Title
Reference Point Effects in Legislative Bargaining: Experimental Evidence
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2019
Abstract
Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact on legislative bargaining of cuts versus increases in government spending. Using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic results in significant differences in bargaining outcomes: There are longer delays in reaching agreement with cuts than with increases, along with which legislative types get their proposals passed. These results can be attributed to a change in agents’ reference point in conjunction with differential responses to gains versus losses.
DOI
10.1007/s10683-017-9559-7
Publisher
Springer
Repository Citation
Christiansen, N., & Kagel, J. H. (2019). Reference point effects in legislative bargaining: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 22(3), 735-752. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9559-7
Publication Information
Experimental Evidence