Title
Whose Money Is It Anyway? Ingroups and Distributive Behavior
Document Type
Post-Print
Publication Date
2011
Abstract
Price theory is often used to explain reactions to rebates and subsidies that are meant to encourage charitable giving. This paper describes the results of a laboratory experiment that tests standard price theory alongside an alternative perspective based on research on the perceptions and behavior of ingroups. Using a modified dictator game, we find that rebates that decrease the price of giving only increase amounts given when they are exogenously funded by the experimenters. When rebates are funded by members of one’s group, the decreased price of giving does not lead to increased amounts given. The result suggests that the presence of an ingroup mentality can mediate the relationship between giving and price.
DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.014
Publisher
Elsevier
Repository Citation
Chavanne, D., McCabe, K., & Paganelli, M. P. (2011). Whose money is it anyway? Ingroups and distributive behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 77(1), 31-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.014
Publication Information
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization