Document Type
Post-Print
Publication Date
2-2020
Abstract
Securitized loans have lower lead bank shares, but larger shares held by non-CLO (collateralized loan obligation) institutional investors than nonsecuritized loans. The result can largely be explained by their degree of information asymmetry and credit risk. We find that lead banks increase their holdings after a nonsecuritized loan becomes securitized, but they do not reduce financial exposure to securitized facilities during the boom of the CLO market. Furthermore, we find that securitized loans do not perform differently from similar nonsecuritized loans. We conclude that differences in syndicate structure are likely shaped by participants’ investment preference rather than a manifestation of adverse selection.
Identifier
85066851591 (Scopus)
DOI
10.1111/fire.12203
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN
07328516
Repository Citation
Guo, Z., & Zhang, S. (2020). The syndicate structure of securitized corporate loans. Financial Review, 55(1), 61-89. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12203
Publication Information
Financial Review