Proponents of Reliabilism must give an account of the conditions under which a belief has been arrived at through a reliable means. In this paper I will sketch just such an account, one which will improve on that of Alvin Goldman1 and others (see Section I). Then, bearing that analysis in mind, I will argue against Reliabilism by refuting the Reliabilist's Thesis (in Section II). Having given Reliabilists the best analysis of reliable belief sources I can develop, I believe that my refutation of Reliabilism should still be of interest, though, since it is resistant to a wide range of alternative analyses.
Document Object Identifier (DOI)
Oxford University Press
Luper-Foy, S. (1985). The reliabilist theory of rational belief. The Monist, 68(2), 203-226. doi:10.5840/monist198568219