a power that not only takes hold of life for our own good but also simultaneously possesses the power to extinguish life itself.

Anxiety over the inability to exercise this power over life and death flows within the well-intended thoughts we hold about the remaining nonmodernists with whom we share this planet. This concern, I am arguing, extends out, from what our thoughts claim to be about, turning and folding back into a problem about thoughts themselves.

But thoughts do not bleed. In the sanctuary of our imagination thoughts receive immunity from the bloodletting.
The felt tremor of uncertainty,
from knowing this thought,
has long been justification
for words to be more than
just the thing they represent,
more than the sign of that signified.

The death of the thing in the world
must also be its rebirth in the discourses
we construct about the world.

Purposeful Pirouettes and the Deliverance of Judgement

I can, expectantly, imagine your possible accusation. “He is purposefully pirouetting around this interiorizing of our shared exteriorized thoughts about the Uncontacted.” I agree. I do so in an inexact effort to stay steady with that which I am at the moment reflecting upon while, at the same time, not wanting it slowly and imperceptibly to disappear from the very means we have available to us for collectively sharing our thoughts about its actual existence. The lived reality of the peoples we think about, write about, speak about, and have continuous scholarly discourses about cannot in actuality be our thoughts, our writings, our speech, or our discourse. No matter how much we might desire such to be the case. Yet even within the redoubled world of our thought-provoked discourses, their invented virtual presence tends to give ground to the greater significance of our own being. The people who have been made to occupy the narrative world of our anthropological descriptions frequently become less of an imperative than our discourses about them. Our presence and the presence of their absence in our discourses—or, as I am arguing, this strange redoubling of subjectivity in narrative form—set the stage for the simultaneous deliverance of judgement necessary for maintaining the superiority of our modern moral values.

I am, therefore, purposely pirouetting, not to close around some anxious-filled ruminations, supposedly existing in the world, independent of our cultural formations of them. Rather, my textual dance seeks, in imaginative cultural form, to gather up or be gathered up by the concerns we always-already have regarding the ethical condition of the Uncontacted. Or perhaps, better still, I desire my words to twirl as conceptual folding of “rights-centred theories and . . . virtue-centred ethics” (Overing and Passes 2000:4) that have specially to do with the uncontacted presence of indigenous Amazonian peoples. For it seems to me that in our modernist concern, not only to deliver a judgement but also to maintain a verdict of a superior common ground for the ethical (that is, over the inferior condition of the unethical) we conjoin, in choreographed discursivity, all differences that might appear between rights and virtue. Hence, at the singular level of the ethical (that is, without ambiguity, without severance, or without any denial of similitude in being just about thought), rights and virtue fold into each other as one. There, in our thoughts and discourse, they serve as doubled statements about the presumed third infamy of the so-called Uncontacted Peoples.

Even as we deploy our benevolent but strategically privileged discourses about the welfare of the Uncontacted, while repeating their difference in our redoubling of their Otherness, rights and wrongs, moral and immoral qualities, become directed accusations. From the peculiar purview of such doubling, the dance steadies upon concerns about good and evil, upon disquieting moralities revealed through the very limitations of modern Western thought that guide well-intended attempts to relieve human suffering and to implement rational forms of justice.

When attempting to foist itself
into the lived realities of indigenous Amazonian peoples
(whom have not yet been fully exposed
to our modernist ideologies of personhood),
the folding of virtuous and righteous theories
has never achieved its highfalutin expectations.
Could cognizance of this limit serve to equip us better on how not to turn away from exposure to the perceived difference in the lived reality of indigenous Amazonian peoples?

Is all thought-becoming-knowledge doomed to failure, in its attempt at wrapping itself around the felt reality of embodied life? Or is it simply just about us taking little account of the differences between thought-made-into-words and the inalienability of felt realities?

Not necessarily in contrastive opposition, therefore, nor in dialectic hostility, but rather more in terms of an intellectual intimacy, rights and virtue double as the ethical in order to inform “how one should live and what kind of person one should be” (Keane 2016:20). Thus culturally and historically, for us in dominant Euro-American ideologies, whenever we deploy and give prominent expression to our rights-centered discourses we concomitantly hold steady to the coupled thought of virtue-centered ethics. When we (no matter how rarely) “figure-ground reverse” (Wagner 1987) our thoughts about virtue, we bring them forth with harlequin-like vigor. As we do so, allowing our untethered theories about rights to recede yet, nevertheless, remain, we actually further substantialize the form of our ethical concepts. Never severed from each other, the melancholic sternest of legal rights and the agile trickery of moral virtue twin their way through our modernist thoughts about ethically lived lives. When made to apply to those living their lives unexposed to or only partially exposed to the effects of the powers pertaining to our modernist rights and virtues, our thoughts unravel and the contrivance of what they bring together as hegemonic and with their status of a truth become more obvious.

The seriousness of the matter hangs depressingly heavy. Worst still that the political installment of this twinning now purveys the dominant global discourses of our state-proclaimed democracies. They do so, of course, without any means to fulfill the integrity of their intent. For while many pay “lip-service” to the ethical idealism of rights and virtues, few actually embrace the tragic horror, suffering, and shame of those whose fear, pain, and humiliation have elicited their concern in the first place. Volumes of juridical judgements and vast vats of righteous moral talk have not slowed down nor stopped the rise of human cruelty. The power to judge with discourses of morality have not explained away what they absolutely need first to have in place before exercising judgment and possession of an imperative moral stance. It is as if only an irreducible “natural” evil or some “innate” capacity for failure can truly explain the modern are of human cruelty.

Take as random example (because they immediately come to mind) the historical events of floggings.

Follow them through nineteenth century chattel labor, Victorian carceral confinement, and mid-twentieth century formal schooling.

We would in each case encounter the slave, the prisoner, and the schoolchild as objects of a sincere well-meaning moral outcry.

Yet such sustained virtuous protest, with its successfully attained juridical laws of prohibition, did not simultaneously dislodge nor openly proclaim as vile that which the floggings consistently sought to achieve. The desire to punish, the eliciting of obedience, and the recognition of the power to command remain with us to this very day. Yes, we no longer flog our workers, nor unjustly beat our prisoners nor suffer our schoolchildren the cane, the belt, or the whip. Attributed to our posturing of realized moral progress, we have given each category its rights and, with heightened vigilance, we protect them as part of our extended ethics of
care. Yet we also continue with strident resistance to insist upon the absolute need to retain the power to punish and the demand for obedience.

When tethered to text and talk, ethical thought invariably finds it difficult to access directly the felt reality of being alive in the world.

But words do not bleed. Its pretense in doing so keeps this pantomime from actually achieving the ideal fulfillment of ethical desires.

We could no doubt oust cruelty from thought, but to banish pain and humiliation from the body seems beyond the capability of thoughts and words.

Left, then, with what thought and words provide for an understanding of felt reality, the rational mind insists upon structuring what it considers to be the difference between a moral and a rationale emotion (Haidt 2003). Carrying reason and intuition into moral judgements, while keeping hold of chaotic emotional irrationality, the questioning unravels.

Can they obey? Can they follow orders? Whenever it confronts them, can they recognize our power? Will our forms of punishment have any effect upon them?

Through such interrogation, the moral emotions of empathy, guilt, anger, shame, and disgust stay with us. For modern rational thought to hitch its desires of manageable forms of order to the compliance of particular moral beings, it must assume and work with the assumption that particular kinds of recognizable subjectivities exists. In all banality, therefore, the so-called problem of the Uncontacted is in us and not, as we might want it to be, with the peoples who do not subscribe to our own contested regimes of truth.

Yet the interrogation continues, circling around and around.

Have we, since first European “contact,” and from our continual exposure to indigenous Amazonian Otherness, achieved any substantive moral progress?

We of course ask this particular question primarily because of our hardheaded rationalist refusal to embrace the indisputability of the Other’s felt reality. Or, better still, because of our inability to think through the undeniableness of our shared reality of being with all perceived forms of Otherness. The “rights” discourse, so embedded in juridical notions of power and modern, believes in subjectivity and frequently ends up with us talking only to ourselves and to all those colonized in our ways of thinking.

At this stage, we still seem to remain oblivious of the potential anthropology has to offer, in the way of enhanced exposure, to multiple ways of being human, perhaps no better exemplified than in the cloistered ways in which we are trained as anthropologist “to do fieldwork.” To do fieldwork in such a style is to deflect the felt humility of actually “being in the field,” fully open to an oftentimes unfamiliar and radical presence. But! You ask yourself: “How else could it be, stuck as we are within the academic regimes of formal knowledge?”
In many convened anthropological panels and symposiums, for example, we variously securitize the reoccurring case of a fundamental principle, pervasive in modern Western epistemologies. It pivots purposely around the deeply invested belief that productivity, like subjectivity, is causal and, therefore, also agential. In this capacity, folded to each other, thoughts about the producer and the subject serve to manifest an irreducible site for “origins” and, thus, the expected space for investigative “exploration” and “discovery” of truth. What we ultimately achieve through such repeated investigations, however, has had mostly to do with further generating more and more questions. With particular reference to our current case, the jury remains out, still questioning, still securitizing, and still deliberating over how and why causality might limit our anthropological understandings about indigenous Amazonian lived realities.

What happens to productivity
as causal determinant
when its explanatory attributes
carry over to exchangeability and consumption?

What, for example, actually occurs
when we attribute to thought
its capacity to produce meanings by
the procedure of exchangeable
or distributive signs?

Indeed, is our acceptance of cultural meanings
(as productive of our thoughts)
too revealingly similar in the way
we as Capitalists often presume
it is the market and not labor
that produces the goods
and services we consume?

Nevertheless, in its role as absentee witness, the jury deliberates above all on how to place under analysis the difficulty of extracting from productive causality its core truth-making power. Here it deliberately turns away from the folded feelings of animate labor to embrace instead its measurable capacities. To pass judgement, to conclude guilt or innocence, the jury first looks for motive, measured in terms of the energized productive forces of life itself. Even beyond the Commodity, the anthropologically powerful thesis of the Gift gains its credibility from relying upon its quantitative rather than qualitative capacity to be productive of moral socialities. Hence the anthropology convened—as judge and jury, as well as witness in its triangulation with the victim and the perpetrator (Leach 1977; Riches 1986)—takes its premise from the identifiable work, long ascribed to the productivity of our discipline, by interiorizing the exteriority of Being. Even in its hyphenated form of M-other, the Two in One permits a metric for and of exchange. First, however, the requirement of severance or the necessity of the cut must take place before the difference and the traversal between Self and Other can begin.

A kind of “reverse anthropology” takes shape, then to follow now the tenants of an Amerindian philosophy of Being, by regarding

The third infancy,
its excess,
its aesthetic of monstrosity,
which some have called
the “assault sorcery of dark shamanism”
(Whitehead and Wright 2004) occurs
in that traditionally recognized space of greed
when one eats what one has killed.

The breakdown of sociality,
In negation of exchange,
the unbecoming of “true” humanness
takes place
not in the killing,
but in the nonfeeding to others
of what must necessarily die.

This takes place visibly between differentiated singular bodies inside of what we in anthropology would regard as the social world of acceptable exchange relations. Nevertheless, in the invisible realm of an already concorporated indigenous spiritual vitality—where neither plant nor animal exists severed from each other, desperately seeking relation—no ends, much less beginnings, of vibrant presence happen. No production, no exchange, no consumption need be performed. No judgement passed. And, moreover, yes indeed, what a scandalous and monstrous set of negations of thought for our anthropological tradition!

Monstrous in its denial of difference. Monstrous in its singularity and sameness. Monstrous even in its exhaustion of the necessary origin point for beginnings, as well as for departures (exhaustive, that is, simply because of the origin point’s repetitions, multiplicities, and ahistoricity). But, additionally, in our veritable anthropological abhorrence (so suspiciously reminiscent of that similarly expected from the modern nation-state), the chimera of the third infancy of the Uncontacted appears as a deformed confluence, peculiarly oblivious of one crucial imperative to our necessary dependence upon difference.

Monstrous congealed apparition does not merely refuse severance and its concomitant divides; it also, by its very unmindfulness, simultaneously rejects the implied necessity for “war” between separated parts. In other words, it apparently denies the combative nature of the dichotomies and dialectics of our thought, a pacific refusal of warring opposites. In our rationalist discourses, we rely upon arriving at truth through “war,” the kind of war that depends upon combatants of logic dividing into opposing parts, hurled against each other, merely to obtain a victory for truth through the defeat of the untrue. In this regard, one could add also that the third infancy denies even the movement of reconciliation and revolution. For in “folded thought” (the encompassment of dichotomies and binaries indicative of dialectical thought), where there are no severed parts standing in opposition to each other, there can be no differences to be reconciled and thus no revolt for which to fight.

No sense of something missing.
No lack. No gap.
No unfulfilled desire.

It is like the harrowing screams heard emitted by conjoined twins: screams released in response to our normative moral judgement and desire to sever their bodily intimacy. Their felt reality from their concorporate infamy whose heartfelt protests we must righteously endure precisely because we seek “to do the right thing.” Indeed, it supposedly “hurts us,” just as much as it will no doubt hurt them. In the re-doubled space of our empathetic thoughts, where we modernists have “given them voice” (without them speaking) and where we hear or think we hear them say, in counter-discourse to the horror of separation:

_We the Uncontacted Peoples, say to you, it is your ethical responsibility not only to pass judgement on our infamous being, but also to act on your verdict of our guilty subjectivities and, therefore, provide us with the rights of a reserved confinement and/or the virtues of care administrated to our now newly acquired modern and precarious autonomy._

In our collective imagination we hear their objection to the attempted severance of our common humanity, but we do so only because we have folded to the thought of our shared commonality the obvious possibility of its transgressive infamy, that is, of them being the monster that might well be oblivious of the imperative to possess a subjectivity precarious enough to warrant our ethical discourse. Hence, to reiterate, in this thick discursive covering of ourselves, in the process of describing the Other, we simultaneously narrate our presence as well as that of the absent other self. Here then, with this doubling, we manifest the sustained site of our anxiously delivered judgement.
Ends of the World

The infamy of the exhausted points of origin, as well as the repetition and the multiplicity of death revisited so many times, are documented and known, as if to exercise simultaneously the power to retain and the power to release. If not the actual life of the deceased, then at least its fleshy replica at the mercy of our materialized thoughts become archived—ahistorical as well as historical in the fold of thought.

Since that searing and unsettling instance— which some might now recast as an “Ends of the World” (Danowski and Viveiros de Castro 2017) moment—

when he staggered dehydrated and emaciated out of his proclaimed “hiding” (Clifford 2013:91) place in the ravines of Deer Creek, California, on August 29th, 1911;

the enigmatic man we have called Ishi has variously been invented and reinvented under many different and contested terms of classification.

Shamefully, as “captive” (ibid.), five years into his confinement among the ostensibly civilized Californians, this nonimmune Yana-speaking “trickster-survivor” (ibid.) succumbed, on March 25th, 1916, to a deadly bout of tuberculous.

It says he was fifty-six years of age when his physical body expired at the University of California hospital.

He had already experienced long exposure to stifling sorrow from loss of loved ones massacred by those greedy for gold which, in 1849, had opened the floodgates for the constant hounding, grounding, and isolation that finally lead to his choreographed life in the museum; of his right to reserved confinement and of virtuous care from his benefactors.

His replica world of the living dead, no true match for his lost indigenous well-being, of the felt touch of Being, in the now, within the grasp of the Other’s warm and trusting embrace.

We claim we see for the first time—in the now-iconic John H. Hogan photograph of Ishi in Oroville jail (Starn 2004:160)—the image of a listless, lonely, and bereaved man. From everything we now know, through our rigorous scholarship on traditional indigenous Americans, it is possible to interpret his haggard demeanor as ultimately brought on from the suffering of social bereavement. At the level of empathetically felt experience, we can imagine him as emotionally deadened. With the intimacy of his loved ones extinguished, Ishi the “refugee” or “emissary” from our intellectually conjured-up Stone-Age, or Ishi the so-called Last Wild Man is, to all intents and purposes, ontologically dead. He experienced his last five years in the museum as a “living exhibit” and “ethnographic source” without the mutually shared feelings...
and thoughts of what he might have called “true humans.” Such social beings depend—we anthropologically declare—upon the moral will each provides for the other, in order to live safely in vibrant bodily and spiritual intimacy. Indeed, it is a concorporality necessary for sustaining the balanced harmony of their distinctive world. As bodies violently disappear and the curation of memories about them slowly recede to the point of a single individual, imagine, then, a people finally “without-world” (Danowski and Viveiros de Castro 2017)—an ends of the world we modernist have long aspired to in order to achieve our ultimate desire for progress.

How much has changed? As we continue relentlessly to fry our own planet in the name of so-called development, is it even worthwhile to ask such a naïve question? In Amazonia, we already know the answer. Little has changed.

As Davi Kopenawa has so astutely noticed by way of his attuned sense of smell and the nervous sensitivity of his Xapiri spirits, the “epidemic fumes” (Kopenawa and Albert 2013:176) of our Capitalist bodies remain the harbinger of death for indigenous peoples. Yet, with regard to our modern sensibilities, we have made much, at least in our intellectual circles, of an advancement in humanitarian reason (Fassin 2012; Moyn 2010). The “fantasy of a global moral community” (Fassin 2012: xii)—elicited by a humanitarianism from within “a mode of governing that concerns the victims of poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and exile” (ibid.: x)—has fed our voracious desire for guarantees in our superiority over those Others characterized by their precarious lives.

Retained within our new modernist definition of governing have been the old principles of command and obedience that successful moral governance has relied upon for its forceful power to punish. This new government for the precarious would have us more concerned with the victims of human rights violations. To reiterate, however, such concern comes in order to exercise our superiority in being able to punish the guilty perpetrators. Hence, for example, the genocide of indigenous peoples appears less a distress for their suffering and more about having identified the normality of our own sympathy for their precarious lives and the essential universality or nature of transferred divine justice, legally practiced by our supposedly evolved and improved governance.

In the humanitarian politics of today, therefore, we look back at the genocidal killing of Ishi’s Yahi kindred not only as resulting from the actions of coldhearted racists but also as a crime against humanity understood as the coextension of self. We pass judgment driven by our sentiments about shared pain but also by our relatively recently acquired beliefs about the impudent illegality of the perpetrators’ violence.

Note, for instance, in the concluding passages of “Appendix D. The Haximu Massacre,” how Bruce Albert asserts, in italics, the view of a moral victory obtained from the legal ruling to characterize and judge the slaughtering of Yanomami as an “attempt at genocide” (Kopenawa and Albert 2013:487) and as “an unprecedented act in the history of Brazilian jurisprudence regarding the massacre of an Indian group” (ibid.). Yet another origin point. Yet another new beginning. Again, the repetition of multiplicities of death. But in the process of documenting Yanomami and Yahi deaths from inside of life, we simultaneously categorize Californian gold diggers and Brazilian garimpeiros (mineral prospectors) as immoral human beings judged as criminals deserving of vindictive punishment from governmentality.

Could it be then
that we continue to be far more concerned
with the infringement of rules
that help to maintain the separation
between the true and the false
(Foucault 1984), that is,
with the transgression of thought
productive of evidence necessary
for establishing the guilt of the perpetrator
and the necessary suffering of the victim.

Could it be
that the conceit of our beliefs
having to do, for example, with
rational government, “rule of law,” and
the universal autonomy of self,
finds it far too difficult to decompose or
inhibit the immanence of an authentic self
in our thoughts.

In other words,
exposure to the reality of felt experiences
by those whom we presume to live precarious lives
is capable of moving us only
in the direction of rights and virtue
precisely because of the doubling process
of self in and by thought.

When the third infamy of the Uncontacted-ness
of indigenous Amazonian peoples manifests
in thoughts about rights and virtue,
as doubled self,
as interiorization of outside,
as redoubled Other repeated as different, it,
this third infamy of their villainy,
“places in immanence an always other or
a Non-self” (Deleuze 1999:81).

Not the lived reality of indigenous Amazonians,
doubled in the folding process,
but us, doubled,
our “original” self,
interiorized, redoubled as Other,
and placed in immanence as non-self.

A conflictual and argumentative exercise of power is briefly and stridently expressed, fading
in figure-ground reversal. Thus, we continue to find it hard to relinquish thoughts of holding
on to the power to punish and our self-centered sense of superiority which, in righteous in-
dignation, allows us to seek out further not simply a justified retribution but also, quite spe-
cifically, our patronizing right to protect the more vulnerable. The infamy of indigenous iso-
lation, of remaining vulnerable to the effects of an illegitimate use of violence presumes, with
conceit, the need, on their part, for our power to protect. Our power to protect is clearly
something we, in their place, would thankfully want and receive. In this regard we should be
prepared to accept the same measure of responsibility—even those among us who would
vote for leaving the Uncontacted alone—for re-educating our thoughts and emotions about
what happens when we are being advocates and guardians of those whom we concede in the
fold of our thoughts to be inferior to us. Without doing so, particularly as engaged anthro-
pologists, the superior status of our strident pleas and collective moral positions will remain
irreconcilable elements of the self-serving chimera of our binary thoughts and reclusive feel-
ings.

Notes

1 The first infamy, as I understand it from an anthropological point of view, refers to those
instances where, within the structural triangle formed by the victim, perpetrator, and witness,
the witness testifies to the actions of the individual perpetrator as warranting the social cate-
gorization of villain (Riches 1986). This villainy of the first infamy, however, takes on a height-
ened grandeur, even a horrific glorious notoriety, that could just as well prove to be heroic.
This possibility occurs by way of an inversion classically explained by the assertion that “the
deviant characteristics of the hero and the criminal are essentially the same” (Leach 1977:27). The lives of
those who live this first infamy, that is, “figures of terror or scandal . . . because of the
abominable remembrances they left behind, the misdeeds credited to them, the respectful horror they have inspired” (Foucault 1979:82) exist, nonetheless, as “false infamy” (ibid.:81). The second infamy, as I understand it, refers specially to individuals judged and categorized as villainous, not so much for their monstrous or horrific deeds, but rather for their ornate extravagant flamboyancy whose crime of “baroque infamy” (Deleuze 1999:121) appears in stark contrast to the legalized simplicity and austerity of other peoples’ lives.

2 My use here of the hyphenated word “Mother” remains tentative. Mother continues to be in experimental mode. I have yet to deploy it rigorously enough to make it any more usable. What I have at present complies with an already-dominant thesis about the origin site and its causal determinant for the presence of all humankind. But I am also giving way to learnt indigenous Amazonian notions about motherhood and their thoughts about the primacy of touch, particularly within the context of our anthropological reference to the so-called couvade. Within this context, I have two folding ideas moving together, back-to-back, and undivided from each other. Given whichever position you adopt, they can be thought of as opposite to each other or not. One position might insist on the unique autonomous existence of the mother separate from that of the child. Mother and child each have their own individual identity. The other position might take up the view that the concorporatedness of the mother and child during pregnancy makes them one. This oneness privileges the meaning of singularity or sameness—no “difference” then between the mother and child at this stage. Carried over into the following stage of the couvade—even after the physical severance of the child from the mother—the nondifference continues into the time-space of what I am categorizing as the M-other. As an anthropological category (in-the-making), it refers to the felt intimacy desired and achieved by the touched and the touching body in its cultural attempt to traverse the interval between self and other.

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