Document Type

Article

Publication Date

4-1985

Abstract

Proponents of Reliabilism must give an account of the conditions under which a belief has been arrived at through a reliable means. In this paper I will sketch just such an account, one which will improve on that of Alvin Goldman1 and others (see Section I). Then, bearing that analysis in mind, I will argue against Reliabilism by refuting the Reliabilist's Thesis (in Section II). Having given Reliabilists the best analysis of reliable belief sources I can develop, I believe that my refutation of Reliabilism should still be of interest, though, since it is resistant to a wide range of alternative analyses.

Document Object Identifier (DOI)

10.5840/monist198568219

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Publication Information

The Monist

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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